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To be published shortly in Eurasia Insight, www.eurasianet.org |
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A STRIKE OF GENIUS? |
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Dr. Svante E. Cornell* |
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The Azerbaijani Central Electoral
Commission’s decision to bar two main opposition parties, the Musavat
Party and the Democratic Party, from participating in the upcoming
parliamentary vote can be seen as part of a larger strategy related,
beyond the aim of securing continued control of the country by the current
ruling élite, to regime succession and Council of Europe membership.
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The opposition nevertheless learnt from its mistake, and the four major opposition parties now decided to run in the upcoming elections. Hence the amount of electoral manipulation necessary to produce a pro-regime majority in the upcoming elections would be significant. In fact, it would probably require a blatant and unambiguous adulteration of elections results. As the CE has unambiguously linked Azerbaijani membership to the conduct of the elections, the regime is fully aware that such fraud is likely to mean a rejection of its membership bid, whereas Armenia is next in line for membership. The regime has hence been facing a dilemma. Wide-scale fraud would cause irreparable damage to Azerbaijan internationally, but the alternative would be risking having a parliament controlled by the opposition. That would not immediately put the regime’s control of the country in danger, given that Azerbaijan has a strong presidential system. However, an opposition-controlled parliament would effectively ruin the prospects of Ilham Aliyev’s succession to his father. |
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President Heydar Aliyev |
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Barring two opposition parties--indeed
the two most irreconcilable ones--in retrospect seems to have been the
middle way chosen by the regime. With the Musavat Party and the Democratic
Party out of the way, the chances of achieving a pro-regime majority
increase significantly. Moreover, the two remaining large parties (the
Popular Front Party and the National Independence Party) are more amenable
to strike a power-sharing deal with the government. International
reactions to the move have been mixed, with the OSCE issuing strong
criticism but the US State Department hardly reacting at all. As a result,
the Azerbaijani regime has positioned itself strategically on two
accounts. It has significantly increased its chances of securing a
benevolent parliament, and reduced the risk of suffering a major
international setback in the process. Whereas this could be termed a
strike of genius, it does not necessarily secure the desired outcome. The
ideological differences between the four major opposition parties being
negligible, the chance of an opposition victory is still present.
Moreover, although the risk could be termed minor, the regime still runs
the risk of the CE seeing through its scheme. |
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