BIWEEKLY BRIEFING       Wednesday/January 31, 2001

PARLIAMENTARY SELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN: A LOST OPPORTUNITY
Svante E. Cornell

The second parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan’s young but embroiled history were a crucial event in the country’s road not only to democracy but also to long-term stability. The significant electoral manipulation has polarized the already entrenched government and opposition forces, lowering the chances for a dialogue. By keeping major political forces outside the parliament, the government has reduced the likelihood of the eventual political succession to President Aliyev taking place in an orderly fashion.

BACKGROUND: The 5 November parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan carried special significance for several reasons. Most immediately, the Council of Europe had postponed a decision on Azerbaijan’s membership in the body pending the conduct of the election. As such, observers feared widespread fraud would lead to a refusal of membership in that body. More importantly, Azerbaijan’s political sphere has for some time been geared to succession politics. Since now 77-year old President Aliyev underwent heart surgery in 1999, both the government and opposition camps have been preparing for the period after Aliyev’s retirement. At that point, a succession crisis with internally as well as externally induced turmoil is widely feared, risking the destabilization of this strategically important and oil-rich country. In this context, Azerbaijan has been in a desperate need for strong institutions with popular legitimacy that could keep order during the transition period, and keep politics off the streets.

The rubber-stamp parliament elected in 1995 lacked this legitimacy; hence the 2000 elections presented a crucial opportunity to improve not only Azerbaijan’s democracy but also its long-term stability. Since 1998, Azerbaijan had moved towards a more pluralistic society with increased freedom of press and an improved electoral law, leading to hopes of a freer election. However, major problems took place during the registration both of candidates for the single-member constituencies and political parties for the proportional list. Major parties and numerous opposition candidates were refused registration, and only strong international pressure brought about a partial remedy of this problem in the last minute, as all parties were allowed to contest the proportional election.

On election day, observers registered a wide variety of systematic violations of the law including ballot studding, inflated voters’ registration lists, inflated turnout figures, the creation of closed polling stations, and falsified protocols. Most disturbingly, the advanced computer system intended for tabulation of votes at the district and central level was apparently used for what could be termed electronic ballot stuffing. Eventually, the ruling party claimed victory with almost 65% of the vote, a figure distinctly different from the observations of independent observers and exit polls conducted. According to official results, the major opposition parties whose actual popularity was comparable to that of the ruling party (such as the Musavat Party and the National Independence Party) failed even to pass the six percent threshold to proportional representation. However, the mid-sized Popular Front party and two minor opposition parties were eventually granted seats in the legislature, thereby creating an aura of pluralism. In single-member constituencies, only a handful of opposition candidates gained seats. In its report, the American National Democratic Institute noted that the vote failed to meet even minimum international standards.

IMPLICATIONS: The 2000 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan are best characterized as a missed opportunity for democratic development as well as for the further stability of the country. In 1995 and perhaps even in 1998, the regime led by Heydar Aliyev was rightly associated with political and economic stability, which was then the country’s clear priority. But in the last years of the 1990s Azerbaijan, compared to its neighbors, enjoyed a remarkable political and economic stability. Georgia and Armenia were plagued by various degrees of turmoil, including assassinations or coups against its leaders and severe economic difficulties. By contrast, Azerbaijan saw the consolidation of its oil and gas industry, sustained western investments, and the government had relative stable control over the republic’s territory.

In the context of this increased stability, the increasingly assertive opposition, and the looming succession crisis, Azerbaijan’s stability can no longer be associated with one man, or for that matter one party. The country’s internal stability can only be improved by the strengthening of legitimate institutions, a difficult task impossible under circumstances excluding major political forces. It should be noted that democratic development in Azerbaijan is not a lost cause. In comparison to many of the Central Asian republics that are moving toward greater authoritarianism, Azerbaijan remains a relatively open country responsive to international criticism.

The west enjoys a rare degree of influence in the political development of the country; moreover, the opposition forces are, with few exceptions, dedicated to democratic methods of achieving power, and capable of exerting significant pressure on the government. This said, the damage inflicted on the body politic by the recent elections remains significant. The people’s remaining confidence in the regime was further damaged, and the polarization between the government and the opposition increased to a point where efforts to set up a dialogue, as happened in 1998 and in 2000, seem largely futile at present. The prospects of Azerbaijan achieving a peaceful and orderly transition of power have worsened, and the risks of the eventual political succession being accompanied by unrest, either internally or externally induced, has increased.

CONCLUSIONS: Most alarming of all is the political apathy and general aversion for politics that is widespread in Azerbaijani society. In 1992, masses of people gathered in enthusiasm on the streets of Baku to support the Popular Front’s bid for power; but in 1993, the people’s indifference toward the fate of the Front government accelerated its demise. Again, in October 1994, it was the masses and not the secret services that saved Heydar Aliyev from being unseated by Surat Huseinov’s Russian-supported coup attempt, by amassing by the tens of thousands in front of the presidential office. The people have during the entire 1990s constituted the best guarantee for a ruler’s position in Azerbaijan; the alienation of the people by high echelons of the ruling elite poses the perhaps greatest danger to their position, and to the stability of the country.

In a situation of increasing Russian pressure on the South Caucasus, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, crucial policy choices need to be made in the US and European states. Abandoning Azerbaijan because of a setback in democratization would be a decidedly erroneous policy. The country remains a starkly pro-western, relatively open and liberal country, to that with an important geostrategic position. No one except imperial forces in Russia would benefit from the west distancing itself from Azerbaijan. While reassuring Azerbaijan of continued strategic support, the west needs to help put back on track Azerbaijan’s processes of democratization and state-building. Azerbaijan is not a lost cause, and to walk out on the country at this point in time would only serve the forces, inside and outside the country, seeking to obliterate the advances the country has made in the last nine years.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Svante E. Cornell is a visiting researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and normally teaches at Uppsala University (Sweden). He is the author of Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press 2000.

Copyright 2001 The Analyst
All rights reserved