STOCKHOLM ANKARA BAKU BOSTON DUSHANBE ISLAMABAD
LONDON TASHKENT TBILISI TEHRAN UFA WASHINGTON

Washington's success in enlisting the support of Central Asian governments in anti-terrorist initiatives has heightened fears that the security of the region could be compromised. Tamara Makarenko examines the motivation of Central Asian governments and the attitudes of the region's Islamists.

The events and aftermath of 11 September established a framework that could profoundly alter the pattern of terrorism in Central Asia. Unfortunately, contrary to the goal of the international anti-terrorism coalition (i.e., to eliminate terrorism) the implications of the developments over the past four months may actually result in the growth of political violence in the region.

Haphazardly seeking to secure partners in an alliance created to simultaneously condone US actions in Afghanistan and assert US dominance in a strategically important area, Washington has successfully coerced Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to extend unlimited co-operation and place themselves at the forefront of the 'war against terrorism'. Although the relationships developed between the Central Asian republics and the US-led coalition may appear mutually beneficial, beneath the surface there is real concern that the long-term security interests of the region have been put at risk.

A shaky coalition

In order to attract strategic states - such as those surrounding Afghanistan - to the international anti-terrorism coalition, the USA initiated an approach that essentially relied on a combination of bribes, threats and promises. President George Bush's statement, "you are either with us or against us", pushed many states to extend their co-operation despite the implications such decisions might have for the future.

Of the Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan arguably enjoyed the warmest diplomatic relations with Washington prior to 11 September. Partly for this reason Bishkek did not hesitate to articulate its support for US actions. This verbal support, however, was not translated into action until it became apparent that Kyrgyzstan could benefit economically from its direct involvement in the anti-terror coalition.

The unofficial attitude of Kyrgyz government officials seems to be that the prospect of economic benefit was the primary motivation for its decision-making. For example, the recent decision to allow US forces to establish a 'temporary' base at Bishkek's Manas airport was primarily based on the agreement that Washington would pay US$7,000 every time a plane lands or takes off from the airport, and $1,000 and $500 for every truck and car, respectively, entering the airport. Furthermore, the USA promised Kyrgyzstan $3.5m to be used towards purchasing spare parts for helicopters, and to repair their fixed-wing aircraft.

Tajikistan's decision to extend its co-operation and territory to the US-led anti-terrorism coalition could be interpreted as a response to a variety of threats. Given relatively sustained instability in the country as a result of the 1992-1997 civil war, Dushanbe was easily convinced that if it did not extend its co-operation, the country would face further instability with the threat of a refugee influx from Afghanistan. Partnership with the coalition would ensure that Tajikistan would not have to face such a prospect in isolation.

Given that Tajikistan has regularly been accused of allowing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to operate from its territory, it was in Dushanbe's interest to appease US requests. Failure to do so would not only alienate Washington, but would also cause further friction with Uzbekistan.

Essentially responding to bribes and threats, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain committed to aiding the USA in its 'war against terrorism'. These two states have been joined by Uzbekistan, which acceded to Washington's call for co-operation in response to a list of US promises. By singling out the IMU as a dangerous regional terrorist group as early as 20 September in a speech to Congress, President Bush and his planners laid the foundation for Tashkent's co-operation. Rumours suggest that Uzbekistan and the USA reached an agreement whereby the US military would be allowed to use Uzbek territory if Washington targeted IMU bases in Afghanistan, and ceased to publicly comment on human rights issues.

Despite bribes, threats and promises, it may be that all states involved in the anti-terror coalition are benefiting from the arrangements agreed on. The overarching concern, however, is that none of these agreements have appeared to take into consideration potential implications on the development of regional terrorism.

For one, the causes of terrorism in Central Asia - poverty, unemployment, poor human rights records - have only been mentioned in passing as problems that need to be addressed. Current aid and 'gratuity' packages for Central Asian co-operation are focused on military concerns. Future economic aid packages have also been discussed between Western donors and the region, but largely in the context of seeking advantageous investment conditions for Western companies interested in developing the region's vast natural resources.

The problem which underlies the US decision to give aid to Central Asia is that it is forwarding money to governments without taking necessary precautions. In a region where corruption is widespread, the chance that aid and development funds will be misdirected and misappropriated, as they have been in the past, is very high. As a result, there are no guarantees that aid granted as a reward for co-operation in the anti-terrorism coalition will benefit the wider population. There are also indications that aid and development funds are no longer being tied to economic and political reforms or human rights.

Such a predicament will merely exacerbate social frustrations and threaten to further destabilise an environment that is already fragile. In turn this will produce an ideal breeding ground for terrorist recruits.

Following from this situation are the implications of ignoring regional human rights abuses in order to secure co-operation. Since the USA began to seek partnerships with the Central Asian governments, there have been growing perceptions among the populations that their governments are being rewarded for violently cracking down on political and religious opposition simply because such crackdowns have been cloaked in the rhetoric of counter-terrorism. For example, since 11 September, 150 Muslims in Uzbekistan have been arrested for 'political' reasons. Over the past three years over 7,000 Islamists have been incarcerated, in most cases as a result of planted evidence or trumped up charges. Despite these obvious abuses carried out by Uzbek authorities, the USA and the anti-terror coalition have voiced little concern or condemnation.

In this context of securing regional co-operation, the prospects for long-term terrorism in the region have not been curtailed. Feeding already unstable environments, current developments threaten to aggravate regional terrorist groups and suppressed political parties.

The IMU

Since 11 September, the IMU has been given more credit as a terrorist group than its activities merit. Examining its brief history, the IMU and its leader have resembled little more than a network of militants primarily motivated by economic interests. However, in its desire to secure Tashkent as a partner in the 'war against terrorism', both the USA and Uzbekistan may have driven the IMU towards fulfilling the requirements of a terrorist organisation.

Apart from conducting a few insurgencies across segments of sparsely populated border in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000, the IMU has done little more than release the odd statement indicating that its primary intention was to topple the regime of Islam Karimov and form an Islamic state in Central Asia. The group has not perpetrated any significant acts of terrorism. It was blamed for a wave of explosions in Tashkent in 1999, but the evidence has never been conclusive. In fact, there are strong indications that the Tashkent bombings were perpetrated by one of Karimov's political opponents who had ties to a powerful criminal organisation.

Since its official formation in 1999, the IMU's activities have largely focused on transporting illicit opiates from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which were ultimately destined for Russia and Europe. It also attempted to make money from taking hostages. Although successfully profiting from taking hostages during its incursions into Kyrgyzstan in 1999, the IMU failed to repeat its hostage-taking successes in 2000.

In addition to driving much of the group ethos, economic incentives have also played a large role in attracting recruits to the IMU. Evidence indicates that leader of the IMU, Juma Namangani, pays his militants between $100-$500 per month. Even if this were not true, the mere prospect of being paid would attract many followers from a region suffering deteriorating living standards. This, however, is not meant to entirely ignore any legitimate grievance that a large percentage of IMU members display. Many recruits have sought to join Namangani since 1999 because they were driven from Uzbekistan as a result of Karimov's harsh policies against any forms of Islam that are not sanctioned by the state.

Furthermore, it is important to note that Namangani has never been driven solely by Islamic ideology. Although Namangani is considered a born-again Muslim, his primary motivation for establishing the IMU appears to have been his hatred for the Karimov government. As journalist Ahmed Rashid observed, Namangani is a guerrilla leader, not an Islamic scholar.

Based on this understanding of the IMU, the group resembles a gang of guerrillas more than a group of terrorists. Despite this, the US State Department placed it on its list of foreign terrorist organisations in September 2000, shortly after the IMU took US hostages. As current developments unravel, there are indications that the IMU may finally realise the label that it has already been given.

Rumours of Namangani's death in Afghanistan came as good news to many: although not confirmed, there has been a perception that Namangani's death would signal the end of the IMU. This, unfortunately, is far from the truth.

If Namangani did perish in Afghanistan, the IMU would likely be taken over by Tohir Yuldashev. Unlike Namangani, Yuldashev is primarily driven by Islamic ideology; and of the two, Yuldashev was the one who introduced the IMU to the Taliban and the international network of Islamic militants - including Al-Qaeda.

It is believed that Yuldashev is currently hiding in Iran or Pakistan, waiting for the moment when he can regroup the IMU and initiate a campaign against those perceived as fighting Islam. His targets thus have effectively expanded from Central Asian governments to the USA. Should current social, economic and political conditions remain unchanged in Central Asia, Yuldashev will have little difficulty in recruiting a solid membership base. This will only be made easier by the fact that the IMU already has 'sleepers' throughout the region that can be called up. An IMU led by Yuldashev may become more ideological in nature and thus increasingly concerned with establishing their interpretation of Islam in Central Asia.

On the other hand, if Namangani is still alive, the IMU will probably remain focused on profiting from the illicit narcotics trade. Narcotics will remain a source of funding for the group well into foreseeable future - especially given that the IMU has lost financial support from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The impact of 11 September and the 'war against terrorism', however, will inevitably change the dynamics of the group even if it remains under the leadership of Namangani. The continued repression of fellow Muslims in Central Asia, incessant government corruption, and sustained poverty - combined with a new found hatred for the USA as a result of its actions in Afghanistan and its attempts to further penetrate Central Asia - will give the IMU a list of new motivations to fuel their activities in the region.

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Not officially regarded as a terrorist group by the Western-led coalition against terrorism or by the governments of Central Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir ('Party of Freedom') is a peaceful party seeking to establish an Islamic state in Central Asia and install a legal system based on sharia law. Not legally allowed to register in any Central Asian republic because its form of Islam deviates from the more moderate interpretations supported by the Central Asian states, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have been forced underground. As a result, the group operates in highly secretive, small independent cells.

Despite its peaceful stance, members or alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are commonly targeted by the security services of Central Asian states - especially in Uzbekistan, and increasingly in Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, continued human rights abuses directed against Hizb ut-Tahrir members and any Muslims practising outside the parameters of state-sponsored Islam is creating widespread frustration.

The fear is that groups of these individuals will sacrifice their peaceful ideology for one of militancy. There are already indications that some Hizb ut-Tahrir cells, for example, have begun to engage in the drugs trade and have sought to establish links to the IMU. If these rumours are true, it would suggest that cells are seeking lucrative sources of funding, potentially to be used for financing terrorist operations.

It is unlikely that Hizb ut-Tahrir will turn its back on the peaceful acquisition of its goals. However, there is growing evidence that cells will break off and engage in violent behaviour out of frustration, disappointment, and the knowledge that little will change in Central Asia even though the West has finally shown a greater interest in the region. In fact, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have already voiced their disapproval of regional leaders who have turned their states into 'US colonies'.

As Ahmed Rashid, writing in the New Yorker, says: "In this landscape of repression, which appears to be sanctioned and rewarded by the United States, the IMU and other radical Islamic parties seeking to end the status quo cannot help but find supporters."

Tensions exacerbated

Since 11 September there have been signs that the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir are becoming increasingly frustrated with developments in Central Asia. One of the primary causes of this frustration is anger at the governments of Central Asia for appearing to appease the USA at every turn. Most recently the concern has focused on the USA establishing bases on Central Asian territory.

Various opposition groups in Kyrgyzstan, for example, are opposed to foreign forces being given access to Kyrgyz territory at a time when the 'war against terrorism' - at least in Afghanistan - is coming to an end. Permission granted to the USA to establish a base at Manas airport is at the centre of much opposition. In addition to having to open the country up to as many as 3,000 troops, public irritation may be fuelled by the knowledge that US soldiers are immune from Kyrgyz laws, are allowed to enter and leave the country freely, and may wear uniforms and carry arms. The deal also allows for the USA to use the base at Manas for whatever operations they see fit - creating a fear that Kyrgyzstan will be used as a base of operations for future military operations in countries such as Iraq, Somalia and Saudi Arabia.

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has not placed a time limit on the USA's use of its Hanabad airbase. Karimov recently noted that: "We have no negotiations with the Americans on the question of how many years they will use Hanabad base." In part this comment indicates that Tashkent would like to see the USA remain because the US-Uzbek relationship has given Karimov's regime a degree of legitimacy in its actions at home; but the arrangement has also placed Uzbekistan in a favourable position for attaining a regional leadership role.

Senator Joseph Lieberman's statement during his trip to Central Asia on 6-7 January highlights a long-term US interest in maintaining a physical presence in the region: "Our interest in this region post 11-September is going to be permanent and, I believe, constructive both to economic development and the spread of democracy," he argued.

Unfortunately, despite statements such as these, neither the USA nor the international coalition against terrorism has indicated that it is committed to eliminating the root causes of terrorism in the region. Calls for democratisation have already been hindered by silence over regional human rights abuses, and illegitimate elections. Washington has yet to comment on Uzbek plans to hold a national referendum on extending Karimov's presidency for another two years.

Prior to finalising plans for the future, both the USA and the coalition against terrorism need to carefully consider what they are trying to accomplish in the region after their tasks in Afghanistan are completed. If Washington believes that its presence will secure future business and geo-strategic interests, for example, it must ensure that it does not compromise needs for regional democratisation.

Finally, the USA has given the states of Central Asia justification for conducting their own counter-terrorist operations. As the members of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation noted in a communiqué signed on 7 January: "We are determined to continue to work to eliminate to the maximum the terrorist threat, including terrorism within our own countries, and appeal to the international community to provide us with corresponding support."

It is this support that must be given with great caution. Anti-terrorism, contrary to what some officials in the international coalition against terrorism may believe, does not necessarily equate to a pro-US stance. Thus supporting undemocratic and oppressive regimes, intervening in domestic Central Asia policy, and establishing military bases on Central Asian territory may create more problems than it solves.

Tamara Makarenko is a Senior Associate with Cornell Caspian Consulting. She is also JIR's adviser on Systematic Transnational Crime and lectures on criminology at Glamorgan University, UK.