Sunday, September 10, 2000 -- Jamadi-ul-Sani 11,1421 A.H.

The May 1998 nuclear detonations in South Asia dealt a major blow to the US non-proliferation efforts. Non-proliferation had been given a significant priority in the US nuclear policy in the 1990s with significant deviations. In the post cold war era the US policy is mainly influenced by its efforts to counter growing regional conflicts, the nuclear arms race and spread of weapons of mass destruction in regions of instability, leading to nuclear flash zones.

Nuclear neighbours together and apart

Maria Sultan comments on India and Pakistan's roles in the bigger US nuclear policy

In the emerging security milieu, America seeks to create a situation where its
interests are rarely threatened and if they are then America should have the
means of addressing the threats.

Precisely, the aim has been that, with the help of policy options like
engagement or sanctions, the US is able to sustain its military forces, foreign
initiatives and global influences.

According to new patterns of thinking in Washington, in future states will have
the capabilities and the desire to threaten US' vital interests, either through
coercion, cross border aggression or by improvement in their military
capability. Thereby regional security situations and non-proliferation concerns
are convergent to US goals.

The regional state-centric threats, threats of weapons of mass destruction
and the threats perceived to transcend borders on account of phenomenon
like terrorism, drug trafficking, internationally organised crime, refugee influx
and migration problems, though South Asia specific, are seen as potent
security threats to the US.

The existence of these situations all over the world is defined in the realm of
realpolitik as a situation where the US is over-burdened due to its security
commitment. The thesis claims that future resource wars and non-traditional
security threats will increasingly overlap US interest in various regions of the
world.

Similarly, in terms of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the new
thinking envisages an era of neo-non-proliferation. According to this theory,
there will be nuclear proliferation and the only way US can defend is to
counter these threats which will coincide with 'threats from states of concern'
that is states like Libya or Iraq.

Secondly the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists has
given rise to the fear of 'loose nukes' thereby leading to a theory that in
future the US would face a different nature of threats than the ones faced
from fixed silos in the Soviet Union. This threat perception has revitalised the
dominant thinking in Washington to meet this new brand of threat by working
on a pro-active nuclear policy. It is aimed not only at curtailing the spread of
nuclear weapons, but also meeting this threat physically.

Bill Clinton's counter-proliferation initiative in 1993, as well as the entire
debate of the theater missile defense (TMD) (which will stop all incoming
missiles towards US and its allies) is based on this. Hence, in short the main
thrust of the US nuclear policy has shifted from only meeting the proliferation
threat through sanctions regime to a policy of active defence.

Threat is now seen or termed in transnational factors like terrorism and nuclear
weapons proliferation. The main objectives are specified in terms of time span.
The long-term objective is to prevent the acquisition of nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery systems by unwanted elements as
described by Pentagon and lastly to roll back proliferation where possible,
while the short-term objective is to engage with states which are a threat to
the viability of the non-proliferation regime, highlighting the interaction with
India and Pakistan.

In the case of South Asia, the US has come up with concrete steps starting
from the signature of CTBT, to moratorium on fissile material production and
maintenance of firm export controls on nuclear material, followed by intensive
Pak-India dialogue. The US nuclear policy in the region has been of cyclic
order, ranging from a period of extreme use of the sanctions approach to a
settling of the threat by giving presidential waivers and technology transfers.

It is claimed that the Indian programme has been the result of an indigenous
effort but regular reports from Washington claim that the US has been
involved in the critical development of India's nuclear capability. New
documents from the files of the 1994 Brown Back mission to India which had
been sent to see the potential of development and investment policies in India
has revealed that secure satellite communication, systems, super computers,
and even turbine engines for the most advanced US army helicopters were
sold to India.

In addition to this, in 1994, the US commerce department authorised Signal
Allison Engine Company to sell T-800 turbine engines to Hindustan Aeronautics
for a mere $ 35 million. Furthermore it is believed that advanced
telecommunication and encryption technology was used by India to help
conceal the 1998 explosions. This had been one of the major reasons for the
US non-ratification of the CTBT as well as the Republican criticism of the US
nuclear policy towards India during Clinton's period.

The Americans had also supplied the light water reactor to India at Tarapura,
operational in 1969, which led to the first nuclear explosion of 1974. .

As a matter of fact after the 1974 Indian explosion, India should have been
put under the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which necessitates the US to
stop all kind of aid and technology transfer to states that are involved in the
military use of nuclear technology. However, this act had not been activated
and instead by 1974, the US alone had trained 11000 Indian nuclear scientists.

Prior to the Afghan war, the US activated the non-proliferation act of 1978,
prohibiting export of nuclear technology, especially in respect to Pakistan. The
act established that co-operation was to be terminated if a non-nuclear
weapon country detonates a nuclear explosive device nevertheless it was not
enacted against India.

The uncertainty in consistency in the US policy of non-proliferation had been a
result of the significance of US' short-run aim to remain engaged with India at
a time when Soviet Union was a force to reckon with.

In the case of Pakistan, leverage was given because Pakistan was to be a
frontline state against the now defunct USSR's 'expansionist designs'. The
relaxation in the American policy had been made possible due to the use of the
presidential waiver. Hence the Cold War saw the use of the carrot and stick
policy regarding the non-proliferation concerns of the US.

After the May 1998 tests, the US policy has been a picture of pragmatism
where analysis is being made on the basis of evolving Sino-US relations. Hence
the relations with India and Pakistan are of potential interest to Washington.
The economic dividends of the sanctions had been maximised by engaging
both India and Pakistan in a strategic dialogue with the US, and easing the
sanctions by way of presidential decree.

The dialogue and the concentrated step-by-step approach has primarily
helped the US achieve a better bargaining position with the two states.

Though the long-term aims have not changed towards this region, in the
short-run India is seen as a market for American military goods.

The Indian IT growth has also enchanted the US. On the world disarmament
scene, the possibility of a future deployment of TMD in the US and repatriation
of research and development towards this system in Japan has led to the
theory that the future of disarmament is oblique and it is likely to have a
special effect in the Chinese and Indian nuclear programmes.

India has been assigned the new role of the fourth policeman in South Asia --
one with a missile programme the Asean countries should keep an eye on. The
objective being to harmonise the international climate to foster the American
policy of preponderance, that is, the world will remain safe and will develop as
long as the US remains the key actor in international relations. This position of
India is further facilitated by India's potential to help contain the Chinese
influence in the region in addition to the prospects of giving a new reason for
the US' continued presence in the Asia Pacific. 

The rise of the fundamentalist powers in India amidst growing economic
influence and an attempt to enlarge its political influence in this region would
necessitate increased defence spending of the countries in the region and the
need for a more formidable US presence here.

Where a resurgent India is desired vis China, Kashmir presents a challenge on
its own. The persistent Indo-Pakistani relations underscore the danger of
Kashmir becoming a flashpoint of nuclear exchange. Hence South Asia is
termed as an area of great importance to Washington where the key
objectives include preventing another Indo-Pakistan war, enhancing regional
stability, combating terrorism, drug trafficking, promoting democracy, trade
and investment.

In this new framework both India and Pakistan are viewed individually. While
India is to fulfil the role of the anti-China threat card, Pakistan is termed as a
strategic equaliser in the region to neutralise the transnational threats.
Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons, though understood by Washington, is
not empathised.

The attempt has been to first cap the programme. This is where CTBT and
FMCT politics come into play. The second stage is rolling back of the nuclear
programme, that is where the firm position of not retracting the demand of the
NPT figures.

Nevertheless the threat which is related to Pakistan is more than its nuclear
equation with India. It is the strategic location of Pakistan and the possible
influence Islamabad can have on Afghanistan and Kashmir. The fear is termed
as the revival of political Islam aided by militancy. Elaborating on the fear that
in Central Asia the new democratic alliance may be run over by more radical
players inspired by these ideologies, this in turn is seen as destabilising for the
US interests in the region. For it might make the US withdraw from the region
and thereby leaving space for Russia to come in.

The aim has been to pressurise Pakistan on the nuclear front to enact
concessions. In the over-all analysis, the US policy towards South Asia after
the nuclear testing has been but a dividend of the American outlook towards
the great game.

In this orientation, the nuclear tests and the capabilities of India and Pakistan
is seen as bargain chips to extract as much political and economic mileage as
possible. In the case of India the role assigned to it fulfils its national
objectives. However, in the case of Pakistan the US is still toying with the
idea as to how much can be extracted, at what price and for how long. 

Though the American policy is a direct manifestation of the US pragmatism,
caution must be exercised while dealing with both states. For in either case
the mismanagement of cost and benefit to the states can lead to a total
rebuttal of the US nuclear policy in the region. India may become too
independent to require US guidance in its foreign policy orientation and may
decide to reassert itself. Similarly Pakistan may face a situation where the
threshold of sanction and threat may become pointless.

Maria Sultan is a research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan,
and a senior associate and Pakistan representative of Cornell Caspian Consulting.

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