AFGHANISTAN AS CENTER: CENTRAL ASIA’S NEW GEOPOLITICS
Svante Cornell and Maria Sultan

The ongoing insurgency in southern Central Asia is the outer demonstration of a recent broader developing trend. Central Asia, especially the three southern states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, are becoming increasingly tied insecurity matters to the areas to their South and East, that is to Asia. This negates the nearly decade-old paradigm of a 'Turkish-Iranian-Russian triangle' in the geopolitics of the region. Turkey and Iran play only a small role in Central Asiansecurity, but the Central Asia region is becoming part of an emerging security complex centering on Afghanistan. In the newequation, US-Russian collusion in Central Asia signals a break in the confrontation that has marked NATO-Russianrelations since the 1999 Kosovo war.

BACKGROUND: The independence of Central Asia's five Muslim republics in 1991 fundamentally altered the geopolitical scene at the center of the Eurasian continent. A paradigm evolved defining Russia, Turkey and Iran as the major players in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Two security threats were defined: the risk of 'loose nukes' and the threat of radical Islam. As Afghanistan fell into total disarray, the Taliban movement eventually surged to power with the assistance of Pakistan's intelligence
agency. India, Iran and Russia, saw the emergence of the Taliban through the prism of a zero-sum game due to fear of the spread of the Taliban ideology to neighboring countries, and also to the strategic location of Afghanistan. Major players have covertly used the Afghanistan situation to their benefit. A major geopolitical game has emerged, connecting former Soviet Central Asia directly to Afghanistan. 

Russian and American authorities view these developments within a framework centered on vaguely defined threats like 'terrorism' and 'radical Islam'. Central Asia is seen as a brewing ground for radical Islam. Socio-political and economic factors, coupled with authoritarian styles of government, in fact have fueled the resurgence of Islam in the region. Regional politics have zeroed in on the perceived threat of radical Islam, and has moved away from the perceived Iran-Turkey rivalry that dominated the early 1990s. Iran's main concern lies to its south in the Persian Gulf, and Turkey's to its west, in Europe. For the security of Central Asia, neither Turkey nor Iran currently plays a major role. Throughout the 1990s, the security of Central Asia has increasingly come to be linked with Afghanistan, Pakistan and China, countries that matter immensely more for Central Asia's political andeconomic security than either Turkey or Iran. 

Since the Taliban movement's emergence in 1994 and its subsequent conquest of 90% of Afghanistan's territory, Afghanistan has become perceived as the prime security threat to southern Central Asia. The illegal narcotics trade centered on Afghanistan has accentuated this perception. Instability and unrest in Afghanistan has provided anti-regime forces from Central Asian states with a sanctuary. The most blatant is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that reportedly has over a thousand fighters onlymiles away from the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This has rekindled the domino theory of radical Islam upsetting regional stability and endangering secular regimes. However, it is very doubtful whether the aim of the Taliban was ever to spread radical Islam but rather to consolidate Afghanistan and its political orientation.

IMPLICATIONS: The recent fighting in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is not likely to be an isolated event. The mode of action of the Islamic rebels seems to indicate a protracted state of turmoil. Alignments of regional and great powers are developing rapidly around Central Asia's southern borders. China is aiming to increase its standing in the region, partly due to energy needs but also to concern of instability in Central Asia affecting its Xinjiang. Unlike Russia, China seems to have resorted to engaging the Taliban instead of subscribing to the as yet unsuccessful policy of combating it militarily. Meanwhile, India is increasing its profile and revitalizing its Russian alliance. Pakistan's success in achieving a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul is interpreted in India as a major setback, providing Islamabad with the strategic depth it has long desired. 

The United States until recently conducted a policy of "going it alone" in Central Asia, but for over a year, it has conducted a policy of deference to Russia. Washington's fears have centered on a rising Chinese threat along with the fear of political Islam and has tipped the United States over into a closer understanding with Moscow regarding the region. Russia was, in the Central Asian context, the only force that suited its two overarching global objectives of thwarting Chinese power and radical Islam. Developments in Beijing's uneasy relations with Moscow and New Delhi will hence bear great significance for the geopolitics of Central Asia.

Meanwhile, a commonality of interest can be observed between Pakistan, the Taliban regime and Turkmenistan. Whereas Pakistan's relations with the Taliban are widely known, resource-rich but landlocked Turkmenistan's stance is less clear. The collapse of the Trans-Caspian pipeline project, supposed to carry Turkmen natural gas over Azerbaijan to Turkey, has rekindled interest in a pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Firm Taliban control over Afghanistan may be seen as a requirement for the realization of this project, which is crucial for Turkmenistan to benefit from its huge reserves of natural gas and also to meet Pakistan's need for energy and hard currency.

CONCLUSIONS: Central Asia, to a large extent, is important because of its neighbors. And given the internal weakness of its component states, coupled with the military power of the states surrounding it, there is a clear danger of turmoil in Central Asia adversely affecting Asian security as a whole. The geopolitical map of Central Asia and its southern neighbors is all but determined. Alignments in Central Asia are fluctuating and under development in contrast to the Caucasus where a clearly defined security complex has emerged. This uncertainty feeds instability in the region and Central Asia may face a long period of turmoil. 

Ethnic and religious tensions, energy politics, and great power rivalries all intersect in the area connecting Central Asia to the whole of Asia. Afghanistan impacts instability in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and beyond, though the problems in these countries are not simply linked to Afghanistan alone. The interactions between Central Asia and Asia have already developed to an extent that highlights the largely unexplored geopolitical linkages between Central Asia, South Asia, and China. Almost ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asia is profoundly altering the patterns of interaction among Asian great powers, a development of which we may only be witnessing the beginnings. Presently, the shadows remain the key arbiters.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Svante E. Cornell is a lecturer in the departments of Peace and Conflict Research
and East European Studies, Uppsala University, and the author of Small Nations and Great Powers: A
Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, 2000. Maria Sultan is a research
fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.