A Comparative Study of the American Foreign Policy in Afghanistan
Haydar Ali Balouji*
Amu Darya: The Iranian Journal
of Central Asian Studies, vol. 6 no. 9, Summer 2001.
Historically, Afghanistan has
been subject to the influence of foreign powers. The country used to be Iran’s
easternmost province and its independence was prompted by the British pressure
exerted on the Iranian government during the Qajar period. In addition to Great
Britain, other world powers attempted to gain influence in Afghanistan in the
19th and 20th centuries. Power shifts on the national and international scales
affected the scale of presence various countries sought in Afghanistan. It was
commensurate with this presence that these countries shaped their foreign policies.
All of these countries pursued their own national security interests in the
region. The Afghan domestic scene is at the same time made up of various ethnic
and religious groups and its geography is uneven. These parameters together
with lagging socio-cultural conditions have paved the way for the intervention
of foreign powers. The peculiar situation of Afghanistan is undoubtedly caused
by the domestic and international factors that were mentioned above. As the
spearhead of a monolithic post-war international bloc, the United States
follows its distinct interests in the various regions of the world.
Commensurate with the importance assigned to West Asia over various historical
periods, the American foreign policy has been subject to change and has thus fluctuated. The American
foreign policy in Afghanistan proper has undergone change and has shifted on a
spectrum ranging from reaction to proaction. During the Soviet period, the
United States did not seek to establish an active presence in Afghanistan, but
upon the Soviet armed invasion of that country, the US was forced to adopt a
proactive stance and counter the then
Soviet threat actively. With the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, the American objective was attained and aid was only channeled
towards fundamentalist Muslims. Thus the US distanced itself from Afghanistan
gradually, but the resulting vacuum entailed Iran’s greater presence. In
addition, the breakup of the former Soviet Union gave way to new parameters on
the international and economic scales that redirected the American attention
towards Afghanistan. Once again, Washington adopted an active foreign policy
posture in that country. Against this backdrop and with the support of the US
and other states such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the Taliban emerged as the
latest phenomenon in Afghanistan.
Over the past few years, the
Taliban have assumed considerable power and control 95% of the Afghan
territory. Power struggle in Afghanistan continues. Foreign states are seeking
to increase their influence in that country and continue their assistance to
their allies. On the other hand, the Afghan forces have lined up in two
opposing forces and fight against each other. This article looks into the
background to the presence of foreign powers in Afghanistan. Development over
the past few years will be analyzed against this backdrop. A comparative
analysis of the American foreign policy is the prime objective of this article
that seeks to answer the following questions:
- Why is influence in
Afghanistan important and what benefits will the US and other countries gain
from establishing a greater presence in that country?
- What are the developments
that mark the evolution of the American foreign policy in Afghanistan?
- Why did the Americans only
support the Taliban out of all warring factions in Afghanistan?
- What will be the impact of
the American foreign policy on the other countries of the region?
- What will be the result of
the American posture towards the Taliban?
In order to answer these
questions, we will take a look at the shaping of the “strategically significant
Afghanistan” and the economic interests of the countries that seek to influence
the course of events in that country.
The American foreign policy in
Afghanistan will be divided into distinct historical phases:
- The pre-invasion, invasion,
and the withdrawal phases during the Soviet period;
- The short period of a
diminished American presence that lasted from the withdrawal of the Soviet
forces until the emergence of the Taliban;
- The emergence of the Taliban
prompted by active American support.
Notwithstanding the separatist
moves of local leaders, Afghanistan was part of the Iranian territory until the
19th century. However, during the reign of Nasseredin Shah and due to Britain’s
colonial objectives to the east of Iran, the British encouraged the creation of
a buffer region with the intention of protecting western India. At the time,
the main threat to India did not come from the east (China and Japan were
comparatively weak), but from an alliance between Iran and the British rivals,
i.e. Tsarist Russia and France. Both countries sought an alliance with Iran
against the British on numerous
occasions, hoping to use the Iranian territory as a corridor in their attack
against India. In the Tilsit Treaty signed in 1807 by Russia and France, “Tsar
Alexander and Napoleon put their plans of attack against India to the fore. It
was agreed for Iranian armed forces to move in that direction with the help of
the French and for Russian forces to pass through the Iranian territory.”(1)
The British were swift to react
against both the Russians and the French in the European theater and exerted
pressure on Iran by threatening an armed invasion. Thus the Russo-French plan
was stillborn. In accordance with the Paris Agreement of March 4, 1817 signed
by the representatives of Iran and Britain, Iran renounced all rights to seek
sovereignty over or interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan.(2) Thus the
present borders of Afghanistan as a buffer state were drawn in 1896.(3)
Afghanistan was created upon
the pressure exerted by foreign countries and it was natural that its
historical evolution on the domestic and international fronts be subjected to
the same kind of influence. The only difference over the years was in the
players that were involved or in their manner of exerting influence. Britain,
the former Soviet Union, and the United States were the main forces that shaped
the Afghan fate and alongside these actors, regional countries played their
share in the evolution of Afghanistan’s policies.
The special attention channeled
towards that country and the active role that various players have assumed over
the years show that this country wields considerable importance, or else it
would have been totally neglected like many other countries in the world. As
mentioned before, during the 19th century, England sought to contain the
influence of its rivals by playing the Afghanistan card. The increased power of
rival forces would invariably translate
into Britain’s diminished influence, thus putting India at risk. France and
Russia sought to exert pressure on Great Britain through Afghanistan. They
hoped to curtail the British power in India and thus restrict the extended reach of that colonial power.(4)
In line with its Asian policies
and Peter the Great’s will, Russia viewed Afghanistan as an access corridor to
the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. After the active entrance of the United
States into global politics, Afghanistan assumed importance for both
superpowers in the Cold War era.
Afghanistan’s tilt towards the
Soviet Union as the main rival of the United States prompted the latter to keep
a close eye on developments in Afghanistan. Americans sought greater engagement
in the Afghan affairs subsequent to the Soviet military invasion of that
country. In the aftermath of the Soviet demise, confrontation with Iran and the
necessity of greater presence in Central Asia justified American involvement in
the Afghan scene.
The former Soviet Union had
resorted to a policy of armed intervention in order to spread Communism, add to
the number of its allies, and especially contain the Islamic threat ignited by
the Iranian revolution.
In addition to its strategic
significance, Afghanistan is endowed with considerable natural resources, i.e.
natural gas and proximity to Central Asian markets. Recent developments
subsequent to the emergence of the Taliban are mainly analyzed from an economic
perspective.
Multinationals are studying the
prospects of investment in that country, some of which have reached positive
results. This is while the political situation in that country remains
uncertain and the investments of these companies will be ridden with high
levels of risks. American firms that support Afghanistan’s present policies are
especially keen to win a share of the pie.
The United States adopted a
policy of isolationism during the first four decades of the 20th century. In
this period there was no need for planning on a presence in a backward and
internationally isolated Afghanistan.
It was not until the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that the Americans adopted an active posture in
that country, and this despite considerable changes that had affected
international relations, i.e. the 1917 October Revolution led by the Soviet
Union as the main rival of the United States in the Cold War era. Although WWII
put an effective end to American isolationism, the theater of superpower
rivalry did not extend as far as Afghanistan.
During this period, most Afghan
governments displayed a distinct penchant for the Soviet Union and it seemed as
if the Americans had allowed that country to become the Soviet Union’s backyard
without seeking active involvement in it.
All in all, the American policy
towards Afghanistan in this period was lackluster and drove Kabul closer to the
then Soviet Union. “Since the 1960s, the United States and the West viewed
Afghanistan as a Soviet satellite and that country was valued neither
economically nor commercially. In 1959, Davud Khan asked for American military
help in order to counter the Soviet interference, only to be rebuffed by the
Americans.
After Davud’s fall in 1963, the
new Afghan Prime Minister sought rapprochement with the US, yet his efforts did
not translate into concrete results. Until 1973 the amount of American economic
and military aid to Afghanistan totaled $420mn; whereas Soviet assistance
amounted to $1.5bn over that same period.”(5)
America’s lack of involvement
prompted the Soviets to seek greater influence in that country. The US policy
in Afghanistan was shaped on the basis of a number of factors, namely:
1. Absence of valuable natural
resources similar to the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf countries;
2. Existence of a tribal social
structure in Afghanistan and the complications stemming therefrom;
3. Lack of political, economic,
and social security in Afghanistan (from a Western perspective);
4. Landlocked position of that
country and lack of access to warm waters, 5. Proximity to the former Soviet
Union;
6. The US strengthened
Pakistan’s position in order to prevent the Soviet intervention. America’s
prime interest in the region was vested in the Persian Gulf region and a
strengthened Pakistan seemed to meet that country’s objective of containing the
then Soviet Union. As such, there was no need to add Afghanistan to the
picture;
7. The US did not wield a
similar position as the British did in India in the 19th century and therefore,
American policymakers did not see any point in establishing a presence in
Afghanistan. It was in this context that Afghanistan’s attempts to edge closer
to the United States did not bring about the desired results. The American government
was among the last governments that extended recognition to the government of
Zahir Shah.(6)
As one of the main superpowers,
the US did not focus on Afghanistan, a policy very much unlike that of the then
Soviet Union that displayed interest in that country and sought to expand
bilateral relations on various levels. It was against this background that the
economic, technical, and military aids of the Soviet Union were channeled
towards that country. Years later, the Soviets succeeded in emerging as the
prime economic and military partner of Afghanistan and played an active role in
that
country’s foreign policy scene.
The Soviets followed all of
Afghanistan’s major domestic developments very closely. Proximity to
Afghanistan allowed them to bloc America’s intervention in the region and exert
influence with the aid of the Afghan left-wing parties. The Soviet influence
was primarily solidified by Afghanistan’s parties. It was in this context that
the People’s Democratic Party toppled Davud and the country adopted a Socialist
political model similar to that of the Soviet Union.(7) Relying on a steady
injection of aid to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union gained immense popularity
among that country’s elite who looked up to the Eastern superpower as some form
of utopia.
In this period, interactions
between the US and Afghanistan were at a minimum and most initiatives aimed at
the expansion of relations were taken by the Afghan government, all of which
proved unsuccessful. In addition, the eruption of crises in Pushtunistan and
alongside the Afghan-Pakistani border coupled with the Afghan government’s
obvious tilt towards the former Soviet Union distanced the United States from
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Mohammad Davud Khan (1953-1963) insisted
on the annexation of Pakistan’s northwestern territories to Afghanistan. The
border disputes between the two countries prompted the American government to
halt economic aid to Afghanistan and as a result, the Afghan government
approached Kremlin for assistance.(8) The main reason behind Afghanistan’s
rapprochement with the then Soviet Union was the American reluctance in
extending the needed military assistance. This vacuum was filled by Moscow that
sought to attain its own political objectives and meet the needs of
Afghanistan’s armed forces.(9)
The passive involvement of the
US in Afghanistan was primarily associated with non-strategic economic aids.
These aid projects were mainly aimed at such sectors as agriculture, public
health, and
education and remained limited
in size and amount compared to the level of Soviet assistance. In the 1960s, the American government showed
scant interest in Afghanistan; whereas the Soviet assistance was aimed at that
country’s infrastructure and thus assumed strategic significance.(10) One of
these projects involved the diversion of the Hirmad River with the help of the
American firm, Morris-Nodson. In time, the company expanded its scope of
activities. Similar to other projects, the Hirmad Project was abandoned and the
Afghan government was forced to apply for two loans at the US Ex-Im Bank in
1949 and 1953 for the amounts of $21bn and $18.5bn. It has been maintained that
prior to this development Americans were involved in oil discovery projects in
northern Afghanistan but were faced with the strong Soviet objection in 1912,
and thus ended their exploration activities.(11)
Also in the 1970s, the US
sought to compensate for past disinterest in Afghanistan by encouraging its
resource-rich ally, i.e. Iran, to channel aid towards that country. The Shah
had envisaged donating considerable amounts of financial aid to
Afghanistan.(12)
From a political perspective,
despite the growing influence of the Soviets and especially in the period
before the Soviet invasion, the pre-Communist Afghanistan was considered as a
non-aligned country. At the time, successive Afghan governments maintained
impartiality vis-à-vis the East and the West.
This position was also accepted by both superpowers and the Afghans
observed it. When this impartiality was violated by the former Soviet Union, a
new round of hostility and harsh positions followed.(13)
In this period, the US could
have easily factored Afghanistan into its policy of containing the Soviet Union
and could have also allowed that country to join regional alliances such as the
Baghdad Pact, CENTO, and the Regional Development Organization; yet, this
scenario never materialized.
America’s lackluster reactions
to developments in Afghanistan paved the way for increased Soviet influence.
The Soviets extended considerable amounts of aid and exerted influence though
indigenous Communist parties, and especially the People’s Democratic Party,
that proved instrumental in furthering their objectives in Afghanistan. The
1978 coup resulted in the ascension to power of the first Communist government
in that country and the next year, in December 1979, the Soviets invaded the
Afghan territory. The invasion heightened the presence of the Soviets in
Afghanistan; yet at the same time, it resulted in the strong reaction of
Western countries and especially that of the United States. “The 1978 coup
d’etat transformed Afghanistan into a theater of East-West confrontation.”(14)
The main reasons for the Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan are as follows:
1. Unrest spreading throughout
Afghanistan against the Soviet-backed Communists in an attempt to weaken them;
2. Victory of the Islamic
Revolution;
3. Amin’s tilt towards the
West;
4. Access to the warm waters of
the Persian Gulf in line with the old Russian/Soviet policy;
5. Defense of the Communist
ideology;
6. Prevention of future threats
to the security of the Soviet borders.
The Afghan people rushed to put
up a strong fight against the invading forces and despite the numerical
superiority of the Soviet army, the popular resistance not only did not subside
but grew in scale by the day. The opposition was later to be organized and
supported by foreign countries. The war between the people of Afghanistan and
the Soviets entailed the involvement of the Americans who were not active in
the region until that time. The US drew on the support of its allies, i.e.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to deal a heavy blow to the then Soviets. That
policy later on enabled the United States to plan for an active long-term
presence in both Afghanistan and Central Asia.(15)
At the time, the American
policy was not clearly defined. In the early 1970s, the United States bore the
sour memory of defeat in the Vietnam War, to which the Soviets had contributed
to a great extent. Therefore, the Americans were seeking revenge. In other
words, upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Americans did not respond
adequately to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia or the Chinese attack against
Vietnam. Instead, the US adopted a wait and see policy. The 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran – a country that was considered an American ally in the
region – entailed the rupture of relations between the two countries and
damaged America’s standing in the region. These events precipitated the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. At the same time, the Americans had not predicted the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, assuming that such a scenario would be far more
detrimental to that country’s interests than useful. As such they ruled out an
incident similar to the Czech invasion of 1968. It seemed, therefore, that the
invasion took the Americans by surprise.
When confronted with the
invasion, the American reaction took a defensive turn and indirect pressures on
the then Soviet Union were exerted by,
1. Encouraging stability in
southwest Asia by preserving American interests in the Persian Gulf;
2. Preventing Soviet expansion
towards the south and especially towards the oil fields of the Persian Gulf
countries.(16)
The American foreign policy in
Afghanistan was reviewed in view of past experience and naturally, the harsh
lessons of the Vietnam War were factored in. The Vietnam War turned into a
morass that not only deprived the US of its objectives, but also exacted a heavy
toll in human lives. Also, it was a
very costly war economically.
American statesmen were weary of the Vietnam quagmire and the world public
opinion did not favor active American involvement anywhere in the world.
Therefore, after these developments, the Americans adopted a new policy of
reduced involvement both in Afghanistan and in other regions of the world,
i.e., Nicaragua. The new policy favored American presence on the basis of
political commitment and extension of assistance to local forces supporting
American interests. The policy proved successful both in Afghanistan and
Nicaragua.
In this context, the Afghan
Mujahids were actively supported as they fell in line with this policy and
considerable aid was channeled in their direction. In assisting the Afghan
Mujahids, the American government drew on the Saudi financial support and
Pakistan’s logistical help. To confront the
Islamic revolution and encourage Wahhabism, the Saudi government
injected considerable financial aid into Afghanistan and the Americans
obviously supported this policy.
With regard to Pakistan, the
Islamic revolution in Iran coincided with the military coup of Zia ul-Haq. The
Americans thus lost hope that Iran could be used as a conduit for their policy
and focused on developments in Pakistan instead. On the other hand, Zia ul-Haq
lacked both domestic and international support for having toppled Ali Bhutto’s
government and therefore was receptive of the Americans, expressing willingness
to go along with American interests in the region. As such, the Americans used
Pakistan as a catalyst to transfer aid to the Mujahids. In addition, the
central government’s attempts at arresting and annihilating the Afghan
resistance forces encouraged the latter to accept outside help.(17)
At the beginning, the Mujahid
forces were at a military disadvantage due to a shortage of arms and lack of
experience. Yet they were soon to gain an edge as a result of increasing aid
from the United States and other countries. Thus they were able to strike at
the government and Soviet forces. Increasing financial and military support,
especially from the Americans (the help included sophisticated anti-aircraft
guns in 1986), the Chinese, and the British continued despite the decision of
the Afghan government to close the borders and deploy Soviet guards alongside
the joint Afghan-Pakistani border.(18)
In addition to American aid,
other countries also played key roles in the success of the Mujahid forces,
i.e. Pakistan and Iran. Both countries channeled equipment towards the
resistance forces and took part in the training of the militia. In an overall
perspective, the situation of aid to the Afghan Mujahids can be explained in
the following terms:
“The Afghan resistance forces
drew upon a wide array of outside help. The US coordinated this help, not only
in terms of overall logistics, but also in providing advanced armaments, i.e.,
Stinger missiles. In 1987, the amount of assistance provided by the Americans
went beyond $680mn. The arms produced by China were similar to the ones
manufactured in the Soviet Union and the Chinese provided light arms and heavy
machineguns to the Afghans in addition to extensive military training programs.
A few European countries provided special arms, i.e. the British Blue Pipe
anti-aircraft missile. Saudi Arabia extends financial aid and donates $500,000
to the resistance forces annually. Pakistan acts as a mediator for the
distribution of logistics and provides shelter to the resistance forces and
their leaders. Iran operates outside this arrangement and provides armaments to
paramilitary forces in western and central Afghanistan.”(19)
In order to provide assistance
to the Mujahids, the CIA oversaw their training in Pakistan and played an
active role even in the provision of
Stinger missiles to the forces.(20) All in all, according to estimates,
until 1991 400,000 units of Kalashnikov guns were distributed among the
Mujahids. Until the end of 1987, 65,000 tons of arms were provided or funded by
the Americans and channeled to the Mujahids in Afghanistan.(21)
The era of Soviet occupation
marks the beginning of active American involvement in Afghanistan. During the
presidencies of Messrs. Carter, Reagan, and Bush, Afghanistan ranked high in
the American foreign policy agenda as an area of direct confrontation with the
then Soviets. President Carter formed the rapid reaction force so as to protect
American interests in the Middle East and South Asia while improving ties with
the regional countries, especially Pakistan. The overall American aim was to
contain the ex-Soviet Union. “When assuming power, Reagan led America to act as
a Cold War superpower. Reagan’s main foreign policy theater, in addition to
Central America, was Afghanistan. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations
focused on countering the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, an issue
compared to which other sensitive issues such as the nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction were considered secondary. The Congress usually
adopts a critical approach towards the American foreign policy. Yet, it adopted
a cooperative stance vis-à-vis CIA’s posture and the Reagan-Bush foreign
policies in Afghanistan.”(22)
Throughout this period, the
Americans not only supplied financial aid to the Mujahids, but resorted to a
host of other actions. The Liberty and Free Europe radio stations aired
programs that encouraged Islamic and nationalist sentiments among the Afghans
and in Central Asia.(23) Other moves involved opposition to the sale of grain
to the ex-Soviet Union by Islamic countries and Japan, and the boycott of the
Olympic Games.(24) Through an active engagement in Afghanistan, the United
States not only secured its prime objective of driving back the Soviet forces,
but attained such other goals as solidifying its interests in the region and
especially in the Persian Gulf, preventing Soviet access to the Persian Gulf’s
oil fields, rationalizing its military plans, sale of armaments, and
discrediting the Soviets politically in the regional and international scenes.
In return, the Soviets escalated
force and violence against domestic resistance in Afghanistan and attempted to
contain the assistance that was directed towards that country. However, massive
problems besetting the Soviets, especially on the domestic front, led the
former superpower to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. The Soviets had
understood the scale of their mistake in Afghanistan for quite some time before
the withdrawal and saw that country as a morass. The idea of military
withdrawal assumed momentum with the ascension to power of Gorbachev and launch
of his new policies. These policies were finally realized through a host of
measures in Afghanistan and led to the Geneva Accords.
While training and helping the
Afghan government forces, the ex-Soviet
Union allowed Najibullah to gain maneuver room and set aside
anti-religious propaganda and Communist methods. This policy shift lessened
internal dissent and the continued Soviet influence seemed guaranteed. While
the Soviets were seeking a face-saving formula for withdrawal from Afghanistan,
the US-Soviet relations took a new turn and this objective was finally realized
through the Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords were signed in April 1988 by
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the United States under the aegis of
the United Nations. Apparently the main parties to the agreement were
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States and the ex-Soviet Union acted as
supervisors. The Accords in fact embodied the agreements of the two superpowers
over the adoption of political and non-military solutions to the Afghan
problem. The Geneva Accords dealt with the following issues:
- Resolution of the Afghan
problem by political and peaceful means;
- Withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan;
- Discontinuation of aid by the
US to the Afghan resistance forces.
The withdrawal of the Soviet
forces from Afghanistan started on 15 May 1988 and lasted over a period of ten
months. As stipulated in the Accords, the totality of the Soviet forces
withdrew from Afghanistan.
Upon the Soviet withdrawal, the
main assumption was that the Kabul regime would immediately be replaced by a
coalition of Mujahid forces. Numerous factors postponed the realization of this
alternative for another three years. It was only after the Soviet
disintegration that the Najibullah regime was toppled. The main reasons for
this delay can be enumerated as follows:
1. The Soviets strengthened the
Kabul regime militarily and attempted to meet its needs. In addition, military
training was provided to the Afghan government forces so they could continue
their occupation of various regions. Prior to the withdrawal, several regions
were ceded to the Afghan government
forces on a test and trial basis so that weaknesses would become apparent and
eventually solved;
2. After the Soviet withdrawal,
international aid gradually stopped and the issue lost its priority. Aids to
the Mujahids were thus cut and their military, economic, and political power
declined. All the while, the Kabul
regime was supported by the then Soviet Union;
3. Foreign invasion usually
stirs domestic solidarity. Upon the Soviet invasion various popular and Mujahid
groups from various Shi’ite, Sunni, and other ranks united to eject the common
enemy from the Afghan soil. Yet, after the enemy was thwarted, this unity
collapsed and the Mujahid ranks broke apart. As such, they failed to stage a
unified attack against the government to defeat it;
4. The regime embarked on
extensive propaganda efforts. The Kabul regime began supporting Islam and hence
drew some degrees of popular support;
5. The United States did not
particularly favor the formation of an Islamic government. At the time, the
fall of the regime could easily translate into a victory for the Mujahids and
Islam, allowing the formation of a powerful Islamic government. Both the United
States and the then Soviet Union
opposed the emergence of any form of Islamic government and spared no
effort to prevent the final victory of the Mujahids.(25)
Afghanistan lost its priority
in the American foreign policy in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. The
US policy thus entered a period of relative decline in that country. Even
during the Soviet occupation, the American support of the Mujahids was relative;
enough aid was channeled to damage the Soviet position but would not be enough
to enable the Mujahids to score absolute superiority over the enemy.
The unprecedented rapprochement
between the superpowers and bilateral cooperation in various spheres, especially
during the Second Persian Gulf War, drove the United States to consider
distancing itself from Afghanistan. In September 1991, the Soviets and the
Americans reached an agreement to desist aid to the Afghan government and the
Mujahids. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic significance of
Afghanistan waned. The Afghan problem no longer interested the American public
and policymakers. The issue was left to Afghan-American pundits to stir
American interest in Afghanistan. In that context the Cooperation Council of
Afghan National Cooperation (CCANC) was founded in the early 1990s.(26)
Once Soviet assistance to
Najibullah’s regime ceased, the Kabul resistance forces relied on past supplies
of weapons to continue their fight for a few more months. Most important of
all, the regime’s lack of legitimacy caused the armed forces to join the
popular movement. In this midst, General Dustam’s alliance with the Mujahids
was noteworthy. Najibullah’s efforts to transfer the government to the Pushtun
groups proved unsuccessful and finally in 1992, Najibullah’s regime fell. Kabul
was effectively occupied by the Afghan Mujahids.
In this period, “the US State
Department distanced itself from the Afghan quagmire. Although the State
Department supported UN’s unsuccessful attempts at halting internal war in
Afghanistan, the volume of its humanitarian assistance dwindled… The American
bilateral and multilateral aid to that
country has continuously declined. In 1989, American multilateral
assistance to Afghanistan amounted to $74mn; but six years later, in 1995, that
figure plunged to $44mn. On the other hand, the size of bilateral aid declined
from $102mn in 1989 to $1mn in 1995.”(27)
Unfortunately, despite
agreements prior to the fall of Najibullah’s regime on an interim government,
the Afghan Mujahids were dragged into a civil war with the intention of
eliminating their rivals and assuming total power. Afghanistan’s civil war was
marked by a picture of shifting alliances between the Mujahid forces, none of which
succeeded in attaining absolute superiority in the war.
“Developments in Afghanistan
prior to the emergence of the Taliban unfolded along a peculiar path that
persisted even after the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of the pro-Soviet
regime. The internal war
was over the control of
territory and assumption of power in the government. The emergence of the
Taliban led to a new situation, which involved Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that
sought control over Afghanistan. This scenario was coordinated and planned by
the United States and Britain.”(28) The ensuing instability besetting
Afghanistan did not favor the interests of non-regional actors and the renewed
disinterest of the US in Afghanistan encouraged greater Iranian involvement
that had entered a new phase with the emergence of the Taliban and the new
policies of the United States.
The continuation of the civil
war inflicted heavy damages on the lives and property of the Muslim people of
Afghanistan. This time, the Afghan domestic forces were the ones that inflicted
damages and not an outside enemy. Due to the ensuing instability and lack of
domestic security, programs channeled towards Afghanistan by foreign countries
were postponed and the degree of involvement of these countries was directly
affected.
Under these circumstances, the
Taliban made an unexpected appearance and scored considerable victory with the
aid of foreign powers. At the beginning, the intent of the Taliban was unclear
and their insistence on restoring calm and security drew domestic and
international admiration. This very factor facilitated their future success.
With the unveiling of the Taliban’s true intentions, the credibility of their
supporters was questioned.
The formation of the Taliban as
a political and resistance force dates back to 1994. Prior to this period, the
Taliban were considered a religious group trained in the madrasas of Pakistan.
Their proclaimed objective was to safeguard and propagate religious teachings.
Since 1994, as Taliban’s convoys to Qandahar were raided, they were forced to
defend themselves and gradually came to be considered as one of the parties to
the Afghan civil war. In this period, the Taliban succeeded in assuming control
of Qandahar subsequent to an easy victory. This very factor encouraged them to
consider expanding their control and the region’s conditions facilitated their
objective.
Pakistan had amassed
considerable benefit from the aids donated by the US and Saudi Arabia to
Afghanistan’s resistance forces. The cutback in the assistance deprived
Pakistan of a notable source of revenue and the government of that country was
thus forced to improvise for an alternative. On the other hand, with the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of the new
independent states in Central Asia, Pakistan’s attention shifted towards the
region.
At the end, Pakistan sought to
use the issues of Taliban and Afghanistan’s internal security to facilitate the
transit of goods to Central Asia through the Afghan and Pakistani territories.
The realization of this scenario would facilitate Pakistan’s access to
considerable revenue. To this end, Pakistan assumed an active posture vis-à-vis
Afghanistan and went as far as seeking direct presence alongside Taliban’s
forces. Moreover, the Pakistani government solicited the support of other
countries, notably the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Pakistan
drew on its previous influence over the
Taliban to channel logistics and training towards this group and undertook
their reorganization. At present, in addition to religious students other
groups are being supported by the Taliban. The interests of these groups are
clearly tied together, yet some of them harbor ideas that are incongruent with
Taliban’s stated goals. Some of these groups are: The Communist commanders who
support Najibullah; Pakistani commanders and the Sahabeh Army’s paramilitary
forces that form the military axis of the Taliban; Afghanistan’s religious
students; members of the Islamic Party and the Islamic Revolution Movement;
drug lords; and the leaders of the Pushtun clan. Except for the Pakistani and
the Sahabeh Army commanders, the rest of the groups are not involved in the
making of strategic decisions.(29)
After Qandahar, other regions
of Afghanistan were targeted. Drawing on extensive support, the Taliban
succeeded in scoring successive victories in the Pushtun regions of south and
west Afghanistan. Yet, the anti-Taliban Shi’ite regions of the center together
with the Tajik and Uzbek regions of the north staged resistance. The Taliban
has a revisionist interpretation of Islam and forcefully shut down all girls’
schools, limited the free movement of women, banned modern lifestyle and music,
and embarked on mass extermination and ethnic cleansing.
In light of post-Soviet
disintegration developments and the new situation in Afghanistan, the American
foreign policy took a new turn. At present, the American policy is very much in
line with the postures adopted by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The factors
contributing to this change were oil and the increasing presence of Iran in the
Afghan scene.
“When oil production in the US
declined and the American oil companies began re-investing in friendly
countries, the Central Asian republics seemed even more attractive than the
traditional Middle Eastern allies. The latter were not willing to entrust the
control of their national oil wealth to foreign powers. The second factor that
contributed to a change in the American foreign policy had to do with Iran’s
increasing influence in Afghanistan. In the absence of major powers, Iran could
assume a greater share by backing Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Clinton
Administration had adopted the ‘Dual Containment’ policy vis-à-vis both Iran
and Iraq and became wary of Iran’s greater role in Afghanistan and Central
Asia. As a result, the Americans gave Pakistan a carte blanche to back the
Taliban in their dealings with Rabbani’s government.”(30)
With Rabbani assuming power,
Iran became the main winner, gaining maneuver room to exert influence due to
its linguistic and religious ties. It did not take long before the US and its
allies entered the picture to change the status quo in their favor.
“The objective that the US
pursues in supporting the Taliban and the continuation of disaster in
Afghanistan is to empower a regime to the east of that country that would be
anti-Shi’ite and anti-Iranian in orientation and thus play a role in containing
Iran. At the same time, the US hopes that with the Taliban’s assumption of
power, gas pipelines could link Turkmenistan to the open seas via Afghanistan
and Pakistan. As such, Iran will be effectively isolated in the Caspian Sea’s
oil and gas geopolitics.”(31)
The diversity of oil resources
and suppliers facilitates access to oil and offers various alternatives should
a specific region be destabilized by crisis. The US opts for the Pakistan route
considering the fact that the government of that country is an ally and
provides an alternative to Middle Eastern sources. It was in this context that
the American firm Unocal signed an agreement with the Saudi Delta Co. on the
construction of the Turkmenistan pipeline. The region’s instability has delayed
the implementation of the agreement. Unocal is also financing the activities of
the Taliban.
By strengthening the Taliban,
the US can attain other objectives as well. The weakening of Islamic
fundamentalism emerges as a case in point. The Islamic revival in Iran and in
other regions of the world was viewed as the main post-Cold War challenge to
the new world order spearheaded by the United States. Once empowered, the
Taliban would present a negative picture of Islam by enforcing a primitive
lifestyle. In addition, the US is exerting political pressure on Russia and
China while undermining their position in Central Asia. Other objectives
include the elimination of advanced weapons that were placed at the disposal of
the Mujahids during the Soviet period and the eradication of terrorists taking
refuge in Afghanistan, i.e. Bin Laden. The American influence over Taliban has
yet to result in the extradition of Bin Laden. The recent attacks staged by the
US against Bin Laden’s strongholds only elicited minor reaction from the
Taliban or virtually no action.
The US does not openly support
the Taliban, but extends aid indirectly through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Taliban’s extremist position has played a major part in alienating the
international community, thus depriving it of formal recognition. The United
States sees itself in a bind as well. Extensive negotiations with the Taliban
did not result in the extradition of Bin Laden who is accused of staging
terrorist acts against the US; nor did Taliban’s behavior towards women and
children change. As such, the United States could not extend recognition to
that group and yet claim to be a supporter of human rights.(32)
The American policy towards
Taliban is one of resignation and silence. Only the breach of human rights and
international law by the Taliban has been condemned. In the UN Security Council
declaration of 6 August 1998 against the Taliban, the Western countries
rejected Russia’s proposal of
simultaneous condemnation of
the Taliban and Pakistan’s intervention in
Pakistan. No concrete step has thus far been taken against the Taliban.
A number of observers even argue that the United States
played an active role in
Taliban’s advancement in northern Afghanistan by providing to this group
sensitive satellite pictures of the movement of anti-Taliban forces. Agreements
signed by oil companies and the Taliban further intensify existing doubts.
From the very beginning, the
Americans supported the Taliban; yet in order to avoid criticism, the US
government has also negotiated with other groups that not only did not benefit
from these contacts, but suffered instead. In 1996, the US government invited
all warring factions to negotiate a political formula in Washington. The
invitation included the Taliban as well. Participation in the negotiation
sessions and seminars assigned credibility to that group. A number of warring
sides rejected the invitation and the move incited differences and quarrels
among these groups. On the other hand, the Taliban took advantage of the
situation and engaged in negotiations with American policymakers in order to
pave the way for carrying out future plans.
The next year, the Taliban
sought the American help in securing a seat at the United Nations by opening an
office at the UN headquarters in New York. Subsequently, the US decided to
close down
Afghanistan’s embassy in Washington
to the detriment of that country’s government. In that year, the American
government drew up a peace plan for Afghanistan that involved the
demilitarization of that country’s western regions and the withdrawal of the
Taliban from Kabul. The impact of the plan was to instigate further rifts among
the resistance groups, while putting greater pressure on the Shi’ites. During
the OIC summit meeting in Tehran, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan sought to
influence a number of countries to accept Taliban’s participation in the
conference.(33) In pursuing its policies, the United States has resorted to
rhetoric, while avoiding any action against the extremist actions of the
Taliban.
Before reaching any conclusion
and making predictions about the future, it bears mention that the Afghanistan
chapter is not closed and various developments are still underway in that
country. Given
the possibility of change in
the postures of involved countries and groups, it would be very difficult to
make any prediction about the future course of events. What follows, therefore,
is at best an extrapolation based on the past history of developments.
The extremist positions and
actions of the Taliban together with the breach of human rights and
international law, have placed the supporters of Taliban, i.e., the US,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, in a difficult position. The Taliban rely
on crude force to rule Afghanistan. The organizations that would be necessary
to run the country have been shut down. To meet the war’s expenses, they draw
on foreign aid and trade of narcotics. In addition, the multi-ethnic
configuration of Afghanistan
prevents any single group from
assuming power. In the past two years, the rule of the Pushtun Taliban over the
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and the Shi’ites has faced major obstacles. Given the
circumstances, Taliban’s aims and objectives will either drive Afghanistan
towards dismemberment or another group will replace them. It can also be predicted
that even if the Taliban succeeded in controlling the totality of the Afghan
territory, the probability of rifts emerging in the Taliban ranks would be very
high. Also, in case of Taliban’s total victory, chances are that the
non-regional supporters of this group might wish to have them replaced by more
moderate forces. In the past, there have been concrete moves against the
Taliban, yet they have proved unsuccessful. By extending indirect support to
the Taliban, the US has been able to attain its objectives. The agreements
signed by Unocal with the participation of other oil companies bear this point
out. In addition, the victories of the Taliban have translated into the
relative weakness of the pro-Iranian forces, leaving the latter on the defensive.
Iran no longer exerts influence in Taliban-controlled regions. The primary
objective
of the United States in
Afghanistan is to support and maintain the Taliban in power. A few problems,
however, do not allow the US to
directly support the Taliban.
The American government is
bound by diplomatic considerations when the extension of recognition to
anti-human rights groups is concerned. On the other hand, American women and
their lobbies exert considerable pressure against any pro-Taliban measures
adopted by the American government. In this context, Unocal was forced to stop
the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
pipeline project and lay-off its workers.(34) Taliban’s support of Bin Laden
who is accused of staging attacks against the American government and its bases
prevents an outright and direct support of this group by the US. In an act of
retaliation, the US government targeted terrorist installations in Afghanistan,
yet the attacks were not directed at the Afghans or the Taliban
strongholds.(35)
Since the stated American
foreign policy objective is to counter Islamic fundamentalism, the support
extended to the Taliban shows that the Afghan movement is one of the Islamic
fundamentalist trends that, unlike the case of Iran, has been brought under the
American control.(36) The United States
has expressed willingness to extend formal recognition to the Taliban should
Bin Laden be extradited. The former US Secretary of State had made explicit
statements to that effect. Subsequent to Albright’s statements, the Taliban and
the US government edged closer towards a common solution to the problem.
As long as the Bin Laden
problem persists and the anti-humanitarian activities of the Taliban continue
the attainment of a solution will be impossible, especially given the fact that
the United Nations has become increasingly active.(37)
On the other hand, both Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan hope to reap benefit from the Afghan situation over the
short term. Should Taliban’s position stabilize, the balance of power will
favor Pakistan, especially in face of India and Iran.
Pakistan has persistently asked
various countries to extend recognition to Afghanistan and accept existing
realities. In the meantime, the Saudi Arabian government expelled Taliban’s
Charge D’Affaires to Riyadh and recalled its Charge D’Affaires from Kabul. This
development took many observers by surprise and was attributed to the
improvement of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran
has always sided with the people of Afghanistan and contributed spiritual and
material help to the Afghan people during these years of turbulence and war.
Iran is home to three million Afghan refugees. However, the increasing power of
the Taliban has brought many challenges before the Iranian government. The
Taliban have perpetuated a very negative picture of Islam that Iran must
redress in the eyes of the world. Iran’s reaction to Taliban’s policies of mass
extermination and the massacre of its diplomats was to resort to international
quarters. This policy proved to be more successful than any other unilateral
move that could have been contemplated by Tehran.
Tehran should be wary of
involving itself in the Afghan quagmire that can easily elicit considerable
negative propaganda and cost. At the same time, movement towards détente in
relation to various countries can benefit the Iranian diplomacy in major ways
and secure Iran’s national interests. Iran seems to be well on its way to tap
the diplomatic opportunities that have availed themselves over the recent
years.
*Haydar Ali Balouji is
Researcher at the Law and International Studies Center, Institute for Political
and International Studies.
1 Albert A. Stahl, “The
Strategic Background and Importance of the Afghan Issue,” Second Seminar on
Afghanistan (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies, 1991),
p. 65.
2 Abdolreza Hooshang Mahdavi,
The History of Iran’s Foreign Relations from the Safavid Era to the End of WWII
(Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications, 1990), p. 276.
3 Albert A. Stahl, Op. Cit.
4 Abdolreza Hooshang Mahdavi,
Op. Cit.
5 Afghanistan’s Green Book
(Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies, 1993), p. 259.
6 Ibid, p. 260.
7 Nasser Mosturi Kashani,
Afghanistan: Two-Face Diplomacy (Tehran: Iranshahr, 1992), pp. 7-8.
8 Proceedings of the Second
Seminar on Afghanistan, Op. Cit., p. 77.
9 Nasser Mosturi, Ibid, p. 41.
10 Alex P. Schmid, Soviet
Military Intervention Since 1945 (New Jersey:
Transaction Inc., 1985), p. 127.
11 Parviz Varjavand, “Iran’s
Diplomatic Crisis and Its Implications,” Etela’at Siasi va Iqtisadi,
November-December 1996, p. 102.
12 Afghanistan’s Green Book,
Ibid, p. 153.
13 Ibid, p. 236.
14 Central Asia and the
Caucasus Review, No. 18, Summer 1997, P. 185.
15 Parviz Varjavand, “The
Crisis of the Iranian Diplomacy and Its Implications,” Etela’at Siasi va
Iqtisadi, No. 109-110, 1996, p. 113.
16 Nasser Mostouri Kashani,
Ibid, pp. 72-73.
17 Ibid, p. 60.
18 Ibid.
19 Marin Stremecki,
“Gorbachev’s New Strategy in Afghanistan,” Strategic Analysis, No. 3, Summer
1997, p. 34.
20 Dilip Hiro, “America Turns
on the Monster It Spawned,” Middle East International, No. 582, September 1998,
p. 19.
21 Parviz Iqbal Khan Tarin,
“Afghanistan: Victory and Tragedy,” Central Asia and the Caucasus Review, No.
15, Fall 1996, p. 63.
22 Shinamati Mahapatra,
“American Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,” Translated by Sanaz Tabarestani,
Etela’at Siasi va Iqtisadi, March-April 1998, p. 118.
23 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p. 19.
24 Nasser Mostouri Kashani,
Ibid, p. 73.
25 Afghanistan’s Green Book,
Ibid, pp. 180-181.
26 Shinamati Mahapatra, Ibid,
p. 118.
27 Shinamati Mahapatra, Ibid,
p. 118.
28 Parviz Varjavand, “The
Crisis of the Iranian Diplomacy and Its Implications,” Etela’at Siasi va
Iqtisadi, June-July 1997, p. 82.
29 “Interview with Burhanoddin
Rabbani, President of Afghanistan,” Etela’at, September 1998, p. 12, quoted in
Al’Alam, No. 639, Translated by Ismail Iqbal.
30 Shinamati Mahapatra, Ibid,
p. 118.
31 Pirouz Mojtahed Zadeh, “The
World in the Year that Elapsed,” Majaleh
Siasi va Iqtisadi, March-April 1998, p. 18.
32 Parviz Varjavand, Ibid.
33 Isa Kameli, Chronology of
Developments in Afghanistan: 1997 (Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998).
34 Kate Clark, “The Taliban
Dilemma,” Middle East International, No. 582, 4 September 1998, p. 6.
35 Ibid.
36 Dilip Hiro, Ibid, p. 18.
37 http://www.cnn.com, 19 January 2001.
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