The ongoing negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are of essential importance. The final text of the treaty would determine its purpose: disarmament, the curtailment of horizontal non-proliferation, or arms control.

This paper will attempt to study and analyze the various suggestions regarding the FMCT, in order to evaluate the relevance of the various approaches to the final outcome of the treaty, the likely impact of its negotiations on the future production of fissile material, the drawbacks in the various specifications of the fissile material, and the relation between the different types of inventories, i.e., civilian, transitional, and military.

Since the end of Cold War there have been considerable developments in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control. New actors such as India and Pakistan have not only declared their capability overtly but also challenged the efficiency of existing non-proliferation mechanisms. In addition, developments of new technologies such as the Anti Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) systems, and the broader movement by the United States of America towards a revision of the ABM treaty could result in the undoing of the prevailing concept of deterrence. The development of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the role of such technologies in the self defense capabilities of the countries would in turn lead to an upward revision of their respective fissile material requirements and deterrence needs. Hence the importance of a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT), equally applicable to the new and old actors of the proliferation game.

The Next Step in International Arms Control and Disarmament

The FMCT is the most likely step in the direction of arms control and disarmament. The purpose of treaty as defined by the UN Resolution 48/75L, (December 1993) is to negotiate a ‘non discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. The Resolution designated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the agency to provide assistance in examining verification arrangements as required. [1]

By virtue of the UN Resolution 48/75L on January 25, 1994, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) appointed a Special Coordinator, to seek the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate the type of FMCT requested by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The Special Coordinator, the Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon, announced in June 1994 that consensus existed among members that the CD forum was the most appropriate one for negotiating such a treaty.[2] On March 23, 1998, the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of Ambassador Shannon's report, agreed on a mandate based on the UN Resolution 48/75L.

The report (CD/1299) of the Special Coordinator reflected the only instance when a consensus existed within the member states. It outlined the following objectives:

1. To establish an ad-hoc committee on the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. To negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, international, verifiable treaty, with the aid of the adhoc committee, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, devices, or nuclear weapons.

3. The ad-hoc committee will report to the CD on progress of its work, before the conclusion of 1995 session.

Following this session, no Resolution was adopted by the UNGA till August 1998, when preliminary negotiations were commenced on the basis of the Shannon Report (CD 1299) in CD and an ad-hoc committee was established to negotiate a treaty banning production of fissile material.[3] The committee, however, did not meet, therefore, no report was ever presented. The significance lay in the differences over scope and verification approaches and safeguards mechanisms to be employed by the treaty in the CD negotiations on the issue. However in December 1998, the UNGA Resolution 53-771 encouraged the CD to resume negotiations on FMT during the 1999 session, on the basis of the Shannon Report. The Conference on Disarmament’s 1999 session, from 18 January-8 September, ended in a deadlock, as it was unable to reconvene the ad-hoc committee, charged with negotiating the treaty. The impasse continued in the next CD session in the year 2000, as the CD members failed to reach a consensus.

The Scope of the Treaty

Though the treaty negotiations are placed on the CD agenda since 1993, a deadlock exists and is likely to exist for some time to come. The central dispute underlying the conflict in the FMCT negotiations can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus nuclear non-proliferation. The differences in the CD debates are primarily over the approaches to the treaty and its scope. A consensus exists on the validity of negotiating a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) by all member states, but there is difference of opinion on the scope, verification level, and transparency, and on the issue of stockpiles.

The negotiation and implementation of a legally binding, effectively verifiable treaty has been termed as high priority for the United States. As a result, the US policies exert pressure on the process of negotiations, and are, therefore, of importance. The US claims that by ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, an FMCT would contribute significantly to arms control and disarmament, and international non-proliferation objectives. Whereas the objectives of the US are clear in the case of the treaty, there are considerable divergences in the case of other members that are parties to the negotiations.

The questions that arise are how to achieve a verifiable production halt in the production of fissile material? What will be the impact of the full scope safeguards on NWS and threshold states? How to ensure that a diversion of civilian fissile material to nuclear weapons program does not occur? Should there be inventory control and safeguards on all existing stocks of weapon usable fissile material and if so, then at what level? How to stop the re-allocation of excess stocks to nuclear weapon use? Whether to use the regime as means to equalize the burden sharing of safeguards between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)?[4] Whether the cut off treaty should handle post-production and existing stocks of weapon usable fissile material? What should be the parameters of direct use material in a fissile material treaty? Should Tritium production be left out or should it be included? How to figure the use of fissile material in naval propulsion programmes, as a measure outside the FMCT or within its scope?

The treaty aims at looking at all these divergent opinions for these would have an impact on the deterrent capabilities of the States, which would become a party to this treaty.

The Divergent Approaches

The selected approach would, in the final analysis, lay the groundwork for the verification mechanism, the extent of transparency allowed, the level at which inventories would be allowed to exist and the extent to which the verification would be intrusive. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the different approaches and their impact on the applicability of the final treaty.

On the basis of their arguments and their essential differences some variations of a potential FMT/FMCT are reflected in the following approaches:

·                        The US approach aims at banning only future production of fissile material without imposing measures on existing materials. This approach would freeze what exists at present.

·                        The good will approach strives for reductions of the amount of material permissible for military use. It calls for a ban on the transfer of material back to military uses once it has become civilian, as well as to register upper allowable limits for undeclared material.[5]

·                        The one way approach subscribes to the total amount of material used for military purposes.[6]

·                        The disarmament approach is for creating mechanisms for reduction, which obliges the members to adjust the upper limits of undeclared material to future disarmament treaties.

·                        The cost-effective approach proposes that the scope of FMCT should be limited to weapon grade material.

·                        The European approach shows that no consensus exists within the European states as one entity on the future purpose or scope of the treaty. 

·                        The Indian approach presumes a time bound framework for comprehensive nuclear disarmament

·                        The Pakistani approach aims at addressing the issue of stockpiles not only by merely demanding a ban on future production of fissile material, but also to make quantitative reductions in the existing stockpiles, or at least to increase transparency for existing stockpiles of weapon-usable Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium.[7] Pakistan claims that the treaty should not be referred to as Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT), but should be referred to as Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), as by calling it FMCT it pre-judges the scope of the treaty, which has as yet not been finalized.

 

The final outcome of the treaty is closely associated with the divergent approaches, as it is the consensus on an approach that will decide the verification mechanisms, and the extent to which they would be allowed under the treaty. The current deadlock in the CD is primarily on the scope of the treaty. The main arguments revolve around questions such as, whether the scope will include the civilian inventories, or will it remain limited to putting a ban on material for military use. Similarly, proponents and CD members argue that if the treaty aims at curtailing further military production, then what would comprise a comprehensive approach?

According to some proponents, the treaty would be comprehensive if it aims at not only stopping future production, but also takes into account the various problem areas, for instance the possibilities regarding the dual usage of civilian inventories for weapon grade material, and the resultant production of other fissionable material like tritium and use of enriched Uranium for naval reactors. These gray areas have been a source of discontent in the CD and an obstacle in reaching a common understanding of the purpose of the treaty.

The scope of the treaty is closely connected to the kind of safeguards that would be required by it. Consequently, the category of safeguards would provide the determining factor regarding the degree of intrusiveness and verification requirements. The basic aim under the proposed treaty is the need that verification must cover not only production, but also non-diversion of civilian use material produced later. The issue is closely linked with the need for transparency, which comes in direct conflict with the need of opacity for security reasons. So what should be the minimum level of assurances vis-a-vis transparency?

 Is figurative qualification of fissile material enough? The precise modality of the usage of term varies, but the international benchmark for transparency about fissile material stocks will most likely be the IAEA safeguards. Therefore, it is necessary to understand what is the existent safeguards systems, and to what an extent they would be used in the treaty’s verification mechanisms.

Moreover, the levels of safeguards would basically determine the extent of intrusiveness provided by the verification mechanisms. Currently, the IAEA Safeguards agreements are in force with states known to have engaged in nuclear activities. Three major types of safeguards have evolved and they differ in the undertakings accepted by the concerned states.[8] To some extent the verification arrangements adopted in a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear explosives or other devices would affect, and would be affected by, the existing control systems, chief among them are the IAEA safeguards.[9] Nevertheless, IAEA safeguards are also in transition and the ensuing changes may further complicate the process of negotiations. Safeguards play a significant part in determining the scope of the treaty, as they cannot be seen apart from it. IAEA safeguards are a verification system within the non-proliferation policy, the NPT and the treaty of Tlatelalco to ensure that no nuclear material is diverted for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Safeguards have been structured as such to provide the basis of establishing the connotations of arms control or disarmament in a treaty, as they together lay the basis of a comprehensive NPT. Since 1967, when the NPT was opened for signature, safeguards have remained a developing debate for the basic reason that neither set has been able to cater for the clandestine operations carried out by states to use the nuclear fissile material for military uses. In this developing debate, differences have emerged due to the differences in the specific national interests of the states on the one hand, and on the other, the advancement in technology challenges. From the debate on the efficiency of safeguards to a treaty, three safeguards systems figure prominently in the context of negotiating a FMCT. They are: INFCIRC/153, INFCIRC/66, and the Strengthened Safeguards System or the S³. (They are also known as the 93+2 reform System ^).

These are the model agreements of the IAEA:

·                        INFCIRC/153. It sets the principles and the requirements for full scope safeguards applied on non -nuclear weapons states.[10]

·                        INFCIRC/66. These are also model safeguards agreements under the IAEA designed to apply to individual shipments of plants and materials. These are not applied to the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Mostly the facilities of nuclear weapon states are under these safeguards. However, because of the fact these safeguards have loopholes, as well as there are growing concerns that the model agreements of INCIRC/153 were unable to stop nations from proliferating, additional protocols were added to cover for clandestine operations.

·                        The Strengthened Safeguards System, S³, or the 93+2 Reform System. These safeguards aim at not only implementing the safeguards but also preparing facilities for safeguards, with an enhanced reach. The S³ are based on the principle of universality and are full scope safeguards by the virtue of their nature and scope.[11] These measures cover both nuclear material and non-nuclear elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Research and Development (R&D) and are affected by control or reporting measures. In addition, they also include both the supply and receiving ends of the technology chain.

The safeguards, because of their extensive reach in the case of the S³ safeguards or their subjective reach to the non nuclear weapons states in the case of INFRCIRC/53,[12] will have a direct effect on the security and the military capability of the States, which would be signatories to the FMCT. Notwithstanding the debate for the appropriate system of safeguards it would reflect a choice between INFCIRC /153 or the S³ system depending upon the consensus within the CD. In all probability, the newly Strengthened Safeguards Systems will provide the safeguards base to the treaty, since the aim of the treaty is to the ban future production of nuclear weapons.[13]

However, due to the fact that states exists at different levels of development and that the concept of deterrence is a dynamic process, the shortage or the limited availability of fissile material might force states to opt for clandestine ways of procuring fissile material, thereby further undermining the purpose of the treaty.

The Problem of Definition of Fissile Material and the IAEA

The specific technological requirements of verification strategies in the FMCT/FMT depend upon the technical production processes, which are an offshoot of the definition of fissile material. The scope of the treaty as well as the verification and safeguards to be applied are directly linked to the definition of the fissile material, used as the starting point for the treaty negotiations. The definitional parameters would help determine related details such as the fuel cycles, which are to be covered by the treaty's verification mechanisms. The significance of the definition of the fissile material lies in the fact that this is to determine the loopholes, which otherwise can give rise to evasion of the verification mechanisms, especially for the countries which want to limit the effect of the treaty on their ongoing nuclear programmes.  Since IAEA is the agency identified to give technical and working support to the treaty, it is presumed that for a FMCT, the definition which will have direct bearing, will most likely be the sub-category of ‘any source of nuclear material or special fissile material’, as defined by the IAEA statute in the Article XX.[14]

 

No definition of fissile material has yet been drawn up for the FMCT. However, the fact that IAEA is to be the agency playing a crucial role in the safeguards system, its definitions of fissile material, as defined in article XX of the IAEA statute, will prevail as the definition to be used by the FMCT.[15]  The categories will relate to the following types of fissionable material:

·                        Special fissionable material: Plutonium 239; Uranium 233; Uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing any of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall find from time to time.[16]

·                         Source material: Refers to ‘Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes accruing in nature; Uranium depleted in isotope 235; Thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal alloy, chemical compounds or concentrates; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine as having a direct bearing on weapons development and military uses.[17]

·                        Direct use nuclear material: Any nuclear material, which does not need further reprocessing and can be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. For IAEA, the direct use nuclear materials are: Uranium 233, Plutonium except that containing 80% or more of the isotope, Plutonium 238 and Uranium containing 20% or more of the isotope of Uranium 235.

·                        Separated direct use nuclear materials: those direct use nuclear material that have been separated from fission products and thus the processing that would be required for their use in nuclear weapons is substantially less, and the time required is subsequently shorter than if mixed with light, radio-active fission products.

·                        Indirect–use nuclear material: is that nuclear material that would require irradiation or enrichment to make it suitable for use in nuclear weapons.

 

It is clear from the brief account of the definitions of fissionable material that differences in definition can complicate the verification mechanisms in the FMCT. The ‘radio-active material’, which remains in depleted Uranium,[18] and other un-identified fissile materials, which are not covered under direct or special fissile material definition but are radio-active and can be easily used in the future manufacture of nuclear weapons.[19] If these and other types of fissile material having a nuclear capacity are not included in the definition it means that the treaty would not cover the nuclear fuel cycles for these materials, thereby creating a loophole for countries with diverse and advance nuclear programs.

Notwithstanding the identification of the fissile material for the FMCT/FMT as defined under the definition of fissile material and direct use material will basically pave the way for the application of safeguards and verification mechanisms on Plutonium and Uranium enrichment facilities. The definition would then in turn lead the way to where and what fuel cycle be covered by the treaty: the ones starting from natural, depleted or low enriched Uranium to the Plutonium production facilities. In the overall analysis, the definition would lay the basis for covering the entire the entire Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC), leading to the question as to which NFC will FMCT cover and to what levels safeguards will be applied?  The question of definitions is hence intrinsically linked to the application of safeguards and the specific verification problems that could arise due to the level of transparency required.  Associated with the problem of military facilities is also the question of the nuclear facilities that are not built or designed to take up safeguards.[20]  It is argued that if the full scope safeguards were applied, the amount of security breach would be severe, especially if military and naval nuclear facilities are also covered.

In addition, these problems are associated with negotiating an appropriate safeguards system for the FMCT. The biggest problem in having particular safeguards is that of inventory control and the question of determining universal principles for the accounting of the fissile material.[21] No universal standard for accounting or inventory control exists and it is argued that what exists may not be control-compatible with IAEA safeguards. The problem is that as there are no legal obligations for limitation, declaration or international controls of any of the military categories, beyond national legislation, on states having fissile materials. Similarly, the subjective use of safeguards by states, enhanced further by inventory problems will remain a problem area for the FMCT negotiations.[22] The disparity in the level and type of safeguards applied to different countries will also pose significant problems in having an effective FMCT.[23]

The Problem of Safeguards in the FMCT

Even for an FMCT with a limited objective involving future production, if it aims at being non-discriminatory and universal in scope, the process of declassification and accountable stockpiles of defense-related fissile material production, would have to cover both the civilian and military facilities inventories. 

A range of options is available as to what is appropriate and what is feasible. Transparency of nuclear materials is to follow the standards laid down by the IAEA’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementations (SAGSI), which defines the level of accuracy and nuclear materials accounts to be periodically reported to and verified by the IAEA.[24]

Such a criterion represents an international standard for verification of maintaining civil or military nuclear material inventories, which would invite confidence. The materials identified are defined as fissile material under IAEA statutes. Six supporting facilities are related to these materials for verification purposes and also come within a purview of verification purposes: nuclear reactors, Uranium enrichment plants, nuclear reprocessing plants, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, Plutonium and Uranium fuels for land based and naval reactors, spent fuel facilities and nuclear materials stores.

The IAEA safeguards, as described under INFCIRC/153[25] on NNWS, would cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle, with a special focus on facilities having greater access to ‘direct use’ materials. In all probability, a comprehensive audit would be used as a device to establish what has been produced.[26] Hence all facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle of a country would become subject to international verification and monitoring, regardless of their status or capacity. This would also include the question of research and development facilities involved in isotope separation, or in the preparation of ‘hot cells’. In short, all facilities involved in the manufacture of direct use nuclear material would be the first to come under the purview of the safeguards.[27]

The safeguards applied in the case of FMCT would be in close harmony with INFCIRC/153-type IAEA safeguards, with a possible upgradation through the Strengthened Safeguards System applied to the NNWS, with the assumption that these safeguards would provide early warning and aim at detecting diversion.[28]

At present, 183 states have made their commitment to accept the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs), which obligates states to subject all their nuclear material to IAEA safeguards, including fissile material and all other nuclear materials aiming at a clandestine production of fissile material. The CAS covers both declared and undeclared facilities. The purpose of these safeguards is to alert the international community before a state acquires its first nuclear weapon. Hence it covers not only the products as fissile materials but also the process through which it is produced.[29] Similarly, if the S³   system is taken as a base for the treaty, the scope of its verification mechanism would increase considerably.

The INFIRIC/153 safeguards under the IAEA criteria require that the states make extensive declarations regarding their past, present, and future planned nuclear material-related activities at safeguarded facilities and provide reports on their nuclear material inventories.[30]  These safeguards also require states to carry out material audits annually, and to report the unaccounted for material.[31] Whereas the INFCIRC/153 provides full scope safeguards on declared nuclear facilities, the additional protocol INFCIRC/540 provides an extended reach to the INFCIRC/153 agreements, by providing additional information through access to technology, required by the IAEA to address all eventualities, through which a state party to the CSA might be able to defeat the systems checks and acquire nuclear weapons. These safeguards are further strengthened by the additional protocol 93+2 based on IFNCIRC/540.[32]

The provisions of INFCIRC/540 allow the IAEA to require information on states, nuclear programmes including research and development facilities that never operated or were decommissioned, and activities relating to the manufacture or import of equipment that could be used to produce or purify fissile material.[33] It allows for a complementary access to resolve questions pertaining to activities or materials, including access to sensitive locations. It will also allow IAEA to adapt the verification requirements in respect of declared facilities, so as to deal with the undeclared operations at these facilities as these come up. Similarly, where INFCIRC/153 only verifies the correctness of the civil inventories, INFCIRC/540 is geared towards attaining the completeness of the information. According to INFCIRC/540, a state has to declare its past, present and intended nuclear activities.[34] This would include the entire description of the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as the development and fabrication of the components of these facilities. In states such as Pakistan, India, Israel, or USA, where all facilities are not subject to the IAEA safeguards, the implications of the safeguards would not only be difficult but highly intrusive.

Similarly, in order to deal with the issue of loopholes, the IAEA is creating a ‘physical model’ of the nuclear fuel cycle, the purpose is to stipulate the possibilities of a breach in the verification net and find ways to eradicate it. This would allow additional verification procedures to be added at various crucial junctures at both the civilian and military plants, as a check against deviations in the production.[35]  Hence through this new system, the IAEA would be able to point out the information gaps, suspicious items, and identify the inconsistencies in declarations. The new access rights are also extended to facilities, companies, sites, and research institutes that are related in some way to the nuclear fuel cycle and its technology such as environmental sampling.[36] The Director General of the IAEA is empowered to act upon information of any breach in the pledge taken by the signatories.[37]

A Comparative Evaluation of the US and Pakistani Approaches to the FMCT

Since the UNGA Resolution 48/75, in December 1993, the Shannon Report has been the only report on which a consensus has existed in the Conference of Disarmament (CD). The Report clearly identifies the framework on which a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty [FMCT] is to be based. According to the Shannon Report (CD/1299), the ad-hoc committee is to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.[38] The deadlock in the CD over the issue of the FMCT has remained due to the differences in the approaches of the CD members. At present two approaches can be taken as spearheading the debate in the CD, the US approach and the Pakistani approach. The reason for the sharp divide has arisen over the difference in accounting mechanisms of stockpiles. The two approaches are different in terms of scope as one, namely the US approach, signifies the arms control approach, while the other, the Pakistani approach sets the basis for FMCT to be viewed in the context of a disarmament approach. Hence the debate between the two reflects two different schools of thought in the nonproliferation ambit.

For states that are reliant on nuclear deterrence, keeping nuclear activities opaque to adversaries have been justified on the principle of national interest. However, if the FMCT is to be based on the principle of non-discrimination, no special provisions can be made either for NWS states outside the NPT, or NNWS.          All are to be treated equally in terms of both applications of safeguards and status of states as under the treaty obligations.

The key benefits of the FMCT cited by Western analysts are that these should serve to arrest the development of nuclear weapons capabilities of the states outside the NPT framework. John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, expressed this view very candidly: ‘ The fissile material cut off is our best hope of capping the nuclear weapon potential of countries outside the NPT, including India and Pakistan.’ [39]

The US Approach

The US approach towards FMCT lays great emphasis on placing a ban on the future production of fissile material, without spelling out the measures regarding verifications of existing stockpiles. According to the Americans, such advantages as cited benefit the non-proliferation efforts, as it would include all states having nuclear capabilities. The US approach has had some degree of support from the nuclear weapon states in defining the scope of the treaty, however, after developments such as the TMD, the future negotiations regarding the scope of the treaty would be trouble some. The Americans argue that if the treaty would be based on the U.S approach, it would lead to the fulfillment of the principles and objectives conducive for a non-proliferation regime under NPT. Similarly, the argument also cites the possible role of a treaty to be an arms control one, fulfilling the requirements of disarmament obligations in the long run, as prescribed under Article VI of NPT.[40]

Other arguments consider the US approach as a deeply flawed one, on the basis that a ban on only the future production of fissile material is counter-productive to UN Resolution (48/75L)’s principle of non-discrimination, as it would freeze the stockpiles of fissile material at the current levels, rather than aim at its total elimination. Secondly, it would lock states into positions of perpetual superiority–inferiority status in comparison to adversaries, especially when there are huge differences in stockpiles to begin with. If this approach is taken as the base of the NPT, it would formalize states into different existent categories i.e. nuclear weapon states, nuclear capable states, and non nuclear weapon states, and invalidate the disarmament efforts.

Thirdly, most of the existent fissile material would not even be declared and therefore, continue to remain without safeguards, and it would allow states to have previously manufactured material outside the framework of the treaty. Fourthly, the NWS among themselves have large reserves of nuclear fissile material, which they would be able to employ for upgraded weapon designs or rearmament. In comparison NNWS and nuclear weapon states, outside the NPT framework would be confined to their status quo. The U.S approach does not endorse the principle that once the material has been converted to civilian use from military use, it cannot be re-transferred back to military use.

The Pakistani Approach

In comparison to the US approach, the Pakistani approach attempts to deal with the issue piecemeal, both as a non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament measure. Pakistan maintains that a fissile material aiming at banning only future production, would be ineffective and discriminatory as unequal stockpiles of fissile material existing at sub-regional, regional, and global levels and such a ban would freeze nuclear imbalances, and create new security problems. Therefore, the issue of existing stockpiles should be taken into account, [41] as the wide disparity in fissile material stockpiles of India and Pakistan could erode the stability of nuclear deterrence, which would be exacerbated once India acquires S-300 ABM and anti-aircraft systems from the Russian Federation.[42]

The information about the size of current stockpiles and release of information about the highly-enriched Uranium and Plutonium inventories is necessary in addressing the issue of excess stock.[43] Unilateral declarations regarding inventories cannot be taken as a basis for the previous, current, or future level of stocks, as it is likely to leave loopholes for future production of fissile material. Similarly, Pakistan argues that aggregate stock guarantees are needed as a baseline to measure the progress of establishing controls and programmes of these stocks. Accurate stock-taking, therefore, serves as an important disarmament and non-proliferation objective, and for ensuring that fissile material has not been stolen or diverted from the existent stockpiles. In this context, an effort to maintain production histories is seen as a necessary step, leading also to confidence building.[44] The disparity in stocks is likely to increase especially in the context, that of the Indian and Pakistani enhanced military capabilities, due to the procurement of new defense systems by either side.[45]

The concerns about undeclared stocks have arisen because a huge quantity of weapon usable material already exists in the world, much of which could remain un-safeguarded. If the treaty does not aim at looking at the inventories from the very beginning of the production cycle, such existent stocks could be used to acquire nuclear weapons, thereby posing an ongoing threat to international security. Therefore, care has to be taken that stocks that are not covered by the treaty will not create loopholes that will diminish the effectiveness of the treaty. The older NWS demand that existent stocks should play no part in the fissile material treaty.

The Categorization Problem

The two approaches bring certain problem areas for the treaty to the forefront and raise issues like how should the fissile material be categorized, and what inventories of fissile material be included? Should the fissile material used for naval propulsion or production of Tritium be left out by the treaty’s scope?[46] What measures regarding the fissile material stocks have developed and what is their current significance? How to address the problem of stocks in a multilateral, non-discriminatory framework?

Fissile material stocks are usually divided into three categories on the basis of their uses namely: military, transitional, and civil inventories. Approximately 3,000 tonnes of Plutonium and highly enriched Uranium (HEU) exist in the world, out of which 2000 tonnes are for military purposes.[47]  About two-thirds (1,300 tonnes) is considered as ‘transitional’, or surplus to military requirements.[48]  In addition, less than one-percent weapon grade and transitional stock are under safeguards.[49]

Of the P-5 states, four namely, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States, have formally announced that they are no longer producing fissile material, by declaring a unilateral moratorium on future production. At present these states are subject to the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreements (VOAs).[50] This implies that their civilian and military facilities may be kept outside of the NPT, at the discretion of the NWS and not because of treaty requirements. Therefore, for them it provides an opportunity that fissile material can be withdrawn from civilian projects for military projects.

The presence of a unilateral moratorium and declaration of excess material by some NWS has proved that they already have a surplus. Their voluntary self-imposed ban on production of fissile material is suggested to be an issue of their internal security, rather than their need for maintaining a credible deterrence. By leaving the past production out of security, no party is likely to disclose the actual excess or availability of fissile material for military purposes by the NWS as, so far, there has been no universal accounting system of stocks internationally.

Civilian Inventories

Linked to this is the issue of civilian and military inventories, and what is can be maintained and what covered by the treaty. Within a few years, the total amount of civil inventories of Plutonium production is likely to exceed the level of military inventories, on account of the fact that the NWS have placed various self-restricting moratoria only on the fissile materials produced for military purposes.

At present, the CD has paid attention only to the military inventories. Deadlocks have arisen due to sharp differences over whether the FMT should stop stockpiling surplus military materials, or whether it should be seen as a disarmament tool? But what of the surplus civilian Plutonium, its non-proliferation needs and the possibility of its diversion into military issues, which is a concern that needs to be precisely defined in a more equitable treaty?

Within the next fifteen years, civilian inventories are expected to double the present military ones.[51] According to the President of the Nuclear Control Institute, Washington D.C, Paul Leventhal: ‘the dream of Plutonium as the key to limitless source of energy has not faded. It is nurtured by a handful of powerful, government-run companies that seek to impose a Plutonium fuel economy on the world.’[52]  Thereby emphasizing that ‘continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards’ is still subject to popular myths like the ‘unsuitability’ of reactor grade Plutonium for weapons.[53] The fissile material used by India in its May 1998 explosion had basically come from its civilian Plutonium plant, “CIRUS’. The IAEA, presently, cannot stop a ‘break out’ or adapt a ‘beat the system approach’ against the safe guards adopted by a country, or stop a wholesale conversion of its safeguarded Plutonium reserves to military uses. Therefore, the adoption of a partial Fissile Material Ban Treaty would be discriminatory, as it would distinguish between civilian and military inventories.[54]

The growing civilian inventories of states are likely to increase the insecurity of states that are locked in a status quo by virtue of a discriminatory fissile material treaty, if it is negotiated on the basis of the American approach. At present, nine states have adopted the ‘Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium’ and dealing with the need for transparency of civil stocks of fuel and of reactor grade Plutonium.[55] Under these guidelines, concerned states have to publish statements of their national strategies for their nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycles and their annual holdings of non-military, separated plutonium and of plutonium contained in spent fuel.[56]

The industrial states with substantial nuclear generating capacity use Plutonium derived from spent fuel from civilian power plants, lots of these facilities are unsafegaurded. Hence ‘ Guidelines for Plutonium Protection’ are likely to figure prominently in finalizing a safeguards mechanism for the treaty.[57]

Finally, for each government to increase its transparency, it would have to publish occasional briefs explaining national strategies, its background such as nuclear fuel cycle and management of the nuclear material), annual statements of its holdings of Plutonium and spent civil reactor fuel stocks, subject to specific guidelines.[58] However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the extension of transparency is inevitable or always linear. There will remain many areas in the civil and military inventories where transparency will be resisted and contested, thereby further making the task of negotiating a possible FMCT difficult and cumbersome.

Military Inventories and FMCT

Subsequently, for the states that are reliant upon nuclear deterrence means than they would also keep fissile material inventories opaque to the world and to their adversaries, as well as to organizations such as the IAEA. For these nuclear capable states, the need is all the more apparent in their defense strategies since they are involved in a precarious balancing act premised on a possible future use of nuclear weapons. An imbalance in stockpiles would lead to an imbalance in military capabilities, especially once the operationalisaton of their respective nuclear doctrines takes place.[59]

Up to the present, all arms control treaties have, by and large, focused on the number of nuclear warheads or their delivery systems, and none have stressed upon the fissile material inventories of the states in question.[60] To publish the military inventories of fissile materials will not be without due dangers to disclosures regarding that a country’s military planning, centered on its fissile material stockpiles, delivery systems and strategies.

FMCT: Impact on Pakistan

In May 1998, Pakistan detonated a series of nuclear devices in response to the Indian nuclear explosion. The purpose was to maintain a strategic nuclear balance vis-a-vis India, by demonstrating its nuclear capabilities.

The nuclearisation of South Asia caused a major shock wave within the non-proliferation regime. In order to re-establish the strength of the regime, a process of dialogue was initiated by the U.S. with both India and Pakistan, led by the US Secretary of Defense, Strobe Talbot, and a special meeting of the CD was held on 29 May 1998 to discuss the South Asian situation.

The international response to the Indo-Pak nuclear tests, at the forums of the P5, the G-8, and the Security Council, focused on the need to curtail the effect of the South Asian nuclearisation on other regions of concern, like the Middle East and Asia Pacific. Two kind of anxieties have surfaced after the Indo–Pak nuclear tests: one, a possible nuclear conflict or war over the Kashmir dispute; two, the fear of an escalating arms race between India and Pakistan.[61]

The fear in the American strategic circles has been closely linked with the possibility of a chain reaction of withdrawals of states from the NPT regime, leading to the unraveling of the treaty, which it was thought would almost certainly jeopardize the future of arms control and disarmament movements.[62] Similarly, other events such as, in 2000 the non-ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the US Congress and the US desire to move out of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and to opt for a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system also posed major challenges to the strength of the non-proliferation regime. Therefore, in view of these developments, efforts were made to bring South Asia in the non-proliferation framework.

During the Strobe Talbott talks with India and Pakistan, the near term objective of the United States of America was described as having India and Pakistan stabilize their nuclear competition at the lowest possible level, with the long term goal being the US commitment to bring about a the universal adherence to the NPT by all states.[63]  The course to be defined by Pakistan and India was linked to their holding a diplomatic dialogue about nuclear issues with the US and the international community. The essence of the case put forward by the Americans was, and continues to be, that India and Pakistan can meet their security requirements, without further testing nuclear weapons, without producing fissile material and without deploying nuclear capable missiles.[64] Against this backdrop, the US asked for further practical steps by India and Pakistan: sign the CTBT and join the ongoing negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Till such time as the treaty (CTBT) comes into force, Pakistan and India were asked to join the other nations that have conducted nuclear tests, by announcing that they would refrain from producing more weapons and stabilize their military competition. The purpose was to meet the international benchmarks in support of non-proliferation.[65]

Emphasis had been laid by the Americans on refraining from the export of nuclear weapons technology and the deployment of weapon systems. Since 1998, the United States has conducted a total of eight rounds with Pakistan and 11 rounds with India. While the US negotiating process seems to be moving rapidly with the Indians, the benchmarks described for Pakistan deal with important issues relating to the prospects of nuclear stability between India and Pakistan, especially when viewed in terms of the  emergent trends in arms control and disarmament issues.

The proposal given by the US at the CD, to ban only the future production of fissile material, is seen as discriminatory and against the proposed treaty’s spirit, for it attempts at establishing yet another order of nuclear states based on the categories of Nuclear Weapon States (P-5), Nuclear Capable States (T-3), and the non nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

The counter-argument against the ban on the future production of fissile material, points to how it would freeze the nuclear fissile material at various existent levels, which would be counter-productive to maintaining effective deterrence and the overall aims and objectives of a comprehensive NPT.

To assess the future nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan, it is necessary to examine their existing and prospective nuclear development strategies and the underlying intentions.  India and Pakistan can by no measure be called new comers in the nuclear game, as their nuclear efforts had started way before the tests in May 1998. The tests followed after the production of substantive quantities of fissile material, as well as after the deployment of first generation nuclear capable delivery vehicles.[66]

Both India and Pakistan have experimented, with varying degrees of success, two categories of fission bombs, with the strategic capability to destroy a medium size city (12 kt weapon by India and 15 kt by Pakistan), and sub-kilo tonne devices presumably for tactical use.[67] Two interpretations can be drawn from the yield of these tested devices, especially in the case of India. First, that India, since it has claimed to have detonated a fusion device, has mastered the art of ‘down sizing’ techniques. This assumption can only be made if the Indians have been able to make it a viable proposition and are able to derive from a comparatively smaller test, a set of data corresponding to a much more powerful explosion. Second, that the device failed to give the expected yield, making further testing necessary.[68] In the case where simulation techniques and related tests have provided insufficient data for India to operationalize its nuclear doctrine, also means that the exact requirements of the fissile material would remain uncertain for India.[69]  This consequently poses a paradoxical problem for Pakistan, if it is to retain its deterrent capability.

In view of the draft Indian nuclear doctrine, that aims at establishing minimum credible nuclear deterrence, a capability of 200 or 300 nuclear warheads ought to be considered a minimum. Other sources suggest that India may possess 1.95 tonnes of Plutonium, derived from its six CANDU-type nuclear reactors and would be able to produce 400 warheads.[70] This may provide India a China-specific deterrence. In addition, India also has a Tritium production capability for Hydrogen bombs. If the scope of the treaty were to leave out Tritium production or civilian inventories of Plutonium production, the increase in yield and destructive potential of its nuclear weapons would be far-reaching. 

The fissile material produced by Pakistan is mostly enrichment-based and may amount to between 400 kg and 600 kg for the manufacture of some 20-30 weapons.[71] Pakistan’s entire nuclear program is based on enriched Uranium, and in the absence of its direct use in the civilian field, any kind of FMCT/FMT aiming at stopping the production of fissile material for military purposes would result in a total halt or close down of the existing nuclear facilities, which in turn would be detrimental for Pakistan’s security, in view of the objectives of the draft Indian nuclear doctrine.

Given the huge disparities between the available and projected fissile material quantities of the two sides, to freeze the fissile material level would be a destabilizing factor for South Asian nuclear stability. Therefore, it is not in the interest of the international community that for the over all arms control and disarmament it seeks that it freezes the current levels of deterrent capability between India and Pakistan. If the American approach is taken for negotiating the FMCT, the result could be no different. The pressure put on Pakistan to agree to FMCT, as proposed by the U.S., highlights a basic question: Do nuclear weapon states have the right to interfere in the security consideration of other countries, especially when the negotiations and proposals in their current phase are inherently discriminatory?

Conclusion

The purpose of the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) is to put a ceiling on weapons-grade fissile material available to producer countries. The negotiations underway are seen as a link in the chain of the eventual roll back of India and Pakistan’s nuclear programmes or any other non-nuclear weapon state, which might have to go nuclear in the future, due to security considerations. A freeze at the current level of fissile material production, without any corresponding systematic reduction of available nuclear fissile material, is to deliberately cause a dichotomy in the non-proliferation efforts and deterrence needs, rather than in strengthening it, for it aims at freezing the status quo embedded with loopholes for all times to come. It would also contribute to regional instabilities. When seen in the South Asian context it would be advantageous for India, which has large Plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle, as it would further consolidate India’s position of strength in weapons development. Whereas, Pakistan has a Uranium-based nuclear programme, which has little or no significant civilian use. Once Pakistan signs a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty, its military nuclear power plants would be shut down because of their commercial non-viability in power generation. While the Plutonium attained from the civilian nuclear power plants would be inadequate to meet any future deterrent needs of Pakistan, since Pakistan’s nuclear capability is based on the Uranium nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, if a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty is at all to be negotiated, then such a treaty should apply equally to all parties, non discriminatorily, capping fissile material available for nuclear weapons globally, while extending equal safeguards on all nuclear-related facilities, including in its scope, the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear fissile material, the inventories of transitional or excess fissile material, and all other nuclear fissile material production, such as Tritium.

In short, such an FMCT should not be converted into merely a non-proliferation tool by the nuclear weapons states, rather it should retain its focus on serving as a disarmament tool as well, to meet an important disarmament commitment made by the international community, under Article VI of the NPT, which was further endorsed in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Hence, a comprehensive FMCT should not serve as a mere production ban, but should aim to evolve into a nuclear disarmament process, that will enable the nuclear weapon states outside the NPT into a voluntary political alignment with the NPT regime.

 

 

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Author Bio:

Maria Sultan is a senior associate and Pakistan representative of Cornell Caspian Consulting, and a research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan. This article was first published in Strategic Studies, Islamabad, in Spring 2001.