POLICY BRIEF, 8 JANUARY 2001

 

 

Straightening U.S. Policy in Eurasia

 

Svante E. Cornell

 

The incoming Bush administration is widely expected to carry out a qualitative shift of focus in American foreign policy. Statements and publications emanating from key foreign policy figures in the Bush campaign have time and again emphasized that American engagement abroad will be increasingly directed by evaluations of national interest, rather than diffuse and in any case selectively applied doctrines of humanitarian intervention. As the new administration is about to take office it will, for several reasons, be compelled to rapidly reassess American policy to the crucially important area of Central Eurasia. Firstly, the area stretching from Turkey to Pakistan over the Caspian sea, Central Asia and Afghanistan, affects international politics and American interests directly. On the one hand, its energy resources are important for western markets; on the other, economic deprivation in the region fuels extremist and terrorist movements that often unequivocally target the U.S. In addition, the weakness of regional states, coupled with overt and covert meddling of foreign powers in their affairs, creates instability that threatens peace and security, permits an uninhibited growth of the drug trade that very tangibly damages both local and western societies—and in turn finances the same extremist organizations. Secondly, the incoming administration will inherit no clear and consistent strategy towards the region. Quite to the contrary, recent American policy has been remarkably shortsighted, tactical and reactive. The most recent and to that most blatant example is the joining of forces with Russia and India in enacting directed sanctions at one of the fighting parties in the Afghanistan civil war, the Taliban movement. The U.S. has had, and continues to have, a potentially stabilizing role in Central Eurasia. By virtue of its status as the sole superpower, its statements and actions are widely respected by small and great powers alike. The dichotomy between signals sent out from Washington to regional states and the actual track record has nevertheless created an unpredictability of American behavior that has been more conducive to instability than to stability.

Central Eurasia is probably the clearest example of the multipolarity of post-Cold War politics: numerous regional powers try to extend their influence here; however none is able to dominate the region or even large parts of it. This is not due to lack of trying, though. In particular, America’s newly found partner in the Afghan quagmire, Russia, has consistently followed a policy of bullying and coercing smaller powers on its southern periphery into obedience. From Georgia to Uzbekistan, insurgencies and assassination attempts on leaders have taken place in countries attempting to stalk out an independent foreign policy; the occurrence of such events seems positively correlated with the evolutions of these countries’ attitudes towards the United States and NATO. In many instances, credible evidence—both circumstantial and direct—have implicated parts of the Russian state apparatus. Since former KGB head Vladimir Putin’s advent to the presidency in Moscow close to a year ago, intimidation has taken an overt form. Vulnerable countries like Georgia and Azerbaijan, that have consistently stuck to a pro-western policy in recent years and attempted to liberalize their economies and political systems despite unsettled ethnic conflicts, are now facing direct Russian pressure. This includes discouragement of their attempts to set up independent regional cooperation mechanisms, the manipulation of their access to energy resources, and the introduction of a visa regime on Georgia affecting hundreds of thousands of its citizens resident in Russia. In this manner, Georgia has been put on the verge of misery with severe cuts in electricity leaving the capital with a couple of hours of current daily and parts of the countryside totally devoid of it.

In this context, America recently decided to create a de facto alliance with Russia in Central Asia, instigating unilateral sanctions on one of the fighting parties in Afghanistan and thereby effectively taking sides in that conflict. The one issue capable of generating an American policy has been radical ‘Islamic terrorism’—a new popular threat perception in the U.S. and Europe—and in particular the presence in Afghanistan of Osama Bin Laden. The pitfalls of the policy are clear to most analysts of the region: Joining a Russian-led alliance to militarily combat the Taliban is unlikely to bring Bin Laden any closer to prosecution; on the other hand, it antagonizes the Taliban further and makes it impossible for the U.S. to exert any influence on the erratic movement. Moreover, the direction of U.S. policy is perceived as a betrayal on the part of regional states. Georgia and Azerbaijan now fear being left without support for their independence after years of loyalty to the U.S.; Uzbekistan is pressured by Washington and Moscow to act as a forward base for the anti-Taliban movement—fully cognizant that it, and neither Russia nor America will bear the adverse consequences thereof. Similarly, Washington’s increasing collusion with New Delhi is alienating Pakistan, a long-time U.S. ally and in fact the only country with any kind of influence over the Taliban.

The new administration needs to set its priorities straight, and moreover, to know its true friends. Russia is rapidly slipping into greater authoritarianism, cracks down on independent media, continues to slaughter its own citizens in Chechnya, expands military relations with Iran, and is embarking on a reconquista of its former colonies, with the clear intention to prevent other powers—especially America—from influence there. Incoming policy-makers need to ask themselves whether it is in the American national interest to keep coalescing with the regime in Moscow. Washington’s interests are better served by sticking to its earlier enunciated policy of supporting the independence, liberalization, and inclusion in the world economy of the smaller, westward-leaning states with great internal and regional difficulties.

What America needs is a strategy. It will take time to elaborate one, but it should start by firstly reiterating unambiguously its support for the independence of smaller friendly states—and act upon it, instead of following a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Russia at the expense of other states; secondly it should identify and work with key allies in the region. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan are all crucial regional states that the U.S. can and should work with to promote peace, security and development in Central Eurasia. With this basis, America is in a strong position to positively contribute to stability and security in this crucial region of the world.

 

 

Svante E. Cornell is co-chairman of Cornell Capsian Consulting, lecturer at Uppsala university, and a visiting researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington DC.