Since the 1950s, ethnopolitical conflict has grown as a
source of concern in the international arena. It culminated after the cold
war with the eruption of conflict in the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. A number of conflicts also broke out between ethnically
defined social groups in Africa and south Asia, in the postcommunist
states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, as well as in Western Europe.
1 The reigning assumption that ethnic conflict was a
vestige of the primitive past was revised and eventually abandoned,
particularly in view of the spread of ethnic conflict to less developed
regions. This led to increased media coverage and public awareness of
ethnic issues; more importantly, academic research on ethnic conflict and
its resolution mushroomed. 2
Ethnic mobilization among minority populations in
multiethnic states has often led to demands for self-rule (territorial
autonomy) or for outright secession. 3 Especially in defined geographical areas where
minorities are compactly settled, the creation of a separate state is a
feasible goal and territorial control becomes a chief issue of conflict.
In situations in which ethnic groups live in overlapping settlement
patterns, such demands are less feasible and are made more infrequently,
making control over or influence in the central government the most
[End Page 245] contentious issue. 4 Indeed, Fearon and Laitin find "regional
concentration of minority group (a) powerful and robust factor. . .
far more likely to see large-scale ethnic violence than urban or
widely dispersed minorities." 5
Many theorists have found that solutions involving
regional autonomy are effective in dealing with ethnic conflict. Ted Gurr,
for example, has argued that "negotiated regional autonomy has proved to
be an effective antidote for ethnopolitical wars of secession in Western
and Third World States." 6 Likewise, Kjell-Åke Nordquist has observed that
creating an autonomy--"a self-governing intra-state region--as a
conflict-solving mechanism in an internal armed conflict is both a
theoretical and, very often, a practical option for the parties in such
conflicts." 7 Regional autonomy implies the introduction of
ethnoterritoriality--territorial control linked to ethnicity. It occurs
either when a region is explicitly created as a homeland for an ethnic
group or when a minority group constitutes a large majority of the
population of an autonomous state structure and perceives it as its own.
Central governments are nevertheless almost universally
reluctant to accede to demands for autonomy for several reasons. First and
foremost, they fear that granting territorial autonomy to a minority group
would be merely the first step toward the eventual secession of the
region. Second, granting autonomy to one region may be perceived as
discrimination against other inhabitants or groups. 8 Third, autonomy increases the risk of intervention
by a foreign state affiliated with the [End Page 246] specific
minority population. 9 In spite of such reservations, however, an
increasing number of ethnopolitical conflicts over territory have been
settled by compromises involving regional autonomy, such as the provision
of autonomy to the Basques of Spain in 1980, the Miskitos of Nicaragua in
1990, the Nagas in India in 1972, and the Afars in Ethiopia in 1977. The
popularity of autonomy as a solution undoubtedly stems from its being one
of the few conceivable compromise solutions in conflicts over the
administrative control of a specific territory. Indeed, as will be
discussed further, autonomy represents a compromise on the issue of state
sovereignty itself.
Advocates of ethnofederalism argue that autonomy
solutions are effective conflict-resolving mechanisms and that further
federalization of multiethnic states along ethnic lines will help prevent
ethnic conflict. In some of the literature, ethnofederalism has been
characterized as what David Meyer terms a "cure-all prescription" for
ethnic tensions. 10 There is, however, considerable reason to argue
that the institution of territorial autonomy may be conducive not to
interethnic peace and cooperation but rather may foster ethnic
mobilization, increased secessionism, and even armed conflict. Whereas the
merits of federalism were widely lauded in the literature from the 1960s
to 1990, developments since then have generated doubt that ethnofederal
solutions can effectively prevent ethnic conflict. Several researchers
have noted--usually in passing--how federal structures may be
counterproductive under certain circumstances. 11 Yet no systematic inquiry has been made into how
and why federal structures, designed to mitigate centrifugal forces,
instead may end up strengthening them. This article outlines a rudimentary
theoretical framework that may explain why ethnofederal constructs,
specifically territorial autonomy, may cause rather than prevent conflict.
After presenting the logical case against territorial autonomy, the
specific case of the South Caucasus and in particular the post-1991
[End Page 247] developments in the Republic of Georgia will be
analyzed. Georgia contains five compactly settled minorities, three of
which were autonomous at independence; it presents an opportunity to
compare developments among minorities with different status. Moreover,
given Georgia's small size, the similarities in political development at
the central level and its effect on minorities, and an analogous
international context, the five cases are comparable.
Theoretical Aspects on Autonomy
A number of authors have attributed the collapse of three
communist federations--Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet
Union--to their ethnofederal character. 12 In each case, the weakening of the central state
structure and its eventual dissolution were intimately related to the
centrifugal policies pursued by powerful national elites in the ethnically
defined component republics. In Yugoslavia, Slovenian and Croatian demands
for a national restructuring along confederal lines was the starting point
of its demise; in the former Soviet Union, centrifugal tendencies in the
Baltic republics, the Caucasus, and Russia itself contributed
significantly to its dissolution. However, literature on federalism and
ethnopolitical conflict has not explored this problem at a lower level of
analysis--that of autonomous regions. Indeed, Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union were federal states whose component republics technically were on
equal footing and had only the nonterritorial, nonethnic federal center
above them. The federal center was legitimized by the civic, ideological
identity of the state. (Although it has been argued that the Soviet Union
was dominated by ethnic Russians and Yugoslavia by ethnic Serbs, the
extent of this assertion has been credibly challenged. After all, Stalin
was a Georgian, Nikita Khrushchev a Ukrainian, and Marshal Tito a Croat.)
The case of autonomous regions is different. As one or several specific
minority regions have been granted autonomy, segregating them from the
rest of the country, the legitimacy of the central government increasingly
rests on an ethnic and territorial basis--the nonautomonous areas,
practically meaning the majority ethnic group in the country.
Autonomy in a political and legal context refers to the
power of social institutions to "regulate their own affairs by enacting
legal rules." In [End Page 248] international law, autonomy is
taken to mean that "parts of the state's territory are authorized to
govern themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but
without constituting a state of their own." 13 This refers to territorial autonomy, which gives
an ethnic group self-rule--political authority over a certain
territory--in order to govern its internal affairs to a determined extent.
Cultural autonomy, by contrast, is a scheme whereby members of
particular ethnic communities are endowed with specific rights and duties
in relation to the government. This is also used in certain countries for
religious communities--in Israel for Muslims and Christians and in India
for Muslims. Members of particular groups may also be given special rights
to preserve their culture and language, often through the institution of
native language schools for minorities. Cultural autonomy is not
territorially based; it may still, nevertheless, be either individually or
group based and either voluntary or compulsory. 14 Both forms of autonomy must be grounded in the
legal system of the particular country and as such form a part of that
state's system of government. 15 In a broader sense, autonomy can be defined as
"the granting of internal self-government to a region or group of persons,
thus recognizing a partial independence from the influence of the national
or central government," which can be determined "by the degree of actual
as well as formal independence enjoyed by the autonomous entity in its
political decision-making process." 16 Territorial autonomy is usually considered
synonymous with "self-government" as stated in the UN Charter--free of
references to sovereignty or independence--thereby avoiding automatic
conflict with the territorial integrity of states. 17 Cultural autonomy does not carry the far-reaching
consequences implicit in territorial autonomy: territory and ethnicity are
not linked, there is no creation of statelike institutions. Therefore,
unless otherwise specified, this article will use the term autonomy to
refer to territorial autonomy.
Autonomy Regimes in the Literature:
Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of autonomy regimes are relatively well
known. Given the multitude of ethnic groups in the world, advocates of
autonomy [End Page 249] argue that group rights need to be
recognized below the state level in order to avoid the proliferation of
hundreds of additional states. The traditional structure of the
international system is already threatened by the relative reduction of
the role of states in international affairs by the increasing importance
of substate entities such as ethnic, national, or religious groups, as
well as by suprastate entities such as regional and international
organizations. Autonomy is basically the only possible compromise to
balance the conflicting territorial interests of the group and the state;
moreover, the flexibility inherent in the concept of autonomy, as it may
be tailored to each particular situation, enhances the ability to reduce
ethnic tensions. Autonomy, therefore, may work both to prevent and to
resolve ethnic conflict.
Autonomy regimes, however, by protecting diversity,
necessarily rely on the assumption that differences and their
institutionalization enrich the world more than they endanger it.
According to Steiner: "Autonomy regimes of ethnic minorities defend
cultural survival rights in counteracting [the trend toward homogenization
that has accompanied Western development]." 18 Indeed, the international system seems to be
moving toward a system of norms that protects difference by pressuring
states into creating autonomy regimes for minorities. But such norms raise
obvious and serious issues: "The ideal in the human rights movement of
preserving difference cannot so readily be bent to support the creation of
autonomy regimes." 19 Whereas such regimes are based on the norm of
equal protection, autonomy schemes imply forms of institutionalized
separateness that violate the very norm of equal protection in that they
"explicitly discriminate among groups on grounds of religion, language,
race, or national origin . . . [and thereby] drive home the lesson that
socioeconomic life and career turn on ethnic bonds." Furthermore, autonomy
regimes not only preserve but also lock into place historical differences
between groups; it is difficult to disagree with the claim that "a state
composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble more a museum of
social and cultural antiquities than any human rights ideal." 20
Other authors have argued that autonomy, by involving the
differential treatment of a certain group, may result in protests by other
groups and thus lead to conflict rather than preventing it. 21 A unitary state, by contrast, through
integration--but with mechanisms for the full respect [End Page
250] of individual human rights as opposed to collective
rights--provides equal opportunities and identical rules for all citizens
of the state, irrespective of color, ethnicity, or religion. The unitary
state thereby counteracts the polarization around such issues that would
arise from solutions such as autonomy or federalism. Autonomy may in fact
isolate the minority and prevent its members from political or economic
participation in the larger sphere of the state. Accordingly, it makes
dialogue between groups within the society difficult, alienates component
groups from one another, and leads to segregation. 22 Lyck's analysis of the Faroe Islands' autonomy in
Denmark illustrates one of the negative effects of autonomy--that it led
the state to feel less responsible for the development of the region.
23 The general sentiment of the literature is that
the advantages of autonomy nevertheless supersede its possible drawbacks.
This can only occur, however, if the autonomy is designed, created, and
maintained with necessary safeguards providing mechanisms to ensure the
regulation of possible future conflicts and for eventual alterations of
the autonomy's status. Autonomy is not automatically a recipe for success;
to the contrary, it is a solution that brings a number of dangers and
risks.
Autonomy and Sovereignty
Autonomous regions, by their very nature, are conducive
to secessionism. The relationship between the central government of a
state and an autonomous region resembles neither the horizontal
relationship between sovereign states nor the vertical relationship
between a state and its citizenry, regardless of whether they be organized
politically along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines. When a central
government grants autonomy to a given region, it acknowledges the
devolution of a certain portion of its own sovereignty to the
representatives of that region's population; the central government
concedes that it no longer has unlimited jurisdiction over the
territory--herein lies the essence of autonomy. At the same time, however,
the central government emphasizes the subordination of the autonomous
region to itself in that the existence of the latter in no way compromises
its own territorial integrity. Hence, the relationship between the two
units can be described as diagonal; an autonomous region can be conceived
of as a state within a state, even if neither party officially
acknowledges it. [End Page 251]
Autonomous regions are typically constructed in the
manner of states--with executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, as
well as statelike symbols such as flags and coats-of-arms. In fact,
autonomies may share most attributes of a state but never by definition
the primary attribute--complete sovereignty. An autonomous region, while
often claiming sovereignty, is by definition a part of a sovereign
state; the sovereignty of the autonomy is always partial, confined to
certain determined spheres such as culture and economy. Yet, the
institution of an autonomous region nonetheless implies that the state
itself is no longer completely sovereign; it has agreed to share its
sovereignty with the autonomous region--albeit on an unequal basis. One
extreme example, the Republic of Bashkortostan, is defined as "a sovereign
state within the Russian Federation." The definition may seem a
contradiction in terms, but it exemplifies the variety of tailored
solutions available for navigating contending claims over sovereignty.
24
That there is no blueprint for the conduct of relations
between an autonomous region and the central government contributes to the
usefulness of autonomy as a mechanism of conflict resolution or
prevention--it is flexible and adaptable to the specific grievances of a
specific minority. Within the "society" of independent and sovereign
states, relations between all members are based on certain generally
accepted principles, such as the equality of states, noninterference, and
the inviolability of borders. The increasing universality of principles of
human rights, and of democratic government are examples of growing but not
yet fully accepted rules governing state-citizen relations. The
relationship between a central government and its autonomous region(s)
shares elements of both of these relationships.
Autonomy and Secessionism
The institution of autonomous regions is conducive to
secessionism because institutionalizing and promoting the separate
identity of a titular group increases that group's cohesion and
willingness to act, and establishing political institutions
increases the capacity of that group to act. 25[End Page 252] Autonomy affects each of the
following areas: borders, group identity, state institutions, leadership,
mass media, and external support.
Borders
An integral characteristic of autonomous regions is that
they have recognized and clearly delimited borders--which in the Soviet
case appeared on most maps of the union. The importance of borders is
emphasized by Benedict Anderson in his classic work Imagined
Communities and Thongchai Winichakul in his recent work Siam
Mapped. Winichakul refers to Southeast Asia as "a map anticipated
spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for,
rather than a model of, what it purported to represent . . . it had become
a real instrument to concretize projections on the earth's surface. A map
was now necessary for the new administration to back up their claims. . .
." 26 Anderson points to the special importance of what
he terms the "map-as-logo," a map on which place names, rivers, mountains,
and neighbors all disappear and only the borders of the territory in
question remain; the map is hence "pure sign, no longer compass to the
world." As he demonstrates, the map in this format can then be used for
"transfer to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook
covers . . . instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map
penetrated deep into the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem
for the anticolonial nationalisms being born." 27 The same process occurred in the former Soviet
Union with respect to its component entities. The maps--with the borders
and shapes of the individual republics, autonomous republics, and
autonomous regions--were long in existence by the 1980s and had been so
for as long as most inhabitants could remember. As in Anderson's example,
these maps and borders antedated spatial realities since the internal
borders of the Soviet Union carried little historical and practical
importance. For autonomous minorities, however, the republic or region's
shape, map, or borders had significant symbolic importance, being a given
for most of its inhabitants. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, this
symbol became an important rallying point and an important tool in the
hands of political entrepreneurs. On a more practical note, the task of
delimiting the borders of the imagined new state was already completed, an
obvious advantage over the situation of nonautonomous minorities. [End
Page 253]
Group Identity
Several researchers have recognized the importance of
autonomous entities in sustaining, promoting, and enhancing group identity
and cohesion. Gurr, for example, notes that "the capacity for collective
action is relatively high [in the case of] groups that control an
autonomous regional government." 28 The primary instrument for the promotion of ethnic
identity is the education system. According to Dmitry Gorenburg:
Instilling a strong sense of ethnic community
in individuals requires them to be exposed early and frequently to
information about their ethnic identity. In the context of Soviet
nationalities policy, this exposure came primarily through the education
system. By establishing separate systems of native language education
for most of the minority ethnic groups that had their own
ethno-territorial administrative units, the Soviet government in effect
created an institution dedicated to instilling a common and separate
identity among the students . . . the identity was further reinforced in
the classroom, where titular students were taught the culture and
history of their ancestors, who were portrayed as having a direct
genetic link with the members of the modern ethnic group. 29
State Institutions
Autonomous regions typically possess statelike
institutions that can be crucial factors in promoting ethnic mobilization.
Unlike nonautonomous minorities, minorities in autonomous regions
typically have governments and parliaments that act as legitimate
representatives of their ethnic constituencies and constitute legitimate
decision-making bodies. Parliaments can pass language laws, refuse to
accept legislation from the central government, and issue declarations of
sovereignty and independence. A minority with autonomous status hence has
institutions for challenging state authorities in general and its specific
policies and actions in particular. A minority lacking such institutions,
by contrast, would find mounting such a challenge more difficult. Popular
movements, petitions, and demonstrations may in certain contexts be
effective ways to influence state policy; however, even organizing such
shows of dismay are considerably easier if autonomous structures already
exist. Beyond increasing the sense of legitimacy of the actions taken by
the minority, decision-making structures are crucial in any attempt to
raise ethnopolitical demands from the level of quiet dissatisfaction to
that of direct action. As Meyer notes, autonomy "institutes a
stratification of authority, subordinating administrative personnel into a
[End Page 254] defined hierarchy"; moreover, it "establishes
standard operating procedures and positive sanctions for the execution of
its bureaucratic roles, and negative sanctions for poor performance,
however that is defined by the Autonomous Structure leadership." 30 In other words, the existence of a nationalist
leadership in the autonomous structure often compels the entire
bureaucracy to follow suit and adopt a more nationalist profile.
Leadership
The very fact that autonomous regions have governments
also means that they have leaders--essential to any process of
mobilization. The position of the leadership of an autonomous region,
having a relatively strong base on which to stand, is therefore
institutionalized in a manner that the leadership of a regular popular
national movement cannot be. As Meyer suggests, autonomy gives "a stamp of
legitimacy to its executives and to the rule of the titular ethnic group,"
and "facilitates improved cohesion of various ethno-politically mobilizing
nationalists by providing a single institution around which they can
unite." 31 Institutionalization also formalizes rules for
succession, helping ensure that a "national struggle" could withstand a
change in leadership. The existence of autonomous structures, especially
in regions where the titular ethnic group is the demographic majority,
also increases the likelihood of politicians promoting ethnic mobilization
to further their own ambitions. Since the institution of autonomy is the
source of power for leading regional elites, the leadership has a vested
interest in increasing their region's level of self-government; elite
power is positively correlated with the level of autonomy. Consequently,
the elite has a vested interest in maintaining high nationalist sentiment
among the population, thereby ensuring pressure from below to sustain or
enhance the level of autonomy.
Mass Media
Governmental authorities in autonomous regions also often
control the mass media--including television, radio stations, and
newspapers. Accordingly, these authorities not only can influence the
attitudes of the population in the long term through the education system,
but often can influence the population directly through news coverage and
depiction of events in media--plainly speaking, propaganda--and speed up
the process of ethnic mobilization. [End Page 255]
External Support
The international political (and perhaps legal) standing
of an autonomous minority is superior to that of a nonautonomous minority
because, as previously mentioned, autonomous minorities possess
institutions and the granting of autonomy entails the recognition by the
state of the devolution of its sovereignty. Therefore, external support is
more likely to be forthcoming for an autonomous minority since there is an
institution in place to which funds and other types of support can be
channeled.
As enumerated, there are a multitude of factors by which
autonomy could hinder attempts to create interethnic harmony and peace.
Even though the practical implications of this proposition, if proven
correct, are large, they would not necessarily imply that autonomy is an
unworkable construct to be avoided at all cost. In particular, it is
necessary to draw the important distinction between postconflict
situations and those in which armed conflict has not occurred. Where there
is armed conflict, especially if it is over territory, it may be
unavoidable to take territorial claims into account. Where a minority
group has de facto control of a portion of territory, it is often
unrealistic to assume it will surrender claims to any of its authority
over that territory. In such situations, territorial autonomy, though
imperfect and potentially hazardous, may be the only available or feasible
compromise. Where no armed clashes have occurred between ethnically
defined groups, however, it is both desirable and practicable to avoid the
ethnicization of territory through the institution of autonomy. Where
there is still a possibility of supporting cross-cutting identities and
discouraging the linking of territory to ethnicity, this should be done,
and ethnofederal solutions should be avoided.
Autonomy and Rival Explanations
Before moving to a deeper analysis of the regional
developments, it is necessary to address several critics' potential
challenges--that the analysis of autonomy in the former Soviet context is
misplaced, given that true autonomy did not exist; a credible argument
could even be made that for most practical purposes, the Soviet Union
differed little from a unitary state. However, this would miss the
point--one of the mechanisms through which autonomy operates with relation
to conflict is in the realms of institutional structure and symbols.
Moreover, in certain realms such as education and, equally important, the
creation of national cadres and elites, federal structure was functional
throughout [End Page 256] the Soviet era even though real political
autonomy was absent. As Carol Skalnik Leff has argued with reference to
the union republic level in the former Yugoslavia and USSR, ethnofederal
institutional arrangements during the time of transition took on in
practice the role they were earlier accorded on paper: "It is in that
context that the bargaining environment for ethnonational disputes clearly
differs from that of unitary multinational states: in the course of
political opening, federal structures provide republic-level political
bases for challenges to the existing political order and offer distinctive
opportunities to key actors in the transition." 32 This statement, although written in the context of
union republics under a nonterritorial federal center, is equally valid
for the case of autonomous regions.
Another objection that can be preempted would be the
assertion that the minorities that were initially granted autonomy in the
first place were those minorities with greater grievances and in a higher
degree of conflict with their central government. After all, autonomy is
normally granted in response to ethnic demands; groups that have expressed
such demands are arguably more likely to experience renewed secessionism
than minorities that have not voiced such claims in the past. However, the
more than thirty autonomous regions that were created in the Soviet Union
in the 1920s and 1930s were not established as a result of ethnic demands.
The very structure of the Soviet state was built on ethnic federalism;
minority groups were mapped, evaluated, and assigned a certain status,
often according to the whims of the highest decision makers, notably
Stalin himself. The full explanation as to why certain minorities received
autonomy and others did not may never be available; it is relatively safe
to argue, however, that the decisions had little to do with actual ethnic
demands.
At the end of the Soviet era in the three South Caucasian
republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, there were nine compactly
settled minorities. 33 Four had an autonomous status: the Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and the South Ossetians in Georgia held
autonomous regions; and the Abkhaz and Ajars in Georgia held autonomous
republics with a higher level of self-determination within the Soviet
state structure. The nonautonomous minorities were the Azeris of Armenia,
the Azeris of Georgia, the Armenians of Georgia, [End Page 257] and
the Lezgins and Talysh of Azerbaijan. 34 In the upheaval of the late Soviet years and
during the transition to independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,
three violent ethnic conflicts broke out, all between central governments
and autonomous minorities. This outcome, upon first reflection,
seems counterintuitive because in a region where both autonomous and
nonautonomous minorities exist, one logically would assume that
nonautonomous minorities would have more grievances and therefore would be
more likely to challenge the central government than those enjoying
autonomous status. Nonautonomous minorities would tend to demand a status
similar to that enjoyed by those already endowed with autonomy, whereas
autonomous minorities would likely tend to be more satisfied with their
current status. However, the pattern of conflict in the South Caucasus of
the late 1980s and early 1990s did not follow such logic. From the start
of the process of political liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev in
1986, no broad-based, well-organized, or credible separatist movement
emerged among any of the five nonautonomous minorities, whereas all four
autonomous minorities displayed high levels of separatism, with all but
one case (Ajaria) ending in armed conflict. Is this apparent
correspondence spurious or is it indicative of a causal link between
autonomy and conflict? The literature on the causes of ethnic conflict
suggests that a wide variety of factors play a role in explaining the
occurrence of conflict or the lack thereof. To prove that autonomy was
indeed decisive, it must be isolated from other factors--which range from
cultural differences over discrimination and geographic, topographic, and
economic conditions to external factors.
Amid this multitude of explanatory factors, it should be
noted that the South Caucasus displays certain specific characteristics
that facilitate the isolation of autonomy as a root cause of conflict.
First, the Caucasian republics' membership in the Soviet Union brought
with it similar levels of both political freedom and discrimination. This
also held true for the different minority populations in the individual
republics. Although minorities such as Armenians in Azerbaijan or Abkhaz
in Georgia claim to have suffered more discrimination than other groups,
this allegation and its political implications must be put in proper
perspective. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state that showed little
respect for the human or political rights of its citizens, thereby making
it difficult to determine whether specific groups or the entire population
were the targets of state abuse. Who was to blame for [End Page
258] discrimination--the republics or the central Soviet state?
Blaming republican governments would actually be somewhat illogical if
major decisions were taken in Moscow; regardless, discrimination is
largely a matter of perception. It is ultimately irrelevant in assessing
the likelihood that conflict will ensue whether discrimination has
actually taken place; what matters is whether there is the
perception of discrimination. While there have been exceptions to
this, most notably in the case of the "repressed peoples" deported under
genocidal conditions during the Second World War, no population group
present in the South Caucasus today was ever subjected to such treatment.
35 And perceptions of discrimination were entertained
by elites in autonomous regions, whereas no comparable elite existed to do
so for nonautonomous minorities. In terms of geography, all minorities in
this study were located in border regions of their respective republics,
contiguous with ethnolinguistically related peoples living across the
border. All minorities are comparable in terms of size and are all vastly
inferior numerically to the titular population of the state they inhabit.
Moroever, given the relatively small geographic size of the South Caucasus
and the existence of equally "porous" Soviet military installations in the
three republics during the period of transition from communism, the
availability of weapons was comparable for all minorities. Indeed, the
entire region is saturated with arms, another factor that can be treated
as a parameter in the study. Hence, the specifics of the Caucasian
situation permits the elimination from the study of those factors on which
all cases have equal scores.
Yet given the diversity of factors cited in the
literature that have a bearing on the likelihood of ethnopolitical
conflict, there are many factors besides autonomy that can potentially
account for the variation in outcome. The factors pertinent to the study
include the extent of cultural differences between the minority group and
the titular population of the state; whether the national conception of
the state was civic or ethnic in character (the latter being less
conducive to accommodation); the intensity of past conflict and
mythification thereof; the topography of the minority's region, that is,
the existence of rough terrain, particularly mountains; 36 whether the minority demographically dominated the
region it inhabits; whether minority populations had ethnic kin in [End
Page 259] neighboring countries; whether the minority-populated region
was economically viable; whether a radical leadership existed among the
minority population; and finally, whether there was external support for
the minority. Several of these factors interplay with autonomy; indeed,
for reasons described earlier, autonomy increases the likelihood of
mythification of past conflicts as well as of radical leadership. All the
factors listed above can be formulated as propositions that are expected
to correlate positively with the level of ethnic mobilization and hence
also with the likelihood of a minority challenge to the central
government--and hence a priori with the level of conflict. 37
One can obtain a rough indication of the role played by
autonomy by comparing its correlation with conflict with its correlation
with other factors. Although the number of cases and number of independent
variables in this study precludes any statistically significant outcome,
contrasting the presence of various factors, including autonomy, with the
existence or not of conflict in the given case, provides a measure of the
explanatory value of the possible causal factor in question. In
statistical terms, this corresponds to the Fisher Exact Probability Test,
a technique for analyzing discrete data with small samples. This is done,
first, by assigning a straightforward score of "yes" or "no" to each case
on the occurrence of conflict--Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South
Ossetia are cases in which an armed conflict has occurred, whereas the
other six are not. Then, in the same manner, a score of "yes" or "no" is
assigned to each case for each possible causal factor. The explanatory
value of each factor is then assessed by viewing its correlation with the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of conflict. In case of a perfect covariation,
all areas of "no conflict" would have a "no" score on the factor in
question, and cases of conflict would all have a "yes" score.
Table 1 summarizes the findings of this overview of causal
factors. A case is considered as supporting the proposition if a "no"
score on the factor is matched by a "no" score on the occurrence of
conflict, or if a "yes" score on the factor is matched by a "yes" score on
the occurrence of conflict. 38[End Page 260]
Of the ten possible causal factors surveyed, none
displays a full correlation. The explanatory value of three factors is
supported in seven of nine cases, but only one indicator--autonomy--is
supported by eight of the nine cases. Only the case of Ajaria (in Georgia)
does not support the proposition that autonomy is a factor leading to
conflict; it represents a case of an autonomous region that had not
experienced armed conflict with its central government. This finding does
not jeopardize the argument made in this study; as mentioned earlier,
autonomy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor for conflict to
take place. Indeed, of the more than one dozen autonomous republics in the
Russian Federation, only one--Chechnya--has engaged in armed conflict with
Russia since the political liberalization of the USSR began in the late
1980s.
This brief survey strengthens the basis of the
theoretical argument previously presented, since autonomy more than any
other factor mentioned in the literature accounts for the emergence of
ethnic conflict in the Caucasus. This, however, does not prove that
autonomy indeed acts as a cause of ethnic conflict. Perhaps, given the
insufficient number of cases for a statistically satisfactory result, the
correlation could be spurious. Moreover, this survey does not add to our
understanding of the mechanisms that in practice make autonomy a conflict
factor; nor does it explain under which circumstances, and in
interrelation to which other factors, autonomy becomes a contributing
factor to ethnopolitical conflict. It is therefore important to further
investigate the available empirical record. [End Page 261]
Autonomy in Practice: Conflicts in Georgia,
1987-2000
The comparability of the nine cases in the brief survey
of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia is hampered by the divergent political
and economic developments in these three countries. General governmental
policies, turmoil at the central level, and the foreign relations of any
individual state may have affected its policies toward minorities. While a
detailed study of all nine cases is beyond the scope of this article, it
is both expedient and useful to focus on Georgia, which displays the full
range of variations found in this study. Georgia still includes five
compactly settled minorities; the Ajars, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians
have held autonomous areas since the 1920s, whereas the Armenians and
Azeris have never had any autonomy. The following analysis will cover
events from 1987--when the first movements toward dissociation with the
Soviet Union emerged in Georgia--to 2000. During this period, armed
conflict occurred in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ajaria has maintained a
high level of autonomy, involving a sometimes high level of
political but not armed conflict with the government of
Georgia. The Armenian minority in the Javakheti region has occasionally
expressed dissatisfaction with its situation, but has not seen any major
ethnic mobilization. Finally, the Azeri minority has been almost
completely quiet during this period.
The most violent armed conflict in Georgia took place in
Abkhazia, where the separatist leadership managed to secure control over
the entire territory, even though the ethnic Abkhaz formed less than 2
percent of Georgia's population and only 17 percent of the population of
their own autonomous region. A similar phenomenon, although to a lesser
degree, occurred in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, where the
Ossetians constituted two-thirds of the population but only numbered
sixty-seven thousand; yet their separatist leadership still managed to
gain control of half the territory. How could such developments have taken
place in these two regions especially as the Georgian government was
adamantly opposed to secession and fought it aggressively?
By contrast, even though political observers for a decade
warned of armed conflict involving the Javakheti Armenians, no such
conflict occurred, in spite of existing tensions. In fact, among the six
cases in which no conflict took place, Javakheti's scores indicated the
highest propensity for conflict (seven indicative factors, compared with
five indicators for Ajaria, four indicators in three other cases, and
three factors in the case of the Talysh of Azerbaijan). Javakheti's scores
differed from those of Abkhazia or South Ossetia only by its lack
of autonomy. [End Page 262] Why did a credible and strong
separatist movement not emerge in Javakheti, as indicators would show?
Finally, Ajaria represents the only case of an autonomous
region in the South Caucasus not engaging in violent conflict with its
central government. Though few other indicators pointed to a high risk of
conflict there, Ajaria had experienced many of the same circumstances that
led to conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. How then did the Ajars
avoid armed conflict?
These four cases, as well as the Azeris, will be examined
in further detail.
Abkhazia: The Impossible Happening
The conflict in Abkhazia occurred against all odds.
39 In 1989, the ethnic Abkhaz formed only 17 percent
of the ASSR population of half a million, while Georgians accounted for 45
percent, Armenians 14 percent, and Russians 12 percent. Interethnic
tensions had erupted briefly in 1978 and 1988 but remained limited. In
June 1989, however, ethnic clashes in the capital Sukhumi left a dozen
dead and hundreds wounded. 40 Despite these incidents, Abkhazia was relatively
calm during the rule of the nationalist politician Zviad Gamsakhurdia in
1990-92, whereas all other minorities in Georgia--including the Ossetians,
Armenians, Ajars, and Azeris--had uneasy relations with the center. It was
after Gamsakhurdia's fall from power in early 1992 that tensions
began heating up between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.
Historian Vladislav Ardzinba was elected chair of the
Abkhaz Supreme Soviet in December 1990. Soon after, a new electoral law
was adopted, providing for a sixty-five-seat parliament. Twenty-eight
seats were reserved for the Abkhaz, twenty-six for Georgians, and the
remainder were distributed among the Armenians, Russians, and Greeks.
Hence, despite only constituting 17 percent of the population, the Abkhaz
controlled 43 percent of the parliamentary seats. A parliament was elected
along these lines in fall 1991 amid unrest in Tbilisi that eventually
brought down the Gamsakhurdia regime, but it soon split into two
factions--an Abkhaz-led group composed mostly of non-Georgian deputies and
the Georgian group. The main dispute between the factions occured over the
need for two-thirds majority on "important" issues that had been defined
only vaguely in the electoral code. It was resisted by the Abkhaz-led
group but insisted upon by the Georgians, who saw the measure as a
guarantor of their position. [End Page 263]
Prior to the election of the parliament, tensions arose
over a Moscow-sponsored referendum on a new treaty to restructure the
Soviet Union. Whereas the Georgian government, seeking to secede, refused
to hold the referendum, it was held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where
the Georgian population loyal to Tbilisi boycotted the vote. Developments
of a regional nature also took place in Abkhazia, when in November Sukhumi
hosted a congress of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (where Ossetians and
North Caucasian peoples including the Chechens were represented) that
adopted a document establishing a "Confederative Union of Mountain Peoples
of the Caucasus". Throughout 1991, Abkhazia continued to distance itself
increasingly from Georgia by building up a political system enshrining the
dominance of the Abkhaz ethnic group and by forging ethnic coalitions both
in Abkhazia (with Armenians and Russians) and regionally (with north
Caucasian peoples). These centrifugal developments drew attention in
Tbilisi, and in early summer 1992, a high-level Georgian delegation
traveled to Sukhumi to discuss the division of powers between Tbilisi and
Sukhumi, but the talks led nowhere. 41 As tensions rose between the two sides, the Abkhaz
leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, soon declared Abkhazia "strong enough to fight
Georgia," a somewhat surprising statement given the Abkhaz's demographic
position and lack of military equipment or training. 42 Nonetheless, that same summer, Abkhazia reinstated
its 1925 constitution defining it as an independent state. 43
This ethnopolitical activity at the helm of the Abkhaz
ASSR would have been impossible without ethnic Abkhaz domination of
political life in the autonomous republic. As the titular nationality, the
Abkhaz benefited from affirmative action policies that ensured full
control over republican institutions despite their vast numerical
inferiority. In addition to the quota of seats in the republican
parliament reserved for ethnic Abkhaz, in practice, more than two-thirds
of government ministers and local communist party department heads were
also ethnic Abkhaz. 44 Hence by forming alliances with segments of the
Russian and Armenian populations, guaranteeing control over the
parliament, the Abkhaz could dominate the political development of the
republic and [End Page 264] guide policy toward the central
government in Tbilisi against the wishes of the Georgian plurality. The
existence of autonomous structures was a sine qua non for the Abkhaz to
control the political institutions and thereby the territory of Abkhazia,
compensating for their weak demographic status.
Despite controlling these republican structures, the
challenge of establishing an independent Abkhazia was daunting. Achieving
a peaceful secession appeared unlikely, particularly given the violent
Georgian response to Ossetian separatism. Moreover, the Abkhaz not only
had to contend with the resources mobilized by the entire Georgian state,
but also had to deal with the many ethnic Georgians loyal to Tbilisi
living in Abkhazia. Given that the prospect of achieving independence by
arms must have seemed far-fetched, the confidence displayed by Abkhaz
authorities during summer 1992 looks perplexing.
The events that followed, however, shed some light on the
calculations that may have underlain their confidence. Poorly controlled
and disciplined Georgian paramilitary forces attacked Abkhazia in
mid-August, occupying Sukhumi and driving back the Abkhaz formations to
the Russian border. Yet the Abkhaz counterattacked in early October,
suddenly equipped with heavy armaments, help from North Caucasian
volunteers, and Russian air support. Sukhumi was eventually recaptured by
Abkhaz forces in September 1993, and virtually all Georgians living in
Abkhazia were evicted. An unstable cease-fire has essentially held since
late 1993, interrupted in early 1994 and during May 1998. 45 The sudden increase in ethnopolitical
assertiveness in Abkhazia in 1992 may have been partly conditioned by
existing knowledge that outside support would be forthcoming in the event
of conflict. The close relations between Abkhaz leaders and Russian
military forces in the North Caucasus are fairly well known, 46 so it is likely that the heavy military equipment
supplied to the Abkhaz was in keeping with existing agreements.
A number of factors clearly contributed to the ethnic
mobilization and conflict in Abkhazia. Existing grievances with
Georgia--particularly over the state's policies toward minorities in the
1990-92 period--played a significant role in creating a tense situation
that could foster ethnic mobilization among all minorities in the
country. Moreover, the availability of external support for the
secessionist cause was especially important in guiding the Abkhaz toward
confrontation. But the crucial [End Page 265] factor was the
existence of autonomous structures that enabled the ethnic Abkhaz to form
a political elite that took control over the territory and administration
of Abkhazia. Without autonomy, the Abkhaz elite would not have had the
necessary institutions--such as the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz
Autonomous Republic--with which to legitimately decide on secession from
Georgia. Such institutions also enhanced the Abkhaz elites' ability to win
external support. Through the linkages and channels inherited from Soviet
Communist Party structures, Abkhaz elites had access to contacts in the
former Soviet military forces that were crucial in securing support for
the struggle. There can be little doubt that the existence of autonomy was
a sine qua non for the Abkhaz secession from Georgia.
South Ossetia: The Power of a Parliament
The chance of South Ossetia seceding from Georgia was
initially not much greater than Abkhazia's. While ethnic Ossetians, unlike
the Abkhaz, did form a majority (of just over two-thirds) of their
autonomous region's population in 1989, their numbers were
diminutive--roughly sixty-seven thousand out of a population of only
ninety-eight thousand. However, almost a hundred thousand Ossetians lived
scattered in other regions of Georgia. Like the Abkhaz, South Ossetians
were a comparatively small minority within Georgia, but they also had
ethnic brethren in the North Caucasus--the Autonomous Republic of North
Ossetia in Russia. A November 1988 law strengthening the position of the
Georgian language in South Ossetia led to disturbances the following year.
47 This was the first step in what has been termed a
"war of laws," which began in earnest in the fall of 1989. 48 With perestroika, an Ossetian popular front called
Ademon Nykhas emerged, and in spring 1989 it addressed an open letter to
the Abkhaz people, supporting their secessionist claims. Isolated
instances of violence started occurring in South Ossetia, and guerrilla
attacks by both Ossetian and Georgian armed bands were reported throughout
the summer. In August, Tbilisi took measures to make Georgian the sole
official language for use in public life. 49 Such a provision would have affected South
Ossetia--where only 14 percent of Ossetians knew Georgian--to a higher
degree [End Page 266] than Ajaria or Abkhazia, given South
Ossetia's lower status in the hierarchy of autonomy. This fueled an
emerging movement for unification with North Ossetia, and accordingly
Ademon Nykhas sent a petition to Moscow in support of that effort.
By late September, tensions had grown to the point where
additional Interior Ministry troops had to be brought in to secure order.
Interethnic clashes began to erupt despite attempts to calm the situation,
and in early November the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet demanded that
South Ossestia be upgraded to the status of an autonomous republic. Within
a week, Georgia affirmed its right to secede from the Soviet Union,
exacerbating the tensions in South Ossetia; resulting interethnic clashes
throughout the fall left several dead. 50 Meanwhile, a refurnishing took place within the
South Ossetian elite, moving the Supreme Soviet closer to the position of
Ademon Nykhas. The Gamsakhurdia government responded in late November by
organizing a "March on Tskhinvali" 51 that was attended by over ten thousand people. The
march was billed as "a peaceful march for reconciliation," but Ossetians
perceived it as a show of force and blocked the marchers, leading to an
armed clash contained only by armored forces of the Soviet Interior
Ministry (clashes, nonetheless, continued until January 1990). Georgian
legislation in August 1990 banned regional parties from the upcoming
elections, and the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet immediately riposted by
unilaterally upgrading its status to that of an "Independent Soviet
Democratic Republic." After elections to the Supreme Soviet of the "new"
South Ossetia were held in early December 1990, the Georgian Supreme
Soviet abolished the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. 52 Only the presence of Soviet troops was now
preventing armed conflict.
The change of government in Tbilisi after the ouster of
Gamsakhurdia and the accession to power of Eduard Shevardnadze temporarily
eased tensions, but the collapse of the Soviet Union--resulting in the
removal of Soviet peacekeeping troops--led to conflict by April 1992 as
artillery duels accelerated and North Caucasian volunteers amassed in
North Ossetia, much as they would later to support Abkhazia. The Russian
government also openly sided with the Ossetians and by late [End Page
267] spring 1992 there was a substantial risk of the conflict turning
into a Georgian-Russian war. 53 This threat nevertheless forced Georgia's new
government to submit in late June 1992 to a Russian-led peacekeeping force
that effectively removed Georgia from approximately half of South
Ossetia's territory.
The Georgian-Ossetian conflict initially involved only
the sixty-five thousand Ossetians within the borders of the South Ossetian
Autonomous Region. The conflict escalated as a result of a "war of laws,"
in which a formerly rubber-stamp Soviet parliament in South Ossetia was
transformed into a vehicle for Ossetian political aspirations that within
a month decided to make Ossetian the state language of South Ossetia and
later unilaterally declared independence. The role of the autonomous
region's institutions in the development of the conflict was critical. In
September 1989, before Gamsakhurdia's march on Tskhinvali, Ademon Nykhas
had already petitioned for the unification of North and South Ossetia
within the Russian Federation, adopting an extreme stand following the
enunciation of the Georgian language laws. The South Ossetian Supreme
Soviet, by contrast, was content with announcing Ossetian as the region's
official language and asking Moscow to raise its status to that of an
autonomous republic like Abkhazia. As the situation deteriorated during
the winter, the stream of decisions from the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet
slowed dramatically. Ademon Nykhas apparently gained control over the
institution during these months, and by September the body abandoned
compromise and declared total independence from Georgia. Clearly, the
preexistence of a legislative body for use by the South Ossetian
leadership was a key element in the escalation of conflict. As will be
discussed, the Armenians of Javakheti possessed no such organ, and their
nationalist organization was unable to assume a mobilizing role. In South
Ossetia, autonomy provided the Ossetian leadership with a decision-making
mechanism for responding to Tbilisi, thereby heightening tensions. As in
Abkhazia, external support certainly played a role in the development of
the conflict. By the time external actors became seriously involved in
late 1991, however, the conflict had already escalated out of control.
While the existence of North Ossetia surely spurred the southerners to
commit to action, it was autonomy that provided the permissive conditions
for the development of the conflict in South Ossetia. The case of
Javakheti, sharing many similarities with the Ossetian case save its lack
[End Page 268] of autonomy and absence of conflict, serves as a
further illustration of this fact.
Javakheti: Escape from War?
The main concentration of Armenians in Georgia is found
in the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, bordering Armenia. Ethnic Armenians
form a compact majority there, in the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda
districts, 54 numbering about 150,000. In many ways, the
Javakheti Armenians exhibit numerous similarities with both the South
Ossetians and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. With their
compactly settled Armenian minorities near the present Armenian border,
both Javakheti and Nagorno-Karabakh had been bones of contention between
the short-lived Armenian Democratic Republic and its neighbors, the
Georgian and Azerbaijani Democratic Republics, between 1918 and 1920.
55 In fact, wars were fought over both regions,
although the Armenian-Azerbaijani war of the time was significantly more
severe. Relations between these Armenian minorities and their host nations
have been uneasy. Because their Armenian identity remains very strong,
Armenians in both Azerbaijan and Georgia feel excluded from even the most
civic interpretation of these two nations' national conceptions. Unlike
Ajars in Georgia or Lezgins in Azerbaijan, Armenians are not considered
part of the majority nation and do not consider themselves as such. Both
groups also reside in mountainous terrain--Javakheti's capital,
Akhalkalaki, is located at approximately 3600 feet above sea level. Of
course, differences exist as well. Cultural differences are less marked;
Armenians and Georgians are both Christian peoples (although of different
rites), whereas Azeris are Muslims. Most pronouncedly, the historical
relationship between Armenians and Georgians has occasionally been
characterized by weariness and suspicion but seldom by overt conflict--the
brief war in 1918-1919 being the exception. By contrast, Armenians widely
equate the Azeris with Turks, 56 a group widely perceived by Armenians as
perpetrators [End Page 269] of genocide against them. Armenians and
Azeris fought wars in 1905-06 and 1918-20. As a result of these surviving
historical antagonisms and myths, Armenian-Azeri relations are
incomparably more complicated than are Georgian-Armenian relations.
The Javakheti regional center of Akhalkalaki is the site
of a Russian military base where local Armenians comprise over two-thirds
of the soldiers and noncommanding officers and a third of the
officers--suggesting that Javakheti Armenians enjoy the support of a
foreign patron and have ample access to arms and military training.
Indeed, Javakheti has been a thorn in the side of the Georgian government
since independence. Armenian ethnic entrepreneurs have nonetheless
remained relatively powerless in their relationship with the Georgian
government, largely unable to make their voices heard in Tbilisi or to
extract any concessions of significance. In spite of these frustrations,
they have not managed to stir up a large-scale popular movement.
Much like other minorities, specifically the South
Ossetians, Javakheti Armenians were alarmed by the nationalist movement in
Georgia led by Gamsakhurdia in 1989-91, and there emerged at roughly the
time of the formation of Ademon Nykhas a political organization named
Javakhk, which campaigned for the creation of an Armenian autonomous
region at par with other autonomies in Georgia. The issues at stake for
Javakheti Armenians during Gamsakhurdia's rule were similar to those in
South Ossetia--with language issues, in particular, at the top of the
agenda. Minorities in Georgia generally spoke both their mother tongue and
Russian, the language of interethnic communication in the Soviet Union;
however, few spoke Georgian. The 1988 law strengthening the position of
the Georgian language was hence perceived as a threat to the minorities.
Meanwhile, the Armenian population of Javakheti had enjoyed substantial
cultural autonomy even in the absence of political or territorial
self-rule. Most schools in the area were Armenian, and the Armenians were
equally disturbed by the development of Georgian legislation in the
period. Javakhk has not managed to sustain a permanent level of active
popular support and has been plagued by internal disputes, so no clear
chain of command exists in the organization. Its position is at times
contradictory; certain statements from the organization seem conciliatory
toward Tbilisi whereas others are more militant in their demands for
Armenian self-determination. 57
Another contentious issue has been that of centrally
appointed prefects, which the Gamsakhurdia regime introduced. Through
large-scale [End Page 270] demonstrations, Javakheti Armenians
physically prevented three different appointed prefects of ethnic Georgian
origin from assuming office. 58 The ensuing lack of legitimate governing
authorities was solved through the creation of a provisional council of
representatives for the Akhalkalaki region, with twenty-four elected
representatives. In other words, Javakheti Armenians took a first
unilateral step toward the creation of institutions of self-rule. The
popular legitimacy of these institutions, which might have been served as
an embryonic autonomist or secessionist movement, nevertheless remains
doubtful as they basically self-dissolved even before the ascent of Eduard
Shevardnadze to the head of the Georgian state. Basically, the Armenian
activists were unable to create legitimate institutions for their
struggle, and no preexisting institutions were present. In 1995, Georgian
authorities successfully merged the Javakheti region with the region to
its west, Meskheti (which has a clear Georgian majority), to create the
province of Samtskhe-Javakheti. This move was interpreted by Javakhk as an
attempt to artificially dilute the Armenian demographic position in the
administrative units of southern Georgia. Although the move did not lead
to large-scale protests, it did increase Armenian resentment and suspicion
of Tbilisi.
The absence of conflict in Javakheti must be associated
with the lack of a strong and legitimate nationalist leadership,
especially in comparison with South Ossetia, which had a comparable
conflict potential. Ademon Nykhas did not have a higher degree of initial
popular legitimacy than Javakhk; the key difference in the development of
the two organizations was that the autonomy enjoyed by South Ossetia
facilitated the cohesion and strengthening of the nationalist/separatist
movement around the governmental institutions of the region. In Javakheti,
the Javakhk movement needed to build up its position on its own, including
the creation of provisional administrative structures; in South Ossetia,
such institutions already existed, with a rigid hierarchy and an accepted
decision-making process. The legitimacy of national leaders was determined
not only by their personality and achievements but also by the posts they
held. Moreover, when unfavorable laws were introduced by the Georgian
parliament, the Javakheti Armenians had little to respond with except
petitions or popular demonstrations. Ossetians, by contrast, possessed a
legislative body, the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous province, which
provided them with an institutional channel for the struggle against
Georgian actions. Likewise, the internal [End Page 271] dissension
within Javakhk and what amounts to an incapacity to take, let alone
enforce, decisions reflected the lack of a clear hierarchy of decision
making. Autonomous structures, as the case of South Ossetia proves,
possess a chain of command that facilitates the decision-making process
and the enforcement of decisions taken at a higher level.
Other factors have played an important role in
Javakheti's relatively peaceful development. First, the Georgian
government already having been defeated by two other secessionist
movements, has been cautious not to provoke the Javakheti Armenians.
Furthermore, the Armenian government, mindful of the importance of its
relations with Georgia, has been careful to defuse potential problems in
the region, intervening several times to dissuade Javakhk from holding
referenda on autonomy or secession. The external support provided by the
Russian military base, therefore, is mitigated by the calming effect of
the Armenian government. In the final analysis, however, the lack of
autonomy in Javakheti must still be noted as a significant reason for the
weakness of ethnic mobilization and the absence of armed conflict there.
Azeris: The Silent Mass
Little political activity, let alone unrest or
separatism, has been observed among Azeris in Georgia, who are
concentrated in the southern and southeastern regions of Georgia. However,
the Azeris were a target of Georgian nationalist groups fearful of the
rapidly increasing birth rates of Azeris and other Muslim peoples in
Georgia. In 1989, Georgian informal groups forced several hundred Azeri
families in the Bolnisi region to migrate to Azerbaijan. Another incident
worth mentioning is a 1990 case of information failure between Georgian
nationalists and Azeris, in which a false rumor spread that the Azeris
were about to secede and join Azerbaijan. Upon receiving this news, a
group of Georgian nationalists gathered followers and marched on Azeri
areas. Georgian authorities were able to defuse the situation before any
blood was shed, after having coordinated their position with the
Azerbaijani Popular Front and ascertaining that no steps toward secession
were being taken. In the postindependence era, the close and improving
relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia have ensured stability in the
region. 59 The Azeris live relatively scattered across
southern and southeastern Georgia, while forming majorities of over 70
percent in the Marneuli, Bolnisi, and Dmanisi districts. The remainder of
the population is composed of Georgians, Armenians, and Kurds. There is no
[End Page 272] clearly demarcated Azeri area in Georgia, and given
their lack of autonomy, it would be difficult for Azeris to outline which
areas they would consider "theirs". The good relations between Georgia and
Azerbaijan have also eliminated any tangible external support for
nationalism among Azeris in Georgia; nor has a nationalist leadership been
able to emerge. It should be mentioned, however, that the Azeris in
Georgia live mainly in rural areas, and though their economic conditions
are fairly good, they are rather isolated from Georgian social and
political life. Very few among them speak Georgian, a proportionally very
low number have access to higher education, and the Georgian government
has done little to integrate them. A certain amount of resentment and
feeling of alienation has been reported, but it has failed to find an
effective channel for expression; a national leadership did not exist "by
default," as it did in autonomous areas. In sum, the low level of
ethnopolitical activity, the role of the government of Azerbaijan, and the
lack of autonomy have made Azeri areas among the calmest in Georgia's
turbulent post-perestroika history.
Ajaria--Regionalism Enforced
The case of Ajaria, as mentioned earlier, represents the
only case of a South Caucasian autonomous region not involved in armed
conflict with its central government. 60 This is not surprising, given that few indicators
ever pointed to a high risk of ethnic conflict between Ajaria and Georgia.
Most importantly, Ajars are in fact ethnic Georgians, differing from the
majority population on account of their Muslim religion. The majority of
its inhabitants adopted Islam and much of Islamic culture (during the
centuries of Ottoman rule that ended in 1878) while retaining strong
cultural similarities with Christian Georgians. This may make it
questionable as to whether classifying them as a minority is appropriate.
Christianity certainly constitutes an important part of the Georgian
national identity, yet after seventy years of Soviet atheism Ajarian Islam
has a comparatively weak hold on the population. Ajars therefore remain
accepted in the predominant definition of the Georgian nation, which can
be said of no other minority in Georgia.
Nevertheless, since the early 1990s Ajaria has been
dominated by a [End Page 273] local potentate with significant
political ambitions. Aslan Abashidze, descending from an influential
family of the local nobility, acceded to the leadership of Ajaria in 1991
and has since imposed an increasingly authoritarian rule. During the wars
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as in intra-Georgian feuds,
Abashidze skillfully achieved wide self-rule by maintaining neutrality.
Moreover, Abashidze managed to turn Ajaria into an important economic
region through the development of trade links with Turkey, using the asset
of the port of Batumi, the regional capital on the Black Sea coast. In
turn, the Georgian government, desiring no further trouble with its
provinces, left Ajaria on its own in most matters. Although Abashidze
endorsed Eduard Shevardnadze's bid for the Georgian presidency, Tbilisi's
subsequent attempts to rein in Ajaria within the hierarchy of the Georgian
state has led to the deterioration of relations between Batumi and
Tbilisi; for example, Ajaria refuses to harmonize its laws with national
guidelines. Although the Ajarian case displays clear elements of
regionalism, these do not have a significant ethnic character. Indeed,
Abashidze has established himself as a politician on the national Georgian
level, in fact emerging as the most serious challenger to Shevardnadze and
his Citizen's Union of Georgia Party even though his political life is
based heavily in Ajaria. Charles H. Fairbanks summarizes the Ajarian
situation well:
The local boss, Aslan Abashidze, has never
raised any question of secession from Georgia. He wants simply to do
what he wants and to enjoy the profits of vacation hotels, tropical
products, and smuggling across the border with Turkey. There seems to be
nothing public in Abashidze's motives; he is operating essentially like
a small businessman. The Russian garrison on the border, whose main
occupation seems to be smuggling, gives Abashidze the protection to defy
the central Georgian government; the Moscow government approves this
arrangement because it limits Georgian independence from Russia. 61
In the final analysis, the independent-minded rule of
Abashidze in Ajaria would have been impossible without the institution of
autonomy. The weakness of the separate Ajarian identity does not provide a
base for a vigorous nationalist movement or for excessively strong
regionalism; in this context the population of the province of Mingrelia
arguably has stronger regionalist attitudes. 62 The institutions of Ajarian autonomy brought
Abashidze to his position of power and enabled [End Page 274]
Ajaria to remain largely isolated economically and politically from the
rest of Georgia; likewise, the political institutions and financial
resources of the autonomous republic have provided a base for Abashidze's
bid for a national political role in Georgia. Given the historical and
ethnic framework, there were no conditions under which autonomy would lead
to ethnic conflict in Ajaria. However, autonomy did provide a ground for
the emergence of a local potentate who succeeded in keeping his region
free of the problems experienced by other Georgian regions while
establishing a rigid autocratic rule.
Conclusions
The provision of institutionalized, territorial autonomy
for an ethnic minority may cause the opposite of its intended effect--it
may augment rather than reduce the potential for conflict between a
minority and a central government. As stated earlier, autonomy is neither
a sufficient nor a necessary cause of conflict. Yet, it has a strong
causal relationship with both a minority's willingness and especially its
capacity to revolt. It is reasonably clear that within the Caucasian
context, autonomy has been a source of conflict and not a solution to it.
This preliminary conclusion suggests that ceteris paribus, secessionism is
likely to be significantly higher among autonomous minorities than among
nonautonomous minorities. This study has been empirically limited to the
former Soviet space, and it should be acknowledged that the specific
history and characteristics of this area leave open the question as to
whether the findings here would be replicated in similar studies of other
political settings. Nevertheless, a number of factors inherent in the
institution of territorial autonomy are likely to have the same
consequences in other areas of the world as they have had in the former
Soviet Union.
The practical implications of these findings are
nevertheless significant. When confronted with the results of this study,
one disheartened practitioner of diplomacy raised the obvious question: if
autonomy, bearer of much hope for the management and resolution of
ethnopolitical conflicts, is not actually a solution but is rather
inherently problematic, what is the way to manage ethnic tensions?
The answer does not lie in any general and easily applicable model, and
that may itself be one of the most important consequences of realizing the
pitfalls of autonomy. Where there has been a tendency to view ethnofederal
solutions in one form or another as cure-all prescriptions, this study
points to the merits of devising political structures that cut across
ethnic [End Page 275] and other communal divisions, encourage civic
identities, but discourage the use of ethnicity in the political sphere.
That does not mean that all autonomy solutions are necessarily
destined to collapse or to lead to war. It does mean that whenever the
ethnicization of territory can be avoided, it should be avoided.
This study has attempted to show that the advocacy of
resolving or preventing ethnic conflict through solutions based on the
devolution of power along ethnic lines is at best a questionable and at
worst a disastrous enterprise. The little publicized pitfalls of
ethnofederalism hence need to be kept in mind while formulating policies
in and toward multiethnic societies.
Svante E. Cornell is Editor of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute of the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced
International Studies, and Lecturer in the Departments of Peace and
Conflict Research and East European Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden.
He is the author of Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of
Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (2001).
Notes
* The author would like to thank Anna Jonsson, Regine
Spector, Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg, and S. Frederick Starr for their
valuable comments and suggestions. Research for this article was made
possible by a grant from the Swedish Research Council for the Humanities
and Social Science.
1. Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,"
Foreign Affairs 79 (May-June 2000), 53.
2. Significant works on nationalism and ethnic conflict
include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2d ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Ernest
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); Anthony
D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986);
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985); Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970); Gurr, Peoples versus States:
Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: usip Press,
2000).
3. In other instances, however, ethnic demands are not for
"exit"--autonomy or secession--but for greater participation in the
government of the central state, particularly when settlement patterns
overlap.
4. It must be noted, however, that ethnic conflict in such
situations is possible, and when it does occur, it is likely to be
significantly more severe than in cases of less intermingled settlement
patterns. Conflict in intermingled states would tend not to be over a part
of the state's territory and its affiliation but over the control of the
state apparatus, that is, the entire territory of the state. The emergence
of violent conflict in such situations would be significantly more likely
to lead to large-scale ethnic cleansing and/or genocide: a geographic
partition line being much more difficult to draw, the conflict is likely
to take place not on a warfront between two organized military formations
but in civilian-inhabited areas over a much larger tract of territory.
Moreover, the knowledge that a clean territorial break is impossible or
very difficult encourages the urge to displace or eliminate members of the
other group and even the perception that it is necessary. A political
solution would also imply that one would continue to live intermingled
with members of the other group. This is in turn interpreted as a security
threat to the own group and again increases the urge to expel or eliminate
the other group, actions that are even conceptualized as defensive and
indispensable for the own group's well-being. This situation is referred
to as the "security dilemma". See, for example, Barry Posen, "The Security
Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993).
5. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough
Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945" (Paper presented at
the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association,
Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999), 16, emphasis in original.
6. Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical
Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies
Quarterly 38 (Fall 1994), 366.
7. Kjell-Åke Nordquist, "Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving
Mechanism: An Overview," in Markku Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications
and Implications (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), 59.
8. Interestingly, in certain instances the central
government, in particular in states trying to build a civic national
identity, argues that granting autonomy to a minority population would be
tantamount to defining that population as second-class citizens. The
Turkish government, for example, sticks to its
refusal for special rights to citizens of Kurdish origin,
on the grounds that they are already enjoying all existing rights as
first-class citizens of the Turkish republic; any special rights would
imply their segregation from the rest of the population and by extension
their diminishment to second-class status.
9. See Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to
Ethnic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: usip Press, 1996), 203. By the same
token it can be argued that the refusal to grant autonomy could be an even
stronger incentive for a state affiliated with the minority to intervene.
10. David J. Meyer, "A Place of Our Own: Does the
Ethnicization of Territorial Control Create Incentives for Elites to
Conduct Ethno-Political Mobilization? Cases from the Caucasus in
Comparative Perspective" (Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Convention
of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, April 2000).
See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace
(Kingston: Queens University, 1994); also Lapidoth (fn. 9).
11. See, for example, Henry Hale, "Ethnofederalism and
Theories of Secession: Getting More from the Soviet Cases" (Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of
Nationalities, New York, April 1999); Robert Dorff, "Federalism in Eastern
Europe: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?" Publius: The
Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994).
12. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism
Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet
Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43 (January
1991). For a recent treatment of the subject, see Carol Skalnik Leff,
"Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup
of the Communist Federations," World Politics 51 (January 1999).
13. Hans-Joachim Heintze, "On the Legal Understanding of
Autonomy," in Suksi (fn. 7), 7.
14. Henry J. Steiner, "Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the
Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities," Notre Dame Law
Review 66 (1991), 1542.
17. UN Information Organization, Documents of the UN
Conference on International Organization, vol. 6 (New York, 1945),
296, cited in Heintze (fn. 13), 9.
21. See Douglas Sanders, "Collective Rights," Human
Rights Quarterly 13 (August 1991).
22. See M. Brems, Die Politische Integration Etnischer
Minderheiten (The political integration of ethnic minorities)
(Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1995), 142.
23. L. Lyck, "Lessons to be Learned on Autonomy from the
Faeroese Situation since 1992," Nordic Journal of International Law
64 (Fall 1995), 481-87.
24. Ildus G. Ilishev, "Russian Federalism: Political,
Legal and Ethnolingual Aspects--A View from the Republic of
Bashkortostan," Nationalities Papers 26 (Fall 1998), 724-759.
Reproduced as an appendix to the article is the Treaty on the Mutual
Derogation of Powers between the State Organs of the Russian Federation
and the State Organs of the Republic of Bashkortostan, in Stanovlenie
Dogovornykh Otnosheniy Respubliku Bashkortostan i Rossiyskoy Federatsii,
1990-1996 gg., Sbornik Dokumentov (Ufa, 1997).
25. Group cohesion, willingness to act, and capacity to
act have been identified as the major categories of factors leading to
conflict in the literature on ethnopolitical conflict. See, for example,
Gurr (fn. 2, 2000).
26. Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the
Geo-Body of Siam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).
29. Dmitry Gorenburg, "Nationalism for the Masses: Popular
Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic Republics," Europe-Asia
Studies 53 (January 2001), 74.
33. Here minority is defined as an ethnically defined
population group under the jurisdiction of a territorial unit with a
distinct titular nationality. Hence, in the South Caucasus, the Nakhjivan
Autonomous Republic is left outside the scope of the study since the
population of Nakhjivan was and remains homogeneously
Azerbaijani-populated (93 percent) and under the jurisdiction of
Azerbaijan.
34. For a detailed overview of the conflicts in the
Caucasus, see Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A
Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (Richmond, UK: Curzon
Press, 2001)
35. The Meskhetian Turks of Southern Georgia were deported
in 1943 but have not yet been allowed to return to their native lands.
36. Fearon and Laitin find that "mountain groups were six
times more likely to see large-scale fighting with the state following the
Soviet collapse." As they note, moreover, rough terrain is a useful tool
to explain how minorities with small numbers can "sustain significant
guerrilla conflicts with the state." Fearon and Laitin (fn. 5), 18-20.
37. Ethnic mobilization does not automatically carry with
it ethnic conflict; conflict only occurs if the central government decides
to answer the minority's challenge by force. Secession, of course, can
take place peacefully, if the government simply lets go of the province in
question; however, cases of peaceful secession are diminutively few.
Another option is the cooptation of the minority elite either through
integration in the central government or simply through bribery. In the
final analysis, it is nevertheless the norm and not the exception that a
minority challenge on the subject of territory is answered by force on the
part of the central government.
38. The full supporting information and the coding of
factors and cases relevant to this study, including tables for each
factor, is available at http://www.cornellcaspian.com/autonomy.html.
39. For a detailed overview of the conflict, see Cornell
(fn. 34), 142-96.
40. See, for example, Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 41, no. 29 (1989), 14-16.
41. BBC Monitoring Service, June 18, 1992, quoting
Russian television "Rossiya," June 16, 1992.
42. "Georgia: Abkhazia 'Strong Enough to Fight Georgia,'"
BBC Monitoring Service, July 30, 1992.
43. BBC Monitoring Service, July 25, 1992. The 1925
constitution did stipulate that Abkhazia was tied to Georgia by a special
union treaty, but de facto it amounted to a secession from Georgia and was
certainly perceived as such in Tbilisi.
44. See Darrell Slider, "Democratization in Georgia," in
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Conflict, Cleavage and Change in
Central Asia and the Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 170.
47. See Elizabeth Fuller, "Draft 'State Program' on
Georgian Language Published," Radio Liberty Research Report no.
559/88, December 12, 1988.
48. See Catherine Dale, "Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
Dynamics of the Conflicts," in Pavel Baev and Ole Berthelsen, eds.,
Conflicts in the Caucasus, Report no. 3 (Oslo: International Peace
Research Institute, 1996), 13-26.
49. See Elizabeth Fuller, "South Ossetia: Analysis of a
Permanent Crisis," Report on the USSR, February 15, 1991, 21.
51. See Julian Birch, "The Georgian/South Ossetian
Territorial and Boundary Dispute," in J. Wright et al., eds.,
Transcaucasian Boundaries (London: soas, 1995), 182. Tskhinvali is
the capital of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region.
52. See Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgian Parliament Votes to
Abolish Ossetian Autonomy," Report on the USSR, December 21, 1990,
8; Rachel Denber, Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights in the Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict (New York:
Helsinki Watch, 1992), 8.
53. See Alexei Zverev, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus,
1988-94," in Bruno Coppetiers, ed., Contested Borders in the
Caucasus (Brussels: vub Press, 1996), 46.
54. For overviews of the issue, see Voitsekh Guretski,
"The Question of Javakheti," Caucasian Regional Studies 3, no. 1
(1998) (poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-05.htm, accessed October 2001);
Ugur Akinci, "Javakhetia: The Bottle-Neck of the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline,"
Silk Road: A Journal of West Asian Studies 1 (December 1997); Igor
Rotar, "Tbilisi Has Only Partial Control over Georgia's Armenian Regions,"
Jamestown Prism 4 (May 15, 1998); Levon Sevunts, "Squeeze Play in
the Caucasus: Russia Could Tighten Its Grip as Georgia, Armenia Break Out
of Bear Hug," The Gazette (Montreal), November 29, 1999.
55. See Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for
Transcaucasia, 1917-1921 (Oxford: George Ronald, 1951).
56. The Azerbaijanis are a Turkic people speaking a
language closely related to Anatolian Turkish, but for the overwhelming
part of their history they have been politically separated from Turkey and
have had closer relationships to Iran.
57. Annotated Headlines of the Georgian Press, September
21-22, 1998.
59. Author interviews in Tbilisi and Marneuli, 1998.
60. See Judith Hin, "Ajaria. Authoritarian Governance,
Favorable Economic Location, and Minor Ethnic Tensions: The Interests of
the Local Potentate in Keeping Violent Conflict at Bay" (Paper presented
at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of
Nationalities, New York, April 2000). The paper was based on unpublished
data from the Brown University research project, "Can Deadly Conflicts Be
Prevented," funded by the Carnegie Corporation.
61. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "Party, Ideology and the
Public World in the Former Soviet Space," in Arthur M. Meltzer, Jerry
Einberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds., Politics at the End of the
Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 252.