New Directions in Caspian Politics

The Central Asian republics and Russia are increasingly

 being used as a route to transport heroin to Western 

Europe. Tamara Makarenko investigates the 

factors responsible for this phenomenon.

A lucrative drugs market and a desirable standard of living has ensured that Western Europe remains an important destination for illicit narcotics and illegally smuggled and trafficked migrants. Although a variety of routes are utilised to bring these commodities to Europe, most official attention over the past decade has been focused on the 'Balkan' route - originally established to transport Southwest Asian heroin to Europe via Iran and the Balkan peninsula. By 1991, Interpol deemed this route responsible for 65% to 75% of all heroin seized throughout the continent and by 1994 it was known as an important conduit for smuggling and human trafficking.

Ten years later many Western criminal intelligence agencies still regard the Balkan route as the most active trafficking conduit. Despite this sustained widespread belief, several factors strongly suggest that illicit opiates from Afghanistan (and Pakistan) are increasingly being routed through what is referred to as the 'northern' route. As Marc Pasotti of the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention stated during a conference in Hungary in 1998: "The Central Asian CIS republics and Russia are being increasingly used as a shortcut for heroin supplies to Western Europe in place of the Balkan route." Recent evidence uncovered also suggests that the northern route is increasingly being used for illegal human traffic.

Three major factors have been responsible for the growth of northern routes: the Iranian counter-narcotics initiative; increased opium production in Afghanistan; and the post-independence environment in the former Soviet Union.

Early indicators

Supported by the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the government of Iran embarked on a strict anti-narcotics campaign in the mid-1980s. Iran has constructed a system of channels, concrete dams, sentry points and observations towers, in addition to regularly deploying over 30,000 law enforcement personnel to guard its Afghan border. This has enabled the government to disrupt a relatively significant portion of illicit narcotics traffic through its borders. The 204.5 tons of opium Iran confiscated in 1999 represented over 80% of the total global opium seizure.

Although Iranian efforts have not completely eliminated trafficking through its borders - government officials estimate that no more than 20% of drugs are seized - by the early 1990s interdiction efforts had placed a considerable strain on the trafficking operations of criminal groups. Traffickers, in search of ways to diversify their risk, were therefore forced to locate addition routes that could be used to successfully transport shipments of illicit opiates originating from Afghanistan.

The second factor responsible for attracting traffickers to the northern route was increased opium production in Afghanistan - especially in the country's northern regions. According to UN statistics, the production of opium in Afghanistan has steadily grown since 1988. Between 1988 and 1991 it increased 100% and between 1991 and 1999 production grew from an estimated 2,000 tons to a record 4,600 tons. Thus by the end of 1999, Afghanistan produced approximately 75% of the global supply of opium.

Rising production in Afghanistan is an important factor primarily because it acted as a catalyst for traffickers to locate new routes in order to ensure that rising supplies reached external markets - a necessary requirement to maximise profits. By the end of 2000, the UNDCP (now the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention) estimated that only 20% to 30% of Afghan heroin was transported to Europe via the traditional Iranian-Turkish route, and at least 50% of heroin consumed in Europe travelled via Central Asia.

Given events in Iran and Afghanistan, northern routes through the Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and Russia were extremely attractive to traffickers for a variety of reasons. The successor republics that emerged from the demise of the Soviet Union not only covered a very large geographic area but had extremely porous borders. For example, border guard units and customs service in Central Asia were not established until 1993-4. Even today they remain ill-equipped, underfunded and undertrained in countering illicit trafficking.

A second factor attracting the exploitation of northern routes was, and continues to be, the deteriorating regional socio-economic situation throughout much of the former Soviet Union. In Central Asia - the first leg of the northern routes - unemployment rates are high and low/unpaid wages remains a common problem. The UN Human Development Report estimates that approximately 80% of the population in Tajikistan and 30% in Kazakhstan lives below the poverty line.

Involvement in the drugs trade alleviated some of the financial difficulties faced by many Central Asians. In addition to farmers willing to grow drug crops as a way to subsidise their family income, many citizens are willing to traffic small amounts of narcotics into Russia. The most recent trend in the region has witnessed criminal groups employing young people and women as their principal drug couriers.

Furthermore, the promise of a better life in the West is luring many people (predominantly women) into the hands of human smugglers. For example, an estimated 5,000 women were trafficked from Kazakhstan in 1999, and a further 4,000 women were trafficked from Kyrgyzstan, according to the International Organisation for Migration's (IOM) April 2001 bulletin. In many cases these women were trafficked via northern routes through Russia to final destinations in Europe.

It should also be noted that the predominantly poor socio-economic conditions along the northern routes create an environment in which law enforcement and customs officials are more willing to accept bribes from traffickers. Estimates suggest that 50% of law enforcement personnel in Kyrgyzstan alone collaborate with traffickers in one form or another.

A final factor responsible for the shifting reliance from the Balkan to northern routes is the growing power of organised crime, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus. As the drugs trade flourished in Central Asia over the past decade, a number of regional criminal groups - with established relationships with government, law enforcement and military officials - took control of the transportation of drugs from Afghanistan. Given a network reaching throughout the former Soviet republics, northern routes became the most feasible conduit for trafficking illicit goods through Russia, the Caucasus and further west.

Evidently these are not the only factors that have given traffickers the opportunity to expand into northern routes. However, they do provide ample evidence that northern routes are becoming increasingly popular.

Following the routes

An intricate system of northern trafficking routes has been established to ship narcotics and, more recently, humans, into the former Soviet Union and further west. Although it is almost impossible to determine all the exact routes, it has been ascertained that trafficking routes flow in the directions illustrated (see map). That said, criminal groups operating in Central Asia have been extremely adaptable, and continuously appear to be using new route combinations.

It appeared that the division and control of routes is largely determined by the origin of the trafficking group. For example, Central Asian and Russian groups prefer to move shipments into Kyrgyzstan via Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, then route them through Kazakhstan to destinations in Russia and further west to the Baltic republics and Western Europe. Groups from the Caucasus, on the other hand, appear to use two main routes: Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan-Russia; and through Turkmenistan, across the Caspian to Azerbaijan/Armenia, into Russia/Ukraine and on to Central and Eastern Europe.

For illicit narcotics there are major transhipment/transit points in most countries that fall along the northern routes. Some of these centres include: Badakhshan, Leninobad and Pyandzh (Tajikistan); Osh, Djalalabad, and Batken (Kyrgyzstan); Kostanay and Pavlodar (Kazakhstan); and Samara and Novosibirsk (Russia).

Once drugs shipments reach the western borders of Russia, preliminary evidence suggests that Estonia, the port of Riga in Latvia, Poland and Slovakia are being utilised as additional transhipment points for illicit goods that are moved into Western Europe. The importance of identifying these transhipment points is imperative as Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Italy have already raised concerns over increasing amounts of heroin penetrating their markets. Although these countries have traditionally been supplied by Southwest Asia, the fact that a number of Central Asian smugglers have been identified in these countries suggests that trends are changing.

In addition to anecdotal evidence provided by a variety of sources, increasing confiscation rates in Central Asia (as indicated in the table) and specific points in Russia suggest that these routes are increasingly preferred over their 'southern' counterparts.

The exact number of drugs entering Russia from Central Asia is not known but recent statistics compiled by the UN suggest that 80% of heroin seized in Russia is delivered from points in Central Asia. Furthermore, it has been estimated that routes via Central Asia deliver 84% of confiscated hashish, 60% of opium, and 53% of all marijuana seized by Russian authorities. Reports that heroin seizure rates in Turkey have decreased 22% between 1998 and 1999 further suggest that northern routes are expanding.

As with the development of the Balkan route, it was not long before the northern routes were also used for the illicit trafficking of commodities other than narcotics - the most disturbing being the smuggling and trafficking of humans. Within Central Asia the IOM has noted that human trafficking flows to Europe predominantly follow two primary routes. The first is from northern Kazakhstan to Moscow, on to Greece and from there to elsewhere in Europe. The second route appears to begin in Kyrgyzstan and ends in the Middle East, Turkey and Europe via routes secured through Kazakhstan and Russia. These routes mostly traffic in Central Asian women destined for the sex industry.

Since last year there have also been allegations that people from Sri Lanka and Afghanistan have been smuggled to Europe via northern routes. The most common route begins in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, goes via Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to Russia, then to Belarus and Ukraine from where they are eventually smuggled to Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands.

Assessing the implications

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore evidence suggesting that northern routes are beginning to play a major role in the international narcotics trade, and a potentially expanding role in the smuggling and trafficking of humans.

Although a significant percentage of drugs and illegal migrants remain within the former Soviet Union, it would be naive to conclude that they are not shipped beyond the western borders of Russia.

Furthermore, given the relative ease with which northern routes are being used, it appears as though they may slowly replace the Balkans as the dominant route for bringing drugs into Europe.

Some current arguments suggest that the importance of northern trafficking routes is already being diminished as a result of the Taliban imposing a ban on the production of opium in Afghanistan this year. Granted that opium production has remarkably declined, two points suggest that this assessment is flawed and that the use of northern routes will continue to expand. First, there remain significant stockpiles of opium throughout Afghanistan, especially along the Tajik border. Trafficking these narcotics to external markets therefore remains a priority for many criminal groups.

Second, should the Taliban ban on opium production successfully continue into the future, the domestic production of illicit narcotics in Central Asia may well increase substantially to compensate criminal organisations facing lost profits from Afghan shipments. Given suitable environmental and geographic conditions, combined with a history of narcotics production in areas such as the Chuy Valley and Zhambyl, Central Asia is capable of becoming a major production zone. This would subsequently ensure that northern routes will continue to play an important role well into the future.

For these reasons it is becoming extremely important for the international community, especially European states, to contribute more resources to help the Central Asian republics strengthen their border control. Rustam Nazarov, head of the Tajik anti-drugs agency, said during a television debate in Dushanbe that: "Unfortunately, the law-enforcement agencies are, to put it mildly, insufficiently equipped to carry out the fight against drug-related crimes in comparison with the requirements." As the front line of the northern trafficking routes, the success or failure of Central Asian law enforcement efforts will eventually have an impact on the amount of narcotics and illegal migrants entering the European market.

European states must also carefully consider the consequences of granting Eastern and Central European states full accession rights. Questions concerning how these states are responding to the illegal flow of commodities requires as much attention and resources as political and economic reforms. With limited influence in Central Asia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe can exert more influence on the governments of Eastern and Central Europe - using accession as a carrot.

YEAR	KAZAKHSTAN	KYRGYZSTAN	TAJIKISTAN	TAJIK/AFGHAN BORDER*	TURKMENISTAN	UZBEKISTAN
1993	12,000	1,733	113	N/A	N/A	6,165
1994	11,000	1,747	321	260	N/A	3,017
1995	10,400	1,255	1,750	1,720	N/A	3,000
1996	12,975	2,118	3,565	2,000	14,109	7,822
1997	31,521	2,428	4,533	2,300	41,109	3,308
1998	13,368	1,774	2,951	956	24,157	3,260
1999	23,000	3,555	2,000**	569	39,555	4,210
2000	30,000***	5,370	7,128	3,129	2,200	3.000***

*Seized by FSB **Heroin and opium. ***Jan-Oct.****estimate

Source: National interior ministries and the ODCCP

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Author Bio:

Tamara Makarenko is a senior associate of Cornell Caspian Consulting, and a lecturer in criminology at the university of Glamorgan. She is an independent political and security consultant specializing in the Russian Federation and Central Asia. This article was published in Jane's Intelligence Review, August 2001.