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The hijacking of a Vnukovo Airlines aircraft flying from Istanbul to Medina, Saudi Arabia last March by Chechen sympathisers, combined with April's hostage-taking incident at Istanbul's Swissotel Bosphorus by pro-Chechen gunmen, have drawn international attention to the spectre of terrorism emanating from the Russian Federation.

Consequently, the international media has focused almost exclusively on the activities of Chechen militants, but this only provides a partial analysis of how terrorism is developing in these regions. When considering the increasing use of terrorism by groups in the Russian Federation, several trends can be discerned:

- groups rarely admit responsibility for the violent acts they have perpetrated, thus making the identification of terrorist groups an elusive task;

- terrorist motivations are seldom clearly defined, and in many cases evidence suggests that motivations converge between the criminal and political;

- both the Russian state and terrorist groups are simultaneously manipulating the environment that has emerged as a result of terrorism; and

- the groups that have not gained the intended results from terrorism at home, such as Chechen separatists, have begun to direct their operations abroad in an attempt to bring greater attention to their cause.

Terrorism in the Russian Federation can be loosely divided into five categories: ethno-nationalist separatists; religious extremists; criminals; the state; and 'others'.

 

 

Nationalism and Religion

Over the past decade, tensions and conflict in the Russian Federation have primarily been focused around ethno-nationalist struggles by minority groups seeking complete independence or some degree of autonomy from Moscow. Although the region has witnessed sporadic terrorist incidents in Dagestan and North Ossetia-Ingushetia, the most intense terrorist campaigns have emerged alongside the continuing conflict in Chechnya.

Over the past three years, Chechen rebel forces have increasingly resorted to acts of terrorism in their operations against Russian troops to support their guerrilla tactics. These evolving tactics can be understood in the context of Russian successes in Chechnya and Moscow's refusal to withdraw from Chechen territory. For the rebels, terrorism has become a dual-purpose tool which serves to force Russian troops out of Chechnya and to erode Russian public support for Moscow's Chechnya policy.

The adoption of terrorism by Chechen rebels is evident on four fronts:

- their growing ties with an international network of Islamic terrorists;

- the use of suicide bombings;

- targeting civilian installations in Russia proper; and

- the provision of militants to terrorist groups in other regions of the former Soviet Union.

External support from the international Islamic militant community can be traced back to the Chechen War of 1994-1996, mostly in the inconsequential form of volunteer Arab, Pakistani, and Afghan fighters. However, by the outbreak of the second Chechen War in 1999, ties to the Middle East and Afghanistan were significantly stronger. In addition to attracting volunteer fighters to Chechnya, the most prominent Chechen warlords - Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab - have apparently benefited from ties with Osama bin Laden.

Although the extent of these contacts should not be overstated, there is evidence that Bin Laden has offered financial support (US$30 million) for the Chechen cause and has opened training camps for Chechen fighters in Afghanistan. Furthermore, it is also evident that fighters loyal to Bin Laden are active in Chechnya in far greater numbers than during the first war. Most interesting, however, is a rumour that emerged in 1999, suggesting that Bin Laden created a Chechen mercenary group called 'Al Dago'. The sole purpose of this group - whose existence remains unconfirmed - was to stage acts of terrorism against Russian troops and civilian facilities in Russian cities.

In addition to strengthened alliances with Islamic militants, the resort to terrorism is also exemplified in the growing use of suicide bombings. Chechen militants appear to be adopting the strategic use of suicide bombings to eliminate federal troop leaders and Russian military unit commanders in Chechnya, as well as to attack military and administrative facilities, and to eliminate 'traitors of the nation'. It is believed that most attacks are conducted by one of two suicide battalions, known as 'Shakhid', formed by Basayev in September 1999. These battalions are believed to number approximately 500.

During a two-day period in July, Russian sources reported five suicide attacks that killed 33 people and wounded 84. Included among the attacks was a truck bomb that exploded in a military complex in Urus-Marten, and a second truck bomb detonated at a police hostel in Argun. Furthermore, in fulfilling their goal to eliminate Chechen 'traitors', between 1999 and 2000, over 50 people were killed for co-operating with Moscow, all of whom were allegedly forewarned. In the first 10 days of May 2001 alone, at least 10 people were killed because they did not support Chechen militant groups.

Chechen rebels have also allegedly intensified their terrorist campaign in Russia proper since 1999. Bomb blasts attributed to Chechen terrorists include the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk and Volgodonsk (resulting in the deaths of over 300 people); and the 2000 bombings in the central Vladikavkaz market, and Pushinskaya Metro Station (Moscow). Despite the fact that no group claimed responsibility, Russian authorities have blamed terrorists from Chechnya. However, there is considerable doubt about who perpetrated these bombings.

There is some evidence that Chechen insurgents have supported other terrorist groups in the former Soviet Union, notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Reports over the past year suggest that Basayev and Khattab have both provided militants to the IMU and have trained IMU rebels at joint camps in Afghanistan.

This raises the question of whether the primary motivation of Chechen terrorism is ethnic or religious separatism. Are such tactics indicative of an increasing role accorded to radical Islam, or is it just another strategy used by Chechen commander Basayev to gain an edge over Russian forces? After all, it was not until 1998 that Basayev united his forces with Khattab and a group of Islamic radicals from Dagestan. It was only after this point that the official motivation of the Chechen rebels turned from ethnic separatism to uniting Dagestan and Chechnya into a single Islamic state.

Potentially the greatest concern in Moscow is that the relationship between radical Islam and ethno-nationalist struggles will spread throughout the general population of the North Caucasus. This is an increasing probability given Moscow's continued campaign, which is directly contributing to the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the Chechens.

 

 

The Crime-Terror Nexus

Arguably the most prominent form of terrorism in the Russian Federation can loosely be labelled 'criminal-terrorism', which may be applied to two distinct situations. The first refers to terrorist groups engaging in criminal activity as a way to finance their activities, and the second refers to the use of terrorism by organised crime groups seeking to create and maintain an environment conducive to their operations.

The decline of state-sponsored terrorism following the end of the Cold War forced many terrorist groups to resort to criminal activities as a primary source of funding. Ethno-nationalist separatists organising themselves and their operations in the Russian Federation since the early 1990s have been no different. In fact, groups in the North Caucasus benefited substantially from the unprecedented growth of criminality in Chechnya under the leadership of Djokhar Dudayev.

Commonly referred to as a haven for organised crime, Chechnya has given terrorists the opportunity to profit from the illegal sale of oil, trafficking in illicit narcotics and weapons, and kidnapping. Statistics from the Russian Interior Ministry reveal that in 2000 approximately 200 Russian and foreign nationals were taken hostage in and around Chechnya - 66 of whom are still being held.

Although the responsibility for most kidnappings has been attributed to criminal groups, it is recognised that the forces of Basayev and Khattab regularly use this method. In a videotape allegedly confiscated by Russian troops in Chechnya in May, Basayev acknowledged his role in organising many of the kidnappings in Chechnya.

While it is rarely contested that Chechen militants engage in crime to finance their activities, it is rather difficult to confidently distinguish the primary motivation of all rebel commanders. For example, prior to joining with Khattab four years ago, Basayev was not regarded as a radical Islamist. The question therefore remains whether Basayev is driven by ethno-nationalism, radical Islam or by the creation of an environment conducive to his criminal activities in Chechnya and the region by manipulating hostilities.

The terrorist threats facing the Russian Federation have developed concurrently with the growth of organised crime in the region. As criminal groups have been attempting to consolidate their position over the past decade, evidence suggests that they have, at certain times, depended on terror tactics. Assassinations, kidnappings and the use of indiscriminate bombings have been used by organised crime to weaken state institutions, business competition and any threat arising from civil society - including journalists attempting to uncover criminal operations and political contacts.

A steady rise in the number of contract killings between 1991 and 1999 reveals the extent to which criminal organisations have used violence to create a lasting sense of fear throughout society. An increase from 50 recorded contract killings in 1991, to approximately 200 in 1994 and 550 in 1999 has contributed to the widespread belief in Russia that organised crime controls the country.

Given these statistics, many observers have attributed a number of highly destructive bombings to Russian organised crime. For example, although government officials quickly blamed Chechen terrorists for the August 2000 explosion at the Pushkinskaya metro station in Moscow, which killed eight and injured over 100 people, evidence has been uncovered suggesting that the bomb was connected to criminal groups vying for control over the lucrative retail points in the station.

A characteristic differentiating Russian organised crime from many other international criminal groups is that the former have used violence and the threat of violence more egregiously. In addition to acquiring profits, organised crime has also sought to control the legitimate economy and exert political influence. The successful use of terror tactics has thus allowed criminal groups to gain varying degrees of control throughout the federation, notably in regions such as Chechnya, Kaliningrad and Vladivostok.

 

A Terrorist State?

Russia has not been directly accused of employing terror tactics or supporting international terrorism. However, as a sovereign state that still possesses considerable resources, Russia has been indirectly linked to terrorism in two respects.

First, Russian strategy in Chechnya has been the subject of considerable international criticism. A combination of sustained military attacks and human rights abuses, in addition to the direct implications the war has had on the general socio-economic environment, has provoked many analysts to deem Russian actions 'terrorist'. Furthermore, it has been argued that the war is being prolonged by senior Russian officers who have an economic interest in continued instability so that they continue to profit from the illicit export of oil and scrap metal - thus conflating state terrorism with criminal terrorism.

Second, President Vladimir Putin's rise to power has been connected to the wave of bombings that terrorised Russia during 1999 and 2000. This theory suggests that Putin and his supporters in the Federal Security Service (Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti - FSB) orchestrated the explosions, killing hundreds of Russian citizens, to win popular support as a result of his subsequent stance on domestic security threats.

The bombings, blamed on Chechen terrorists, thus became the official reason for Moscow's second invasion of Chechnya. Counterterrorism has also been used as an excuse to infringe on certain individual rights and for repressive policies initiated against the media.

While some have argued that Russia can be called a terrorist state as a result of some of the policies it is promoting, there are no significant grounds on which Moscow can, without question, be labelled terrorist. Furthermore, given the fragile economic, political and social environment in the Russian Federation, there are several diplomatic dangers associated with promoting such an idea.

Although dangerous trends may be emerging, Moscow is not alone in recognising that it is threatened by criminal and political terrorism, and is therefore forced to find ways to limit any further negative impact on Russian society. Therefore, Moscow has found it convenient to manipulate the growth of terrorism to serve its own national security and foreign policy priorities.

 

Emerging Trends

'Other' types of terrorism appear to be gaining momentum. Russia has a significant amount of highly skilled workers and professionals that are either unemployed or underpaid. This has resulted in a situation where certain skills, such as computer hacking, can be easily purchased by both criminal and terrorist groups. Although there is little evidence to suggest that terrorists groups will turn to cyber terrorism, the potential does exist.

In 2000, the Interior Ministry announced that the number of cases involving computer crimes (unauthorised access to databases, spreading viruses, fraud) had grown four-fold since 1999 to 436.

Furthermore, in March 2001 the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that hackers from Russia had successfully penetrated hundreds of US e-commerce sites stealing consumer information, including credit card numbers.

Thus the skills for cyberterrorism evidently exist. However, it remains to be seen whether terrorist groups will utilise this potential.

A second emerging trend appears to be the rise of right-wing terrorism in the form of neo-Nazism. The neo-Nazi movement in Russia is currently believed to consist of over 30,000 members who have begun to increase attacks against non-Russians. For example, in March a group of 20 neo-Nazis attacked an Armenian school in Moscow.

These potentially 'new' forms of terrorism are further complicated by the post-Soviet environment in which they have developed. In addition to readily available stockpiles of conventional weapons, terrorist groups with enough capital and the right contacts can potentially access non-conventional weaponry, including biological and chemical agents.

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Author Bio:

Tamara Makarenko is a senior associate of Cornell Caspian Consulting, and a lecturer in criminology at the university of Glamorgan. This article was first published in Jane's Intelligence Review, in July 2001.